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This research explores the regulatory framework of living minors as tissue donors for 
transplantation purposes in England and Wales (under 18), and Scotland (under 16).  
My main argument is that this regulatory framework does not adequately protect the 
minor donor’s interests, therefore, it is in need of clarification and/or reform.  When 
answering my research questions, listed below, I use relational autonomy and a new 
principle introduced in this thesis of relational parental decision-making to examine the 
relationships the minor donor has with others.     
 
First, should non-regenerative tissue donation from living minors be permitted in 
England and Wales, and Scotland?  My contention is that non-regenerative tissue 
donation should not be permitted because the gravity of donating it and the 
irreversibility of the procedure suggests that no potential psychological benefits can 
outweigh the medical risks, psychological harm, and long-term implications. 
 
Secondly, who can and should provide consent/authorisation for living minors to be 
regenerative tissue donors?  Those with parental responsibility (PR) can and should be 
13 
 
able to provide consent/authorisation for an incompetent minor.  If a minor is 
competent, they should be able to provide consent/authorisation on their own behalf, 
and those with PR and the court should not be permitted to override this decision. 
 
Thirdly, what test(s) should be used to determine whether consent/authorisation can be 
provided for a living minor to be a tissue donor?  The best interests test should be 
reformed so the minor’s view and the harm principle are given greater weight, and the 
addition of relational parental decision-making.  The Gillick and 2(4) competence tests 
should require a minor to understand the moral, family, emotional, and long-term 
implications, as well as the consequences if they refuse the donation.  For those aged 
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This research explores the regulatory framework of living minors as tissue donors for 
transplantation purposes in England and Wales, and Scotland examining whether it 
currently protects the minor donor’s interests.  My main argument is that this regulatory 
framework does not adequately protect the minor donor’s interests, therefore, it is in 
need of clarification and/or reform.  I discuss both incompetent and competent minors 
by analysing who can and who should be able to provide consent/authorisation1 for a 
living minor to be a tissue donor.  As part of that discussion, I use the principle of 
relational autonomy2 and develop the new and novel principle of relational parental 
decision-making3 in the context of tissue donation in order to examine the relationship 
that a minor donor has with others, including the potential recipient.  Before discussing 
the medical and legal background of this research, I am going to set out its limitations 
so it is clear to the reader the scope of this research, and also establish any necessary 
definitions for clarity and consistency.   
 
1.1 Scope of Research 
1.1.1 Minors 
Minor donors are the focus of this thesis, while some of the research may be applicable 
to adults this is outside the scope of this discussion, therefore, the reader should assume 
 
1 see chapter 3 at 3.4.1 for the discussion about the definitions of the terms consent and authorisation.  
2 see chapter 2 at 2.2.1 for the discussion on relational autonomy.  See also Jocelyn Downie and Jennifer 
J Llewellyn, Being Relational: Reflections on Relational Theory and Health Law (UBC Press 2012); 
Jennifer Nedelsky, Law’s Relations: A Relational Theory or Self, Autonomy, and the Law (OUP 2013); 
Edward S Dove and others, ‘Elberte v Latvia: Whose tissue is it anyway – Relational autonomy or the 
autonomy of relations?’ (2015) 15 Medical Law International 77. 
3 see chapter 2 at 2.3 for the discussion on relational parental decision-making.   
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that all analysis is in relation to minors.  A minor is under 18 in England and Wales,4 
and under 16 in Scotland.5  I do not consider the position of 16- and 17- year olds in 
Scotland, since section 1(1)(b) of the Age of Legal Capacity (Scotland) Act 1991 states 
that ‘a person of or over the age of 16 years shall have legal capacity to enter into any 
transaction’.  Therefore, they can provide consent on their own behalf to undergo 
medical procedures.  If, however, they lack capacity, then the provisions of the Adults 
with Incapacity (Scotland) Act 2000 will apply.6 
 
I have chosen to focus my research on minors for two reasons.  First, there is a lack of 
discussion in academic literature as well as the absence of case law on the use of tissue 
from living minors.  This academic discussion and the judgments from case law would 
usually provide support to the regulatory framework by aiding its interpretation to 
ensure its application is accurate and consistent.  While this thesis is unable to 
accommodate this deficiency in case law, it aims to fill the void in the academic 
discussion.  Secondly, one of the roles of the regulatory framework for tissue donation 
from living minors is to ensure protection of the minor donor’s interests.  Therefore, it 
is imperative that the framework fulfils this role.  My examination and analysis of the 
framework will enable defects to be identified, subsequently allowing reform to be 
suggested in order to provide a framework to better protect the minor’s interests and 
prevent their potential exploitation.   
 
For the purposes of this thesis, exploitation of a minor is when their tissue is being used 
purely to benefit another without consideration of the implications, such as the physical 
 
4 Family Law Reform Act 1969, s.1(1).   
5 Age of Legal Capacity (Scotland) Act 1991, s.1 and s.9. 




harm, that it may have on the minor donor.  This interpretation of exploitation includes 
considering whether the minor is being used as a means to an end.  A minor donor could 
potentially be exploited by those with parental responsibility (PR) as if the minor is 
incompetent those with PR would be providing consent on their behalf.  Furthermore, 
a minor could also be exploited by medical professionals as they will be the individuals 
who conduct the donation procedure.  It is unlikely that the potential recipient could 
exploit the minor donor because they would not be involved in the consent process nor 
in the donation procedure.   
 
There are a number of terms that I could use to refer to those who are under 18 in 
England and Wales, and under 16 in Scotland, for example, child, infant, or young 
person.  I have chosen to use the term minor because I required a term that could be 
used for every eligible individual without inviting connotations.  The terms child and 
infant connote someone who is very young, while young person suggests a teenager.  If 
a source has used a different term other than minor, I have been true to the quotation, 
however, the reader should infer that any use of alternative terms refers to those under 
18 in England and Wales, or under 16 in Scotland, unless stated otherwise. 
 
I have distinguished between different categories of minor to facilitate the discussion 
and advance the research questions of the thesis.  First, I have separated the minors into 
two categories: incompetent and competent.  The need to distinguish between these 
categories of minor is because various individuals can provide consent/authorisation for 
the minor to be a tissue donor.  I have subsequently split competent minors into two 
further categories: under 16s, and 16- and 17- year olds.  This is because those aged 16 
and 17 in England and Wales are assumed to have capacity under the Mental Capacity 
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Act 20057, and their ability to consent to a medical procedure is governed by section 8 
of the Family Law Reform Act 1969.  By contrast, minors under 16 are governed by 
two competency tests: the Gillick8 competence test in England and Wales, and in 
Scotland the competence test under section 2(4) of the Age of Legal Capacity (Scotland) 
Act 1991.   
 
1.1.1.1  Living Minors  
This thesis concentrates on living donation, rather than deceased donation.  This means 
that the donor is alive during and post-donation.  I have chosen to focus my research on 
living donation for two reasons.  First, there is a lack of discussion amongst policy-
makers about donation from living minors.  Since the Human Tissue Act 2004 and the 
Human Tissue (Scotland) Act 2006, that govern the use of human tissue in England and 
Wales, and Scotland respectively, were enacted there has been an upheaval of the 
deceased donation systems from an opt-in to an opt-out system.  Consequently, 
Parliament enacted the Human Transplantation (Wales) Act 2013 to regulate Wales, the 
Human Tissue (Authorisation) (Scotland) Act 20199 to regulate Scotland, and the Organ 
Donation (Deemed Consent) Act 2019 to regulate England.10  There has, however, been 
 
7 Mental Capacity Act 2005, s.1(2). 
8 Gillick v West Norfolk and Wisbech Area Health Authority [1985] 3 All ER 402. 
9 This legislation is in force from March 2021, see NHS Blood and Transplant, ‘Organ and tissue donation 
law in Scotland’ <https://www.organdonation.nhs.uk/uk-laws/organ-donation-law-in-scotland/> 
accessed 28/08/2020.  
10This legislation governs deceased donations from adults not minors.  See also James F Douglas and 
Antonia J Cronin, ‘The Human Transplantation (Wales) Act 2013: An Act of Encouragement, not 
Enforcement’ (2015) 78(2) Modern Law Review 324; Jane Noyes and others, ‘Family attitudes, actions, 
decisions and experiences following implementation of deemed consent and the Human Transplantation 
(Wales) Act 2013: Mixed-method study protocol’ (2017) 7(10) BMJ E017287; Nicholas Page, Gary 
Higgs, Mitchel Langford, ‘An exploratory analysis of spatial variations in organ donation registration 
rates in Wales prior to the implementation of the Human Transplantation (Wales) Act 2013’ (2018) 52 
Health and Place 18; Sarah Jane R Brown, ‘Organ donor registration in the UK: The need for informed 
consent for ante-mortem interventions to facilitate organ donation’ (2019) 19(2-3) Medical Law 
International 113; David M Shaw, ‘The side effects of deemed consent: Changing defaults in organ 
donation’ (2019) 45(7) Journal of Medical Ethics 435; Jessica M. Pieri and Neil H Metcalfe, ‘The Organ 
Donation (Deemed Consent) Act 2019’ (2020) 13(4) InnovAiT 242. 
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no change in the law of donation from living minors, but this does not necessarily mean 
that this law is ideal or free from defect.   
 
Secondly, the advancements in the medicine of living donation means that the 
regulatory framework needs to be adapted and developed in order to sufficiently 
regulate these advancements.11  NHS Blood and Transplant (NHSBT)12 launched their 
strategy in 2020 in relation to Living Donor Kidney Transplantation, with their strategy 
aim ‘to match world class performance in living donor kidney transplantation.’13  This 
means that NHSBT aim to develop the medicine of kidney donation from living 
individuals to be at a world-class level as NHSBT recognise the importance of living 
donation: 
 
Living donation plays a vital role in saving and improving lives.  Its unique contribution 
to the organ donor pool offers more patients the possibility of a successful transplant 
whilst adding to the overall supply of available organs for those who are waiting.14 
 
This aim is supported by three key objectives: 
 
1. To increase living donor kidney transplantation activity for both adult and 
paediatric recipients, ensuring that donor safety and welfare is consistently 
sustained through best clinical practice. 
 
 
11 see chapter 1 at 1.2.1; NHS, ‘History of Donation’ (NHS Choices, 2015) 
<www.nhs.uk/tools/documents/transplant.htm> accessed 01/05/2017. 
12 NHSBT manage NHS blood donation services in England and transplant services across the UK; NHS 
Blood and Transplant, ‘Discover what we do’ <https://www.nhsbt.nhs.uk/> accessed 18/06/2020.  
13 NHS Blood and Transplant, Living Donor Kidney Transplantation 2020: A UK Strategy (2020). 
14 ibid, 3. 
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2. To maximise patient benefit by ensuring that all suitable recipients have equity 
of access to living donor kidney transplantation and that the principle of 
‘transplant first’15 is embedded in best clinical practice across the UK. 
 
3. To maximise the opportunities for suitable donors and recipients to contribute 
to and benefit from the shared living donor pool by ensuring that the National 
Living Donor Kidney Sharing Schemes are both clinically and cost-effective.16 
 
This strategy emphasises the aim of NHSBT to increase donation from living minors.  
This demonstrates that they recognise the importance of the role of minor donors as 
they contribute to the tissue shortage by providing life-prolonging or life-saving tissue 
to a minor recipient.  This continuing advancement in medicine by NHSBT allows more 
patients and their families to benefit from the donation by living minors as it will be 
possible to offer transplants to patients with complex needs who might not otherwise 
receive a transplant.  If more living minors are able to donate tissue then the Human 
Tissue Authority (HTA)17 will have to alter their stance, which currently states that 
living minors are only considered as donors in rare circumstances.18  But regardless of 
the number of donations that occur, as donation medicine advances the ongoing 
assessment of its regulatory framework is imperative to ensure that the donor’s interests 





15 Includes pre-emptive transplantation for patients not on dialysis and minimise waiting time for 
transplantation for patients already on dialysis.   
16 NHSBT (n 13), 3. 
17 see chapter 1 at 1.2.3 for explanation of the role of the Human Tissue Authority.  
18 Human Tissue Authority, Code of Practice F: Donation of solid organs and tissue for transplantation 
(2017) para 44. 
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1.1.2 What is tissue? 
Although legal and medical literature, and the HTA use both of the terms organ and 
tissue, in this thesis I have made a conscious choice to only use the term tissue.  There 
are two reasons for this decision.  First, the term tissue can include all types of material 
removed from a living human body,19 while the term organ only includes a collection 
of tissue such as a solid organ.20  My discussion examines different types of material 
that can all be covered by the use of the term tissue.   
 
Secondly, a distinction is made between regenerative tissue donation and non-
regenerative tissue donation by the HTA and in the regulatory framework, and I draw 
on this distinction to further my research questions.  Therefore, it would seem apt to use 
the terms regenerative tissue and non-regenerative tissue for clarity and consistency.  In 
England and Wales, the regulation does not contain this distinction because a minor can 
donate both regenerative and non-regenerative tissue, but in Scotland this distinction is 
made because minors are not permitted to donate non-regenerative tissue.21  As a result 
of this distinction, a definition is required to determine the types of donations that are 
permitted.  Subsequently, the discussion below about the distinction between 
regenerative and non-regenerative tissue and the definitions provided is only applicable 
to Scotland, but as the HTA also regulate the use of human tissue in England and Wales 
it would follow that if they were required to make this distinction in England and Wales, 
they would make the same distinction and use the same definitions.          
 
 
19 Britannica, ‘Tissue’ <https://www.britannica.com/science/tissue> accessed 27/09/2020. 
20 Britannica, ‘Organ’ <https://www.britannica.com/science/organ-biology> accessed 27/09/2020. 
21 Human Tissue (Scotland) Act 2006, s.17(4) at Appendix 1; Human Tissue Authority, Human Tissue 
(Scotland) Act 2006: A guide to its implications for NHS Scotland (2006) para 23. 
23 
 
A living minor can donate: blood, bone marrow, a kidney, a lobe of liver, a lobe of lung, 
a portion of intestine, and a segment of pancreas.22  However, the most commonly 
donated types of tissue are the first four listed, therefore, in this thesis I will only 
consider these.23  If a lobe of lung, a portion of intestine, or a segment of pancreas 
donation become more common then it is my contention that as these are all types of 
non-regenerative tissue donation the same argument should be adopted as to other non-
regenerative tissue.24  Section 17(10) of the Human Tissue Act 2006 defines 
regenerative tissue as tissue which is ‘able to be replaced in the body of a living person 
by natural processes if the tissue is injured or removed’.25  This would indicate that 
regenerative tissue includes: blood, bone marrow and a lobe of liver.  There is no 
explicit definition as to what is defined as non-regenerative tissue, but it is likely that it 
would include a kidney.  However, Parliamentary debate about the 2006 Bill implies 
that a lobe of liver is to be considered non-regenerative tissue rather than regenerative 
tissue.26  While this debate is not legally binding, it can be used to aid interpretation of 
the statute and understand the intention of Parliament when passing the Bill.  Even after 
I had consulted the Parliamentary debate it was still unclear as to the classification of a 
lobe of liver donation, therefore, I contacted Organ Donation Scotland and they have 
provided some clarification: 
 
 
22 NHS Blood and Transplant, ‘Become a living donor’ <https://www.organdonation.nhs.uk/become-a-
living-donor/> accessed 15/09/2020. 
23 see chapter 1 at 1.2.4 in Table 1 ad Table 2 for statistics on tissue donation rates.  
24 see chapter 4.  The donation of reproductive material from a living minor is outside the scope of this 
thesis.  See Nicola J Williams, Rosamund Scott and Stephen D Wilkinson, ‘The Ethics of Uterus 
Transplantation’ (2018) 32(8) Bioethics 478; Benjamin P Jones, Amel Alghrani and J Richard Smith, 
‘Re: Uterine Transplantation in transgender women: medical, legal and ethical considerations’ (2019) 
126(4) BJOG: An International Journal of Obstetrics and Gynaecology 545; Laura O’Donovan, Nicola J 
Williams and Stephen D Wilkinson, ‘Ethical and Policy Issues Raised by Uterus Transplant’ (2019) 131 
British Medical Bulletin 19.  
25 see Appendix 1. 
26 Scottish Parliament, ‘Official Report’ (30 November 2005) 
<http://www.parliament.scot/parliamentarybusiness/report.aspx?r=4617&i=35916> accessed 
15/03/2019.   
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I appreciate that the definition of tissue in the Act is not that clear (and there’s no 
definition of what’s a solid organ), but it is generally understood that donation of the 
liver lobe would count as organ (rather than regenerative tissue) donation and therefore, 
in relation to living donation, can only be donated by an adult.  Given this is a procedure 
which can put the donor at significant risk, it’s hard to envisage circumstances where 
clinicians would feel it was appropriate for a living child to donate part of their liver.27 
 
Furthermore, I contacted the HTA in order to gain their perspective, and they reiterated 
what Organ Donation Scotland said by stating that: 
 
Although the liver can regenerate, liver lobe donation is considered to fall within solid 
organ donation, rather than tissue donation. We therefore would consider applications 
for living liver lobe donation only from adults with capacity in Scotland.28 
 
Subsequently, this guidance provided by Organ Donation Scotland and the HTA 
contradicts the definition set out in the 2006 Act.  Therefore, it is unclear as to the 
classification of a lobe of liver donation in law.  Clarification in statute or professional 
guidance as to the classification of lobe of liver is required.  In this thesis, I have chosen 
to class lobe of liver donation as non-regenerative tissue donation following the advice 
by Organ Donation Scotland and the HTA.  But I note that this is considered differently 
by medical professionals.29 
 
There is further type of tissue donation called a domino donation, and it is defined under 
section 17(10) of the 2006 Act as:  
 
 
27 Email from Organ Donation Scotland to author (29 January 2018). 
28 Email from Human Tissue Authority to author (08 February 2018). 




“domino organ transplant operation” means a transplant operation performed 
on a living person by a registered medical practitioner— 
(a)  which is designed to safeguard or promote the physical health of the 
person by transplanting organs or parts of organs into the person; and 
(b)  by so doing, necessitates the removal of an organ or part of an organ 
from the person which in turn is intended to be used for transplantation 
in respect of another living person.30 
 
For this type of donation, the donor does not undergo the operation for the primary 
purpose of donating tissue.  The primary purpose of the operation is to undergo medical 
treatment.  An individual who undergoes a domino donation is usually someone who 
suffers from cystic fibrosis.31  Those suffering from cystic fibrosis are sometimes 
required to have a lung transplant, but there is a better clinical outcome if they receive 
both a heart and lung transplant together.  Therefore, the removal of their healthy heart 
may prove suitable for transplant into another recipient.  While there is discussion of 
this type of donation within the regulatory framework for completeness,32 the reforms 
that I propose to the framework are not designed to be applicable to domino donations.  
The donation of the heart is merely a by-product of the medical treatment rather than 
the primary reason for undergoing the operation.  Therefore, there is no concern over 
the donor’s interests or their potential exploitation since they would have to undergo 





30 see Appendix 1. 
31 NHS, ‘Cystic Fibrosis’ <https://www.nhs.uk/conditions/cystic-fibrosis/> accessed 18/06/2020. 




A donation and transplantation process involves two individuals: the donor, and the 
recipient.  The focus of this thesis is on the donor within the donation process.  The 
donation process is the whole procedure from the start when histocompatibility is 
determined to find a suitable donor up to and including the post-operative care following 
the donation operation.  The reasoning for focusing on the donor in this thesis is twofold.  
First, as tissue donation from a living individual is not curative or prophylactic, but 
medically harms the donor, it is paramount that the donor’s interests are protected to 
prevent their exploitation.  Secondly, the focus within the donation process from a 
medical perspective is usually on the recipient as they are the individual who is ill and 
is in need of the tissue in order for their life to be prolonged or saved.  Once the donor 
has donated the tissue their role in the process ends, and yet they play the most important 
role in the process as it is they who provided the life-prolonging or life-saving tissue.  
 
The donor and the recipient are separate individuals with their own needs and interests, 
however, in the past the importance of the donor’s role and the need to consider the 
donor as a separate individual was seen to be somewhat overlooked.  In the 1960s, when 
tissue donation was a new and novel medical procedure, the donor was not seen as an 
individual with their own medical needs separate from the recipient, but were 
considered to be part of the medical team whose purpose was to help the recipient:   
 
The donor … asked a very pointed question: would the doctors at the Peter Bent 
Brigham Hospital be willing to take care of him medically for the rest of his life if he 
gave his kidney?  We stated that we neither could nor desired to make a guarantee of 
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that sort; we were there to help his brother and if he (the prospective donor) could help 
his brother, we felt that the chances of success were quite good.33 
 
Attitudes have since changed, and the donor is now treated as a separate individual with 
their own healthcare team and their own healthcare needs.  The health and wellbeing of 
the donor is and should be as important as the health and wellbeing of the recipient.  In 
the majority of instances when a medical procedure is required the individual 
undergoing the procedure is the individual in need of treatment for their illness, 
however, in the case of a tissue donation for a donor this is not true.  The donor 
undergoes a medical procedure exposing themselves to medical risks in order to donate 
tissue to another individual.  The operation does not medically benefit them in any way, 
in fact, it medically harms them, often temporarily, but there is a risk this damage could 
be permanent.  Therefore, one of the roles of the regulatory framework is to ensure that 
safeguards are in place to protect the donor’s interests and prevent their exploitation.  
So far, I have stated that this thesis is only considering living minor donors, and I now 
discuss why this is further limited to only sibling to sibling donations.      
 
1.1.3.1  Siblings 
The regulatory framework does not put restrictions on who a minor is able to donate 
tissue to, however, this thesis will only consider sibling to sibling donation.  The reason 
for restricting the scope of the thesis is because it is unlikely that the HTA or the court 
would permit a living minor to donate tissue to anyone other than their sibling.  As I 
will argue in Chapter 4, the donor should develop a psychological benefit from donating 
tissue and this is only likely to occur with sibling to sibling donations.  But it is noted 
 
33 GEW Wolstenholme and Maeve O’Connor (eds), Ethics in Medical Progress: with special reference 
to transplantation (Little, Brown and Company 1966) 17-18. 
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that in certain circumstances depending on the dynamics of a particular relationship, a 
psychological benefit could stem from donating tissue to another family member.  If a 
potential psychological benefit could be identified between a minor and another family, 
and if all of the requirements are met then the HTA or court may permit the donation to 
proceed.  However, this discussion is outside the scope of this thesis.   
 
A minor recipient could receive tissue from four potential donors: living adult, deceased 
adult, living minor, or deceased minor.  But, the HTA have stated that ‘children can be 
considered as living organ donors only in extremely rare circumstances.’34  If, as the 
HTA have stated, donation from a living minor is rare then a minor recipient must more 
commonly receive tissue from the other three potential sources.  But, the HTA do not 
state that living donors are never used as tissue donors, only in rare circumstances.  This 
means that there are circumstances when tissue from a living minor donor is in fact 
used.  This most commonly occurs when tissue from an adult or a deceased minor is not 
sufficient to meet the clinical needs of the recipient.  For example, the donor has to be 
histocompatible with the recipient as tissue matching is required for the donation to be 
successful, also tissue from adults can be too large for a minor, especially in relation to 
the donation of a kidney or a lobe of liver.35  Subsequently, a donor who is likely to be 
histocompatible is that of a sibling of a potential recipient, and as they are likely to both 
be minors the tissue is also likely to be a more suitable size for transplantation, therefore, 
it would follow that sibling to sibling donations are medically ideal.  While it is possible 
 
34 Human Tissue Authority, Code of Practice F: Donation of solid organs and tissue for transplantation 
(2017) para 44.   
35 Orlando Health ‘How Organ Size Affects the Organ Donation Process’ 
<https://www.orlandohealth.com/content-hub/how-organ-size-affects-the-organ-donation-process> 
accessed 16/09/2020.   
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that the HTA or the court could permit a non-sibling minor to donate tissue in extremely 
rare circumstances there is no record that such permission has ever been provided.   
 
In order to be able to successfully restrict the discussion in this thesis by only 
considering siblings, I need to provide a definitive category of who is considered to be 
a ‘sibling’.  As a family may no longer be historically traditional ie a mother, a father, 
and a biological child(ren), there are many types of individuals who could be considered 
a ‘sibling’.  There is academic discussion on the sociological aspects of sibling 
relationships, however, this is outside the scope of this thesis.36  The definition of sibling 
that I am in principle using for the purposes of this thesis is that provided by the 
Encyclopaedia of Human Relationships: ‘a sibling relationship is a relationship one has 
with a sister or brother who have one or both parents in common’.37  Therefore, my 
adaptation of this definition for the purpose of this thesis is that the donor and the 
recipient must share one or more biological parents.38   
 
Also, for the purposes of this thesis, the sibling donor has not been conceived for the 
purposes of being histocompatible with their sick sibling in order to donate tissue.  The 
potential minor donor is likely to have already been born when the sibling recipient is 
diagnosed with their illness.  Conceiving a minor for the purposes of donating their 
tissue raises ethical and philosophical debate, and these minors are referred to as a 
 
36 see Julia Brannen, Ellen Heptinstall, and Kalwant Bhopal, Connecting Children: Care and Family Life 
in Later Childhood (Routledge, 2000); Rosalind Edwards, Melanie Mauthner, and Lucy Hadfield, 
‘Children’s sibling relationships and gendered practices: Talk, activity and dealing with change’ (2005) 
17(5) Gender and Education 499; Rosalind Edwards and others, Sibling Identity and Relationships: 
Sisters and Brothers (Routledge, 2006); Katherine Davies, ‘Siblings, Stories and Self: The Sociological 
Significance of Young People’s Sibling Relationships’ (2014) 49 Sociology 679. 
37 Harry T Reis and Susan Sprecher, ‘Sibling Relationships’, Encyclopaedia of Human Relationships 
(2009). 
38 Even if a donor and recipient share both parents this does not guarantee that they are histocompatible.  
But regardless of what the regulatory framework states, if the donor and the recipient are not 
histocompatible then the donation would not take place.   
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saviour sibling.  Discussion on whether such activities are or should be permissible is 
outside the scope of this thesis as they consider other areas of law such as abortion and 
focus less on the donation process but on whether a minor should be born purely for 
this purpose.39  Also, this type of discussion would not include competent minors since 
a saviour sibling would usually donate shortly after they were born as a transplant for 
the recipient would likely be needed quickly.   
 
1.1.4 Jurisdiction 
The focus of this thesis will be in two legal jurisdictions: England and Wales, and 
Scotland.  I have chosen not to include Northern Ireland in the discussion for two 
reasons.  First, the law on tissue donation is the same as that in England and Wales, 
therefore, it would not add anything to the discussion on the regulatory framework of 
tissue donation.  Secondly, the law of Northern Ireland compared to the law in England 
and Wales, and Scotland is different with regard to the law of capacity.  As this thesis 
focuses on the competency tests for competent minors, consent, and authorisation, not 
on the law of capacity, the inclusion of Northern Ireland would not have provided a 
comparative element nor added anything novel to my approach.  Therefore, it would 





39 see Quintavalle v Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority [2005] UKHL 28; Roger 
Brownsword, ‘Happy Families, Consenting Couples, and Children with Dignity: Sex Selection and 
Saviour Siblings’ (2005) 17 Child Family Law Quarterly 1; Then Shih-Ning, ‘The Legality of Tissue 
Transplants for the Benefit of Family Members in the UK and Australia: Implications for Saviour 
Siblings’ (2009) Medical Law International 10; Lisa Cherkassky, ‘The Human Tissue Authority and 
Saviour Siblings’ (2015) Journal of Bone Marrow Research 3; Lisa Cherkassky, ‘The Wrong Harvest: 
The Law on Saviour Siblings’ (2015) International Journal of Law, Policy and the Family 29. 
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1.2 Background Information 
I have now outlined the scope of the research and its limitations concluding that this 
thesis focuses on living minors as tissue donors for transplantation purposes to a sibling 
within England and Wales, and Scotland.  My discussion will now consider the medical 
and legal background of tissue donation in order to provide context to the subsequent 
analysis of the regulatory framework.      
 
1.2.1 Medical 
The ability for a medical professional to remove tissue from one living individual and 
transplant it into another, to save or prolong the recipient’s life, is a progressive area of 
medicine.40  Tissue donation from a living donor for transplantation purposes is now a 
common procedure, but this type of medicine has continually progressed since the first 
cornea transplant in the Czech Republic in 1905.41  The idea of donation and 
transplantation of body parts is not a new one as it stems back to science fiction with 
the innovative ideas of authors such as Mary Shelley who wrote Frankenstein in 1818.42  
Blood donation was the first commonly occurring type of tissue donation with the UK’s 
first blood bank set up in 1937.43  In 1960, the first successful kidney donation operation 
was performed in the UK from a living donor.44  Following this, the first liver donation 
was performed in the UK in 1968 from a deceased donor with the first liver donation 
 
40 NHS Blood and Transplant, ‘A history of donation, transfusion and transplantation’ 
<https://www.nhsbt.nhs.uk/who-we-are/a-history-of-donation-transfusion-and-transplantation/> 
accessed 08/04/2020.   
41 ibid. 
42 Mary Shelley, Frankenstein (Lackington 1818). 
43 NHS Blood and Transplant (n 40). 




from a living individual occurring in 1995.45  The first bone marrow donation occurred 
in the UK in 1986.46 
 
1.2.2 Legal 
The law has been reactive to changes in tissue donation medicine.  The use of tissue 
from deceased individuals was first regulated by the Anatomy Act 1832.  The 1832 Act 
allowed an individual to make a declaration donating their body after their death for the 
purposes of medical science.  The Act put a stop to body-snatching by the 
‘resurrectionists’, such as the infamous William Burke and William Hare.47  The next 
legal development was the enactment of the Human Tissue Act 196148 which was 
introduced because the common law relating to the legitimate uses of the corpse for 
donation for transplantation purposes at this time was vague and advances in medicine 
needed to be legally regulated so individuals would not be exploited.49  It also provided 
recognition of the pace of new medical technologies in transplantation as it coincided 
with medical advances in tissue donation from deceased individuals in the UK.50  As 
donation medicine at this time was mostly restricted to deceased donors, the Act only 




46 King’s College Hospital, ‘Hospital which pioneered bone marrow transplants celebrates 1000 th 
procedure’ <https://www.kch.nhs.uk/news/media/press-
releases/view/7916#:~:text=Prof%20Ghulam%20Mufti%2C%20Professor%20of,transplant%20centre
%20in%20the%20UK.> accessed 20/08/2020.   
47 Royal College of Surgeons, ‘Human Dissection’ <www.rcseng.ac.uk›rcs›human-dissection-factsheet> 
accessed 18/06/2020.   
48 as amended by the Anatomy Act 1984 and the Corneal Tissue Act 1986. 
49 Gerald Dworkin, ‘The Law Relating to Organ Transplantation in England’ (1970) 33(4) Modern Law 
Review 353. 
50 NHS Blood and Transplant (n 40).  
51 Human Tissue Act 1961, Introductory Text. 
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The 1961 Act allowed a person, orally or in writing, to ‘request that his body or any 
specified part of his body be used after his death for therapeutic purposes or for medical 
purposes of medical education or research.’52  The Act also provided that the person 
lawfully in possession of the body (often the hospital)53 may authorise removal of body 
parts for the purposes of medical education or research.54  This was on the pretence of 
the person having ‘made such reasonable inquiry as may be practicable’, so he has no 
reason to believe that the deceased had expressed objections to such a process, or that 
‘the surviving spouse or any surviving relative of the deceased objects to the body being 
so dealt with.’55  This implied that the requisite consent for the removal of organs and 
tissue for scientific or medical use was provided by the hospital,56 rather than from the 
deceased individual. 
 
The 1961 Act did not contain an explicit provision that allowed the use of tissue from 
living individuals for any purpose, including transplantation purposes.57  The first 
legislation that covered donation from living donors was the Human Organ Transplants 
Act 1989.  This was enacted as a result of a medical scandal involving Dr Raymond 
Crockett.  During the 1980s, it became publicly known that individuals were being 
flown to the UK and paid for one of their kidneys, which was transplanted into a 
recipient in a private hospital, through the National Kidney Centre, a private agency 
under the medical directorship of Dr Raymond Crockett.58  The General Medical 
 
52 Human Tissue Act 1961, s.1(1). 
53 The hospital would be in possession of the body because the individual would have died in hospital 
and the body would be stored in the mortuary until it was released for burial or cremation. 
54 Human Tissue Act 1961, s.1(2). 
55 Human Tissue Act 1961, s.1(2)(a) and (b). 
56 Margaret Brazier, ‘Organ retention and return: problems of consent’ (2003) 29 Journal of Medical 
Ethics 30, 31. 
57 David Price, ‘From Cosmos and Damien to Van Velzen: the Human Tissue Saga Continues’ (2003) 
11(1) Medical Law Review 1, 20 
58 HL Deb 19 July 1989 vol 510 cc 842-58; Marc Stauch and Kay Wheat with John Tingle, Sourcebook 
on Medical Law (Cavendish 1998) 590. 
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Council (GMC) conducted an inquiry into Dr Crockett’s involvement,59 and concluded 
that he was guilty of serious professional misconduct, and ordered that his name was 
erased from the medical register.60  At the time, there was no legislation, common law, 
or professional guidance permitting or prohibiting the removal or use of tissue from 
living donors.61  Regulation was required if such a procedure was to proceed with no 
risk of exploitation of the donor.  Consequently, legislation on the use of tissue from 
living donors for transplantation purposes was enacted in England and Wales, and 
Scotland, namely the 1989 Act. 
 
The 1989 Act was enacted in order to deal specifically with the problems that had arisen 
following the kidney sale scandal, namely the exploitation of individuals through the 
sale of their organs, and the lack of legislation regulating tissue donation from living 
donors for transplantation purposes.62  It appeared to be a knee-jerk response to the Dr 
Raymond Crockett scandal, and as a result the reasoning underpinning the 1989 Act 
suffered from an irrational basis.63  The 1989 Act was repealed and the legislation that 
replaced it was the Human Tissue Act 2004, and the Human Tissue (Scotland) Act 2006.  
These Acts were introduced when it became publicly known that minors’ organs and 
tissue were being retained by hospitals and similar institutions without the knowledge 
 
59  Janet Radcliffe Richards, ‘Nepharious goings on.  Kidney sales and moral arguments’ (1996) 21 
Journal of Medical Philosophy 375; S Choudry and others, ‘Unrelated living organ donation: ULTRA 
needs to go’ (2003) 29 Journal of Medical Ethics 169. 
60 Bob Brecher, ‘The kidney trade: or, the customer is always wrong’ (1990) 16 Journal of Medical Ethics 
120, 123. 
61 see Dworkin (n 49) for the argument that the 1961 Act does in fact cover tissue donation from living 
individuals. 
62 Hansard (n 58). 
63 Choudry (n 59) 170; British Medical Association, Organ donation in the 21st century: time for a 
consolidated approach (BMA 2000) 12.  See also while genetically related donation was expressly 
permitted, donation between non-genetically related individuals was not permitted unless certain criteria 
were satisfied.  The reason for restricting the transplantation of organs between individuals who are not 
genetically related, was to ensure that tissue donation was not coerced. 
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or consent of their relatives.64  This was known as the organ retention scandals and is 
further discussed in Chapter 3 along with the 2004 and 2006 Acts.65  Tissue donation 
from living minors under the 2004 and 2006 Acts is currently regulated by the HTA.66    
 
1.2.3  Human Tissue Authority  
The HTA are a non-departmental public body of the Department of Health and Social 
Care, established to ensure that human tissue is used ‘safely and ethically, and with 
proper consent.’67  They regulate organisations that remove, store and use human tissue 
for research, medical treatment, post-mortem examination, education and training, and 
display in public.  They also give approval for tissue and bone marrow donations from 
living individuals.  The HTA have published a number of codes of practice in England 
and Wales,68 as well as specific guidance for transplant teams, Independent Assessors 
(IAs)69, and Accredited Assessors (AAs)70 in Scotland.  These codes of practice and 
supplementary guidance do not carry the same legal weight as legislation or 
 
64 Bristol Royal Infirmary, The Report of the Public Inquiry into Children’s Heart Surgery at the Bristol 
Royal Infirmary 1984-1995: Learning from Bristol (Cm 5207(I), 2001) (Kennedy Inquiry).   
65 at 3.2. 
66 Human Tissue Authority, Human Tissue (Scotland) Act 2006: A guide to its implications for NHS 
Scotland (2006) para 21; Human Tissue Authority, Code of Practice A: Guiding Principles and the 
Fundamental Principle of Consent (2017) Annex A para 1; The remit of the HTA does not extend to 
Scotland, instead the regulation is performed by the Scottish Ministers.  However, an arrangement was 
entered into by the Scottish Ministers and the HTA so that the HTA is responsible for assessing 
applications on behalf of the Scottish Ministers; Human Tissue Authority, Guidance for Transplant 
Teams, Independent Assessors, and Accredited Assessors in Scotland (2017) para 1. 
67 Human Tissue Authority, ‘About us’ < https://www.hta.gov.uk/about-us> accessed 18/06/2020. 
68 Human Tissue Authority, HTA Codes of Practice and Standards <https://www.hta.gov.uk/hta-codes-
practice-and-standards-0> accessed 08/02/2019; Human Tissue Authority, Code of Practice A (n 66) para 
5. 
69 IAs act as a representative of the HTA to ensure the requirements of the 2004 Act and associated 
Regulations are met in all cases of living organ donation; Human Tissue Authority, About Independent 
Assessors <https://www.hta.gov.uk/about-independent-assessors-ias> accessed 02/02/3019.  
70 AAs assess potential bone marrow and PBSC donations from adults who lack capacity and minors who 
lack competence to consent. AAs act as a representative for the donor and the HTA; Human Tissue 




jurisprudence and there are no formal sanctions should the codes of practice not be 
followed in respect of tissue donation.71   
 
1.2.4 Donation Rate Statistics   
While donation from living minors forms a small part of the total number of donations 
undertaken each year, they form a vital part of that total.  The following statistics 
illustrate this point.  Currently, there is a shortage of tissue in England and Wales, and 
Scotland.72  There are currently 4,220 people waiting for a transplant in the UK.73 
 
The following tables are the statistics that are provided by NHSBT in relation to 
donation procedures.  Table 1 provides information about the number of living donors 










71 Human Tissue Act 2004, s.28. 
72 The change in law to a system of ‘opt out’ in relation to deceased donation in Wales with the 
introduction of the Human Transplantation (Wales) Act 2013, in England with the introduction of the 
Organ Donation (Deemed Consent) Act 2019, and in Scotland with the introduction of the Human Tissue 
(Authorisation) (Scotland) Act 2019 may reduce the organ shortage.  However, discussion of this is 
outside the scope of the thesis.   
73 NHS Blood and Transplant, ‘Statistics about organ donation’ <www.organdonation.nhs.uk/statistics/> 
accessed 30/08/2020.  NHSBT have stated that current waiting list figures do not accurately reflect the 
need for an organ transplant due to the COVID-19 pandemic.  This is the waiting list for the UK as there 
are no separate statistics for England, Wales, and Scotland.      
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Table 2 provides the most up-to-date statistics about the number of blood donations that 
have occurred in the UK.  It does not provide separate statistics for adults and minors.  
But as NHSBT recommend that regular donors are aged between 17 and 66,75 and only 
in exceptional circumstances, such as a rare blood group a minor may be required to 
donate blood to a sibling, these statistics will consist predominantly, if not solely, of 
adult donors.  The statistics are not separated into England, Wales, and Scotland.  
   
 
74 NHS Blood and Transplant (n 73); statistics correct as of 17/06/2020.  NHSBT have stated that it is 
unclear how COVID-19 has impacted donation rates.   
75 or 70 if they have given blood before; NHS Blood and Transplant, ‘Who can give blood’ < 
https://www.blood.co.uk/who-can-give-blood/> accessed 15/07/2018. 
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Table 2: Blood Donation Rates (Adults and Minors)76 
 2016/2017 2017/2018 2018/2019 2019/202077 
United Kingdom 853,469 822,517 829,867 807,805 
 
NHSBT does not publish statistics on bone marrow donation rates in the UK.78  But it 
is reported by Anthony Nolan79 that currently in 2019-2020 they have ‘helped’ 1,109 
patients.80  This involves Anthony Nolan using their donation register to match potential 
bone marrow donors with patients who are suffering with blood cancer.81 
 
While it is unclear in the statistics how many donors are minors, it is clear that tissue 
donation from living individuals form a vital source of tissue for potential recipients.  
Even though donations from living minors occur, there is a considerable lack of case 
law in this area, and the judgment from the recent case of A NHS Foundation Trust v 
MC (by her Litigation Friend the Official Solicitor) demonstrates the lack of judicial 





76 NHS Blood and Transplant, ‘Number of registrations by financial year’ 
<https://www.nhsbt.nhs.uk/how-you-can-help/get-involved/share-statistics/blood-donation-statistics/> 
accessed 30/08/2020.   
77 This is up-to-date as of 30/08/2020.   
78 NHS Blood and Transplant, ‘The British Bone Marrow Registry’ <https://www.bbmr.co.uk/> accessed 
18/06/2020.  
79 Anthony Nolan, ‘Facts and Stats’ <https://www.anthonynolan.org/facts-and-stats> accessed 
18/06/2020; Anthony Nolan is a pioneering charity that saves the lives of people with blood cancer. Every 
day, they use their register to match remarkable individuals willing to donate their bone marrow or blood 
stem cells to people who desperately need lifesaving transplants. 
80 Anthony Nolan, ‘State of the Registry 2019-2020’ 
<https://www.anthonynolan.org/sites/default/files/2266ST_StateOfTheRegistry_1920_v6.pdf> 
accessed 30/08/2020; these statistics are not split into adults and minors.   
81 ibid. 
82 [2020] EWCOP 33 [5]. 
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1.2.5 Case Law on Living Minors as Tissue Donors 
At the time of writing, there has been no court decisions as to whether a living minor 
can donate tissue.  There are, however, two decisions about the donation of tissue from 
adults who lack capacity: Re Y (adult patient)(bone marrow transplant)83 and A NHS 
Foundation Trust v MC (by her Litigation Friend the Official Solicitor)84.  While neither 
of these decisions would be binding on any future case law with regard to living minors 
as tissue donors, they may be used to provide guidance in this area.    
 
Re Y (adult patient)(bone marrow transplant)85 concerned whether an adult who lacked 
capacity could legally donate bone marrow to their sibling.  Connell J held that it was 
in Y’s best interests to donate bone marrow to her sibling, and he stated that ‘it is 
doubtful that this case would act as a useful precedent in cases where the surgery 
involved is more intrusive than in this case.’86  It should be noted that this case is from 
1997, therefore, the 2004 Act and 2006 Act, that currently regulate tissue donation, were 
not in force.  Furthermore, the HTA did not have the same role in the donation process.   
 
A NHS Foundation Trust v MC (by her Litigation Friend the Official Solicitor)87 also 
concerned whether an adult who lacked capacity could donate bone marrow, but this 
was a donation to her mother.88  Cohen J stated that: 
 
This is the first time that an application for the extraction of bone marrow or stem cell 
donation by someone lacking capacity has come before the Court of Protection and the 
 
83 [1997] 2 WLR 556. 
84 MC (n 82). 
85 Re Y (n 83). 
86 Re Y (n 83) 562.  See also SE Mumford, ‘Donation without consent?  Legal Developments in Bone 
Marrow Transplantation’ (1998) 101 British Journal of Haematology 599.  
87 MC (n 82). 
88 MC (n 82) [1] – [2]. 
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first time the Human Tissue Authority (HTA) has been involved in a case of this 
nature.89 
 
While this case involved an adult who lacked capacity, Cohen J noted that ‘apparently, 
there are about 65 individuals each year under the age of 18 for whom the HTA give 
approval for this sort of procedure.’90  This further demonstrates that living minors are 
donating tissue, but also highlights the lack of case law in this area.   
 
1.3 Research Questions and Aims 
I mostly adopt a doctrinal ‘black-letter law’ approach, but in relation to the comparative 
analysis of my research I have undertaken a multidisciplinary approach.91  As part of 
my comparative analysis I consider both medical and legal sources, and I have used 
medical sources and applied them in a legal context.  The regulatory framework that I 
have considered not only comprises of statutes, regulations, and common law, but also 
professional guidance and codes of practice.  In addition, I have examined government 
reports, academic commentary, and Hansard in order to gain a more in-depth 
understanding of the regulatory framework as well as being able to comment on the 
finer issues and provide a more rounded pragmatic approach to identify the defects and 
propose reforms or clarification of the current law.   
 
This thesis will aim to fill a lacuna in the tissue donation academic debate by providing 
an in-depth analysis of the regulatory framework of living minors as tissue donors.  It 
will also provide practical reform proposals to the regulatory framework that could be 
 
89 MC (n 82) [5]. 
90 MC (n 82) [19].   
91 Andrew Knight and Les Ruddock, Advanced Research Methods in the Built Environment (Wiley-
Blackwell 2009) Chp 3. 
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implemented by Parliament through legislation and/or by the HTA through their CoP.  
Furthermore, it will identify areas where further research needs to be conducted that is 
outside the scope of this thesis.  I hope that this thesis will contribute to the ongoing 
discussion about how best to treat minors who donate tissue to a sibling, and that 
medical professionals, families and recipients, as well as policy-makers and 
professional bodies will find this contribution to the literature to be useful in considering 
how best to protect the minor donor’s interests.     
 
As demonstrated above, living minors comprise only a small percentage of the number 
of donation operations that occur each year.  But as tissue donation from a living minor 
is not curative or prophylactic, but medically harms the donor, the regulatory framework 
that governs these donations should protect the interests of these minors and prevent 
their exploitation.  My main argument is that the regulatory framework that currently 
governs living minors as tissue donors in England and Wales, and Scotland does not 
adequately protect the minor donor’s interests, therefore, it is in need of clarification 
and/or reform.  To demonstrate this argument, I aim to answer three questions: 
 
(1) Should non-regenerative tissue donation from living minors be permitted 
in England and Wales, and Scotland? 
 
(2) Who can and should provide consent/authorisation for living minors to 
be regenerative tissue donors? 
 
(3) What test(s) should be used to determine whether consent/authorisation 




As a vast amount of literature already exists about tissue donation as well as the 
competency tests, it is necessary to address the issue of how this thesis aims to make a 
positive and original contribution to the tissue donation debate.  The majority of 
literature considers adults as both living or deceased donors, or minors as deceased 
donors.92  I make an original contribution to this literature in that first, I apply the 
principle of relational autonomy to tissue donation, which has not been previously 
undertaken in academic literature.93  Secondly, I introduce the new and novel principle 
of relational parental decision-making, a principle that I developed in the context of 
tissue donation in order to explore the relationship that an incompetent donor has with 
others in order for those with PR to provide consent/authorisation on their behalf.94  
Thirdly, I undertake a comparative analysis between England and Wales, and Scotland 
in relation to non-regenerative tissue donation using both medical and legal sources and 
suggest reforms to the current law in England and Wales which has not been undertaken 
within academic literature.95   
 
Fourthly, I analyse and suggest recommendations for reform of the best interests test 
specifically in relation to tissue donation; the majority of academic literature focuses on 
 
92 John Harris, ‘The Survival Lottery’ (1975) 50(191) Philosophy 81; IH Kerridge and others, ‘Death, 
dying and donation: organ transplantation and the diagnosis of death’ (2002) 28 Journal of Medical Ethics 
89; Michael T Morley, ‘Proxy Consent to Organ Donation by Incompetents’ (2002) 111 The Yale Law 
Journal 1215; HE Emson, ‘It is immoral to require consent for cadaver organ donation’ (2003) 29 Journal 
of Medical Ethics 125; John Harris, ‘Organ procurement: dead interests, living needs’ (2003) 29 Journal 
of Medical Ethics 130; TM Wilkinson, ‘What’s not wrong with conditional organ donation?’ (2003) 29 
Journal of Medical Ethics 163; Sheelagh McGuinness and Margaret Brazier, ‘Respecting the Living 
Means Respecting the Dead too’ (2008) 28(2) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 297; David Price Human 
Tissue in Transplantation and Research (CUP 2010); Anne-Maree Farrell, David Price, and Muireann 
Quigley (eds) Organ Shortage: Ethics, Law and Pragmatism (CUP 2011). 
93 see Chapter 2 at 2.2.1.2. 
94 see Chapter 2 at 2.3. 
95 see Chapter 4. 
43 
 
the best interests test in general.96  Fifthly, I analyse the suitability of the Gillick97 
competency test, section 2(4) of the Age of Legal Capacity (Scotland) Act 1991 
competency test, and section 8 of the Family Law Reform Act 1969 regarding their 
application to tissue donation.98   
 
1.4 Outline of Chapters 
This thesis will take the form of six chapters.  
 
Chapter 2 provides an overview of the ethical principle of autonomy.  I adopt Thomas 
Beauchamp and James Childress’s well-respected notion of autonomy: an action, or a 
decision to undergo an action, is autonomous when an individual meets three 
requirements.99  These requirements are that the individual acts: (1) intentionally, (2) 
with understanding, and (3) without control from internal states or external sources.100  
I focus my discussion of autonomy on the principle of relational autonomy as this will 
form the basis of my analysis of the three research questions in this thesis.  My 
interpretation of relational autonomy is that if an individual makes an autonomous 
relational decision then that decision is made by considering the network of 
relationships with others.  In other words, for an individual to make a decision they need 
to take into account their relationships with others that underpins their life, such as 
familial and societal relationships.  The degree that a particular relationship is taken into 
account is dependent on the circumstances of that individual; the importance of the 
relationship; and the weight it has on the individual’s life.   
 
96 see Chapter 5. 
97 Gillick v West Norfolk and Wisbech Area Health Authority [1985] 3 All ER 402. 
98 see Chapter 6. 





Moreover, I argue that the philosophical interpretation of the principle of relational 
autonomy should have a legal application in medical decision-making, specifically 
tissue donation from a living minor.  I will also demonstrate how relational decision-
making can and should be applied where those with PR are making a decision on behalf 
of an incompetent minor in the context of tissue donation.  I aim to show this by 
introducing the new and novel principle of relational parental decision-making.  This 
means that when those with PR make a decision on behalf of an incompetent minor, 
instead of treating the minor as if they were an isolated being, I propose that the 
relationships that the minor has with others should be a contributing part of the decision-
making.     
 
The final part of this chapter will consider the well-recognised and understood legal 
principle of consent.  I focus on two aspects of consent that I feel are pertinent to the 
discussion in the remainder of the thesis.  First, the test for informed consent which is 
contained in Montgomery v Lanarkshire Health Board101.  Secondly, I will discuss the 
lawfulness of tissue donation from a living minor with application to consent 
concluding that unlike other medical procedures, the lawfulness of tissue donation from 
a living individual is established by statute which may provide some indication of the 
exceptional nature of this kind of medical procedure. 
 
Chapter 3 considers the regulatory framework of tissue donation, which is a 
combination of legal regulation and professional guidance which includes codes of 
practice (CoP).  The current legislation that regulates tissue donation from living minors 
 
101 [2015] UKSC 11. 
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in England and Wales, and Scotland is the Human Tissue Act 2004, and the Human 
Tissue (Scotland) Act 2006 respectively.  The HTA have produced a number of CoP 
and guidance documents that supplement this legislation.  This legislation was 
implemented following the organ retention scandals that became public knowledge in 
the late 1990s and early 2000s.    
 
There are two main arguments I intend to make in this chapter.  First, as one of the aims 
of this thesis is to recommend reform to the regulatory framework, I need to provide a 
clear conception of what the regulatory framework actually says and identify where its 
defects lie.  In order to do this, I will produce a number of tables and charts that provide 
a summary of the legislation and professional guidance with regard to the donation 
process.  These tables and charts are merely a condensed and simplified form of the 
lengthy and complex information that is available about the donation process.  I will 
produce them to assist the reader so there is a basis for comparison between the current 
framework and my proposed developments.  Moreover, there is scope that they could 
be considered by the HTA to assist when creating a more workable conception of the 
donation process for medical professionals as well as donors, recipients, and the general 
public.  I also recommend that the CoP should be reformed so there are separate CoP 
for adults and minors.  This will allow for a more streamlined set of guidance.     
 
Secondly, I will analyse the difference between the use of the term ‘appropriate consent’ 
in the 2004 Act compared to the use of the term ‘authorisation’ in the 2006 Act.  I will 
consider whether there is a material difference between the two terms by examining the 
legal definitions as well as their interpretation in the CoP.  I shall conclude that the 
difference between the two terms is superficial as the test for informed consent and 
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informed authorisation are identical.  It would be clearer and more precise if the term 
consent is used and replaces authorisation in the 2006 Act with regard to tissue donation. 
 
Chapter 4 recommends reform to the regulatory framework by considering the first 
question of this thesis: should minors in England and Wales be permitted to donate non-
regenerative tissue?  In Scotland, living minors can only donate regenerative tissue or 
as part of a domino transplant, thus they cannot donate non-regenerative tissue.102  In 
contrast, living minors in England and Wales can donate both regenerative and non-
regenerative tissue.   
 
My contention is that no living minor should be able to donate non-regenerative tissue103 
because the psychological benefits of the donation do not outweigh the immediate and 
long-term medical risks and potential psychological risks of the donation, even if the 
donation is to a sibling.  Therefore, the law in England and Wales should be reformed 
and the Scottish approach should be adopted.  I will aim to demonstrate this by 
comparing the two most common types of regenerative tissue donation, blood and bone 
marrow, with the two most common types of non-regenerative tissue donation, a kidney 
and a lobe of liver.  I will discuss both the immediate and long-term medical risks of 
the different types of donation as well as any long-term implications to the minor’s 
lifestyle as a result of being a tissue donor.   
 
I will then move on to consider the potential psychological benefits and psychological 
harms a living minor donor can develop as a result of undergoing the donation process.  
The majority of my discussion will focus on Kenneth Kipnis’ eight discrete types of 
 
102 Human Tissue (Scotland) Act 2006, s.17(4) at Appendix 1; HTA (n 18) para 23. 
103 except domino transplants.     
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vulnerabilities that are applied by Lainie Friedman Ross and Richard Thistlethwaite to 
tissue donation.104  I will explore whether the psychological benefits outweigh the 
immediate and long-term medical risks and psychological risks, therefore, justifying the 
tissue donation.   
 
Put simply: psychological benefit > medical risks + psychological harm 
in order for the donation to be justified.   
 
Chapter 5 will consider the second and third research questions of this thesis in relation 
to incompetent minors: who can and should be able to provide consent/authorisation for 
living minors to be regenerative tissue donors? and what test(s) should be used to 
determine whether consent/authorisation can be provided for a living minor to be a 
tissue donor?  First, I conclude that those with PR can and should be able to provide 
consent/authorisation on behalf of an incompetent minor to be a tissue donor, as long 
as the decision is in the minor’s best interests.  Also, I propose that if those with PR 
have made a best interests decision which does not appear to be flawed, the court should 
not see necessary to override it.  I argue that the best possible decision in those 
circumstances in the minor’s interest has already been made.  If the decision is 
considered flawed then it can be overruled by the court.  Subsequently, it is irrelevant 
who makes the decision for the minor, either those with PR or the court, as long as the 
decision is in the best interests of the minor.  In order to demonstrate my argument, I 
 
104 Kenneth Kipnis, Vulnerability in research subjects: a bioethical taxonomy in: the National Bioethics 
Advisory Commission (NBAC), Ethical and Policy Issues in Research Involving Human Participants 
Volume II Commissioned Papers and Staff Analysis (Bethesda 2001) G1–13; Kenneth Kipnis, ‘Seven 
vulnerabilities in the pediatric research subject’ (2003) 24 Theoretical Medicine in Bioethics 107; Lainie 
Friedman Ross and J Richard Thistlethwaite, ‘Developing an ethics framework for living donor 
transplantation’ (2018) Journal of Medical Ethics 1. 
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will examine the role and responsibilities of those with PR, and the role of the court in 
the decision-making process.     
 
Secondly, I argue that the best interests test should continue to be used to determine 
whether a minor should be a tissue donor, as it allows the decision-maker to take into 
account a range of factors, but an additional test should be added that deals exclusively 
with tissue donation from living minors.  In England and Wales, the best interests test 
is currently in the Children Act 1989, while in Scotland it is in the Children (Scotland) 
Act 1995.  I will consider four other tests that the court and other academics have 
suggested could be used instead of, or in addition, to the best interests test to determine 
whether a minor could be a tissue donor.  The alternative tests I have selected are: 
substituted judgement; constrained parental autonomy as defined by Lainie Friedman 
Ross; “strong” and “weak” family interests; and the harm threshold.    
  
The reform that I recommend to the best interests test within section 1(3) of the 1989 
Act would result in the development of the factor that considers the minor’s view in the 
decision-making process.  I also suggest that an additional section should be added to 
both the 1989 Act and the 1995 Act that deals exclusively with tissue donation from 
living minors.  It would include a factor that considers the harm of the procedure, and a 
requirement that takes into account the new and novel principle that I have devised, 
namely relational parental decision-making.  The requirements in both the best interests 
test and this new section would need to be met in order for a donation to occur.  The 
aim is that this test is more suitable to determine whether a living incompetent minor 
should be a tissue donor than the current best interests test.  It simultaneously protects 
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the minor’s interests and prevents their exploitation as well as takes account of all 
factors that may be relevant in the decision-making process.    
 
Chapter 6 will consider the second question of this thesis in relation to competent 
minors: who can and should be able to provide consent/authorisation for living minors 
to be regenerative tissue donors?  I will conclude that if a competent minor meets the 
relevant competency test then they should be able to provide consent/authorisation to 
be a tissue donor.  As to whether they can currently do this, the law is unclear as there 
has been no application of tissue donation to the competency tests by the court.  For 
those under 16 in England and Wales, the competency test is established by common 
law in Gillick v West Norfolk and Wisbech Area Health Authority105, while in Scotland 
the test is outlined in section 2(4) of the Age of Legal Capacity (Scotland) Act 1991.  
For those aged 16- and 17- years old in England and Wales the test governing capacity 
is contained in the Mental Capacity Act 2005, and section 8 of the Family Law Reform 
Act 1969 permits a minor to consent to ‘surgical, medical, or dental treatment’ as if they 
were full age.   
 
Furthermore, I will argue that those with PR currently can, but should not be permitted 
to override a competent minor’s consent/authorisation. This is because those with PR 
hold their power as agents or trustees on behalf of the minor until they are mature 
enough to begin to make decisions for themselves.  Also, I argue that once a minor is 
competent a court currently can but subsequently should not be able to override their 
decision about whether to be a tissue donor.  The role of the court is to protect the 
 
105 Gillick (n 97). 
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interests of the minor, and once the minor is competent to make their own decisions 
then the role of the court is obsolete.   
 
I will also answer the third research question of this thesis in relation to competent 
minors: what test(s) should be used to determine whether consent/authorisation can be 
provided for a living minor to be a tissue donor?  I will propose clarification to the 
Gillick competence test and section 2(4) competence test.  This clarification will mean 
that for a minor to be either Gillick or section 2(4) competent they should require an 
understanding of the moral, family, emotional, and long-term implications of the 
donation, as well as an understanding of the potential consequences if they refuse the 
procedure.  The family implications of the decision require the minor to make a 
relational autonomous decision about tissue donation.  In relation to those aged 16- and 
17- years old, my contention is that while, prima facie, the term ‘treatment’ does not 
include tissue donation from living minors as it is a non-therapeutic procedure for the 
donor, section 8 should be interpreted broadly to cover such procedures.  But 
interpretation and application through common law is required so there is no ambiguity.  
 
Chapter 7 will provide suggestions and a conclusion to the thesis.  It will tie together all 
of the issues and provide a grounded way forward for the regulatory framework of tissue 
donation.  It will provide recommendations as to reform and clarification of the 
competency tests, as well as the law on consent/authorisation.  It will demonstrate how 
both relational autonomy and relational parental decision-making should have 
application to tissue donation from living minors.  Furthermore, I have devised tissue 
donation stories and I will apply my recommendations to them.  I feel that this offers a 
practical approach displaying to the reader how these recommendations would apply in 
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practice.  There are myriad permutations of considerations that could be presented in 
these stories; however, I have devised three different ones to best demonstrate how I 
think the regulatory framework for tissue donation from living minors should be.106  The 








Respect for Autonomy and Consent 
 
2.1 Introduction 
The legal regulation of tissue donation is underpinned by ethical principles, and this 
chapter provides an overview of the ethical principle of autonomy as it is the most 
relevant to the three research questions that I aim to answer in this thesis.  I will adopt 
Thomas Beauchamp and James Childress’s well-respected notion of autonomy.107   
 
I focus my discussion of autonomy on the principle of relational autonomy – for an 
individual to make a decision they need to take into account their relationships with 
others that underpin their lives, such as familial and societal relationships – as this will 
form the basis of my analysis of the three research questions.  Moreover, I argue that 
the philosophical interpretation of the principle of relational autonomy should have a 
legal application in medical decision-making, specifically tissue donation from a living 
minor.  I will also demonstrate how relational decision-making can and should be 
applied where those with parental responsibility (PR) are making a decision on behalf 
of an incompetent minor in the context of tissue donation.  I aim to show this by 
introducing the new and novel principle of relational parental decision-making.   
 
The final part of this chapter will consider the well-recognised and understood legal 
principle of consent.  I focus on two aspects of consent that I feel are pertinent to the 
discussion in the remainder of the thesis.  First, the test for informed consent and 
 
107 Tom L Beauchamp and James F Childress, Principles of Biomedical Ethics (OUP 2013). 
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secondly, I will apply consent to tissue donation in a way that will provide a preface for 
the wider discussion of consent in subsequent chapters.       
 
2.2 Respect for Autonomy 
The ethical principle that I am going to focus on in this chapter is respect for autonomy.  
This is one of the four principles of biomedical ethics, introduced by Thomas 
Beauchamp and James Childress in 1977 in their book titled Principles of Biomedical 
Ethics, and could be said to underpin the ethics of the medical profession.  In their latest 
book, which was published in 2013, they developed these principles.108  Even though 
there are four principles, I am only considering the principle of respect for autonomy 
because of its relevant application to the three research questions that I aim to answer 
in this thesis.  I will adopt Beauchamp and Childress’s well-respected notion of 
autonomy: an action, or a decision to undergo an action, is autonomous when an 
individual meets three requirements.  These requirements are that the individual acts: 
(1) intentionally, (2) with understanding, and (3) without control from internal states or 
external sources.109   
 
Analysing the principle of autonomy from an academic standpoint, John Harris suggests 
that fully autonomous decisions are largely ideal and ‘control of our destiny’ is beyond 
the scope of our power.110  He argues that the best decision an individual can make is a 
maximally autonomous decision.  This suggests that the ability to make an autonomous 
decision is on a sliding scale, and that at some moments an individual may be able to 
make a more autonomous decision than at other moments.  The three requirements that 
 
108 ibid. 
109 Beauchamp and Childress (n 107) 104. 
110 John Harris, The Value of Life: Introduction to Medical Ethics (Routledge 1985) 195-205. 
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form part of Beauchamp and Childress’s notion of autonomy, mentioned in the previous 
paragraph, need to be met in order for a decision to be autonomous, but if Harris’ 
suggestion is adopted, they only need to be met to a certain standard for the decision to 
be considered autonomous.  Therefore, an individual could make two decisions at 
different points in time, one may be more autonomous than the other, but both decisions 
would be considered autonomous if they meet the three requirements.  Subsequently, 
this means that the decision an individual makes is the decision that is most autonomous 
in that particular situation, therefore, the decision made could differ depending on the 
circumstances of the individual.  In addition, Harris states that: 
 
Autonomy is the running of one’s own life according to one’s lights.  The fact that their 
lights change colour and intensity over time is no evidence at all that the later lights are 
either better or more ‘one’s own’ than the earlier ones.  They’re just different.  To be 
autonomous, self-determined, just is to be able to do as one wishes – not to be able to 
do as one will wish at some future time.111 
 
If as an individual gets older a change in a decision is considered sufficient to undermine 
the original autonomous decision, then only the decisions of an adult would be 
considered maximally autonomous.  Consequently, a minor could never make an 
autonomous decision because their decision could change as they subsequently became 
an adult, however, a minor’s decision is considered autonomous if they are competent 
to make that decision.     
 
Autonomy is an individualistic principle that focuses on the autonomous individual 
being able to make an autonomous decision.  However, interpretations of autonomy 
 
111 ibid 199. 
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where individuals are isolated beings do not work in practice because they emphasise 
individual choice and neglect the importance of relationships and interdependence.112  
Individuals do not live in a vacuum, but are members of a community, therefore, they 
do not make their decisions in a vacuum.  Susan Wolf argues that ‘by depicting the 
moral community as a set of atomistic and self-serving individuals strips away 
relationships that are morally central.’113  When an individual makes a decision and, 
whether consciously or unconsciously, takes into account their relationships with family 
and society this is known as relational autonomy.  
 
2.2.1 Relational Autonomy 
Relational autonomy was originally developed as a philosophical interpretation of the 
principle of autonomy with a feminist underpinning.  Jennifer Nedelsky states that: 
‘relationships are central to people’s lives – to what we are, to the capacities we are able 
to develop, to what we value, what we suffer, and what we are able to enjoy.’114  For 
Nedelsky, we are all ‘constituted by networks of relationships of which [we] are a part’ 
be they intimate relationships with employers, or social structural relationships such as 
with the government.115  Furthermore, Edward Dove et al recognise that most 
individuals do not make decisions as freestanding,116 isolated beings, but are ‘socially, 
culturally and embedded individual[s]’ who ‘exercise self-determination in and through 
networks of relations with others.’117  The individual is determined by ‘the relationship 
 
112 Kimberly Strong, Ian Kerridge, and Miles Little, ‘Saviour Siblings, Parenting and the Moral 
Valorisation of Children’ (2014) 28(4) Bioethics 187, 191.   
113 Susan M Wolf, ‘Introduction: Gender and Feminism’ in Susan M Wolf (eds), Feminism and Bioethics 
(OUP 1996) 16. 
114 Jennifer Nedelsky, Law’s Relations: A Relational Theory or Self, Autonomy, and the Law (OUP 2013) 
3.   
115 Nedelsky (n 114) 19. 
116 Nedelsky (n 114) 19. 
117 Edward S Dove and others, ‘Elberte v Latvia: Whose tissue is it anyway – Relational autonomy or the 
autonomy of relations?’ (2015) 15 Medical Law International 77, 80. 
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through which each person interacts with others’,118 consequently the self is 
relational.119  Although these relationships are significant, they do not result in a 
decision wholly determined by them.120  If the relationship determined what decisions 
an individual could make then there would be no true autonomy.121  Thus, we define 
ourselves in relationships to others and through relationships with others.122   
 
For the purposes of this thesis, my interpretation of relational autonomy is a 
combination of the interpretations proposed by Nedelsky and Dove et al.  My 
interpretation is that if an individual makes an autonomous relational decision then that 
decision is made by considering the networks of relationships with others.  In other 
words, for an individual to make a decision they need to take into account their 
relationships with others that underpin their lives, such as familial and societal 
relationships.  The degree that a particular relationship is taken into account is 
dependent on the circumstances of that individual; the importance of the relationship; 
and the weight it has on the individual’s life.  An autonomous decision allows an 
autonomous individual to make an intentional, voluntary, and informed decision, a 
relational autonomous decision meets these three requirements, while at the same time 
the autonomous individual takes into account their relationships with others.  The focus 
of relational autonomy is on the individual making the decision, not on the individuals 
who they have relationships with.     
 
 
118 Nedelsky (n 114) 3. 
119 Nedelsky (n 114) 4. 
120 Jocelyn Downie and Jennifer J Llewellyn, Being Relational: Reflections on Relational Theory and 
Health Law (UBC Press 2012) 5. 
121 Nedelsky (n 114) 31. 
122 C Whitbeck, ‘A Different Reality: Feminist Ontology’ in Ann Garry and Marilyn Pearsall (eds), 
Women, Knowledge and Reality: Explorations in Feminist Philosophy (Unwin Hyman, 1989) 68.   
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Applying the principle of relational autonomy to an everyday example: Alex needs to 
make a decision as to whether to go to a shop for urgent provisions.  If Alex is to make 
a relational autonomous decision then he will make this decision by considering the 
relationships he has with others.  I will sample a number of different relationships that 
Alex may have with others, and will examine each type of relationship in turn.     
 
First, consideration to be made relates to Alex’s family.  If Alex is a single father of two 
young children who cannot be left unattended, he would need to decide whether to get 
someone to look after them, or to take them with him.  Alex would need to examine the 
viability of each of these options.  This relationship with his children may have a pivotal 
effect on his decision to go shopping at that time.     
 
Secondly, Alex needs to take into account his relationship with society.  Society is a 
term that covers Alex’s relationships with friends, his employment, and his wider 
relationship with society such as the need to abide by societal rules.  Depending on 
whether Alex is employed, self-employed or unemployed this relationship may have an 
impact on his decision.  For example, Alex may only have a limited amount of time to 
visit the shop before he has to start work.  
 
Thirdly, Alex should consider his relationship with his friends when making a decision.  
For example, would he be willing to asking a friend to look after the children for the 
time necessary to go to the shop?  Would he be prepared to ask a friend to do the 




If the parameters are now narrowed and we consider that Alex has no family, no friends, 
and is unemployed, he still has to consider his wider relationship with society such as 
the need to abide by societal rules.  This relationship became truly apparent if the event 
occurred during the COVID-19 pandemic when isolation and face covering measures 
were put into place.  Alex may also consider the gravity of the risk to himself resulting 
in a decision not to go to the shop but resort to shopping online.     
 
Theoretically, when making his decision Alex could ignore all of these relationships, 
however, practically it is unlikely that he would do this because these relationships will 
impact on whether Alex goes to the shop or not.  The weighting that Alex puts on a 
particular relationship will likely depend on his perception of the importance of this 
relationship.  His decision will have resulted in him having considered a combination 
of these relationships, subsequently his decision will be relationally autonomous.  In 
order to assist the reader as to what factors should be considered when examining a 
relationship, I have devised a list of factors and applied them to the different types of 
relationship.       
 
(1) type of relationship 
This factor considers what category the relationship may fall into, for example, family, 
friends, employment, and societal.  A particular relationship may fall into more than 
one of these categories, but each relationship is unique.  Furthermore, the relationship 
may be on a sliding scale of influence within that category.  A familial relationship may 




Another relationship that an individual has with wider society is in respect of their 
religious beliefs.  Religion is a ‘human beings’ relation to that which they regard as 
holy, sacred, absolute, spiritual, divine, or worthy of especial reverence.’123  There are 
many religions throughout the world each with own texts, practices and beliefs.124  They 
take different stances on various aspects of society.125  The weighting that this 
relationship has on the decision will depend on their commitment to their religion.   
 
 (2) length of the relationship 
The length of relationship will not necessarily determine the weight that should be 
attached to it.  Moreover, an individual may have a relationship for only a short period 
of time, for example, a period of employment.  But a constant relationship will allow 
an individual to determine if that relationship should influence their decision and the 
weight that should be attached to it by ‘getting to know’ the individual.      
 
 (3) potential future interaction (temporary or long-term relationship) 
A relationship may be for a defined period of an individual’s life, while for example a 
cultural relationship will usually last a life-time.  The longevity of a relationship cannot 
always be predicted, for example, when two individuals get married, they intend to be 
married for a life-time, however, their relationship may breakdown.  When the decision-




123 Britannica, ‘Religion’ <https://www.britannica.com/topic/religion> accessed 27/09/2020.   
124 Some recognised religions include: Christianity, Hinduism, Islam, Sikhism, Buddhism, Judaism.   
125 NHS Blood and Transplant, ‘Organ donation and your beliefs’ 
<https://www.organdonation.nhs.uk/helping-you-to-decide/your-faith-and-beliefs/> accessed 
27/09/2020.   
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 (4) frequency of interaction 
Frequency of interaction enables a greater level of predictability within a relationship, 
and will result in an individual becoming familiar with how that relationship will 
influence their decision.  But the frequency of interaction does not necessarily determine 
the weight a relationship should be given.  
 
 (5) type of interaction 
The type of interaction considers whether it is a voluntary interaction or a necessary 
interaction.  Using employment as an example, the individual has a necessary 
interaction with their employer and their work colleagues while in the work setting.  But 
if they choose to interact with their work colleagues outside of this work environment 
then this would be a voluntary interaction.   
 
Relationships are unique, and their importance and impact on decision-making can 
fluctuate.  They are shaped by a plethora of influences that are wide-reaching and could 
include, but are not limited to: financial, knowledge, cultural, religious beliefs, values, 
respect, gender, attitude, and third-party and community involvement and opinion.  The 
decision-maker may consider other factors when examining a particular relationship, 
but as already emphasised each consideration will be dependent on the circumstances 
of that individual.  While no one relationship will determine the outcome of the decision 
made, I argue that these relationships are a necessary part of the decision-making. 
 
2.2.1.1  Relational Autonomy and the Law  
The example I provided, with Alex, involved the application of relational autonomy to 
a common everyday decision.  Relational autonomy is a philosophical concept that has 
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not been fully explored within a legal context.  However, Roy Gilbar and Charles Foster 
have argued that the Court of Appeal in ABC v St George’s Healthcare NHS Trust126 
adopted a relational approach to their decision-making.127  They assert this ‘because it 
[the Court of Appeal] acknowledged that any decision made by one individual has 
implications for her significant others.’128  But, Gilbar and Foster did not expand on this 
reasoning nor provide a definition of relational autonomy.  It is my contention that this 
reasoning is not in fact an example of relational autonomy.  As I understand, and have 
interpreted the principle of relational autonomy, the impact of the relationship is the 
influence that the relative has on the individual making the decision.  While Gilbar and 
Foster appear to consider relational autonomy to be the impact the decision has on the 
relationship between the individual making the decision and the relative.  My 
interpretation of relational autonomy is that the decision is influenced by the 
relationship with the relative rather than the relative being influenced by the decision.   
 
So, using the example of Alex who has two young children.  My interpretation of 
relational autonomy is that the decision that Alex makes as to whether to go to the shop 
will be influenced by the fact, he cannot leave his two young children at home alone.  
While Gilbar and Foster’s interpretation would be that if Alex made a decision to go to 
the shop then the impact this would have on his children would be that he would have 
to take them with him or they would have to be looked after by someone else.  Gilbar 
and Foster’s interpretation looks at the resultant impact of the decision.  Using my 
interpretation of relational autonomy, the parent’s decision-making thought process is: 
I want to go to the shop, I have a child, I cannot leave this child alone, therefore, I cannot 
 
126 [2017] EWCA 336. 
127 Roy Gilbar and Charles Foster, ‘It’s Arrived!  Relational Autonomy come to Court: ABC v St George’s 




go to the shop.  While Gilbar and Foster’s decision-making thought process is: if I went 
to the shop then I would be leaving my child alone, therefore, I cannot go to the shop.  
In this instance the end decision in both scenarios is the same, however, this may not be 
the case in every situation.  Gilbar and Foster go on to state that:  
 
the court recognised that the personal decision of the patient to undergo genetic testing 
had implications for her family as a unit and for the interests of individual relatives in 
making informed decisions.129 
 
But I argue that this reasoning is flawed because the relationship should impact the 
decision not the other way around.  Gilbar and Foster are correct in stating that a 
decision made by an individual has implications for the family unit, but this is not the 
principle of relational autonomy, as relational autonomy is the influence that a 
relationship has on the initial decision made by the individual, not the subsequent 
impact the decision has on the relationship.  The following is, in diagrammatic form, 
my interpretation of relational autonomy, and Gilbar and Foster’s interpretation of 
relational autonomy: 
 
A = the individual making the decision 
B = the individual who has a relationship with A 
 
Figure 1: My Interpretation of Relational Autonomy 
 
 
A   B 
 





Figure 2: Gilbar and Foster’s Interpretation of Relational Autonomy 
 
 
A   B      
 
 
Gilbar and Foster acknowledge their interpretation of relational autonomy into legal 
decision-making, but if their understanding of the concept of relational autonomy is 
incorrect then ABC v St George’s Healthcare NHS Trust is not the introduction of 
relational decision-making by the courts.  If the principle of relational autonomy is to 
be used by the courts within their decision-making, then it has scope to be used within 
all areas of medical law, including tissue donation.  However, it is unclear whether 
courts in the future will adopt a relational approach, further analysis is required to 
determine whether relational decision-making with regard to medical procedures 
becomes the norm instead of the exception. 
 
2.2.1.2  Relational Autonomy and Tissue Donation 
Tissue donation between siblings has a familial relational underpinning due to the 
relationship between the donor and the recipient,130 therefore, I am going to argue that 
relational autonomy should be adopted in this area of decision-making.  If the minor 
was an autonomous individual who made decisions in isolation, they would only 
consider their own interests.  However, a decision as to whether to donate may be 
influenced by the relationship the potential donor has with the intended recipient, which 
 
130 see Chapter 1 at 1.1.3.1 for further discussion about sibling to sibling donation; Strong, Kerridge and 
Little (n 112) 191; John Christman, ‘Relational Autonomy, Liberal Individualism and the Social 





includes the effect the donation has on the recipient’s wellbeing as well as the family 
unit as a whole.  Therefore, the decision that is made about whether to donate should 
take into account the relationships that the donor has with others, in particular the 
intended recipient.  However, the focus must continue to be on the minor donor’s 
interests rather than protecting the interests of the recipient.     
 
There is a difference between a relationship that influences a minor, but allows them to 
make a relational autonomous decision, and a relationship that is a coercive influence.  
Coercion occurs ‘if one person intentionally uses a credible and severe threat of harm 
or force to control another.’131  Coercive pressure may be exerted on the potential donor, 
knowingly or unknowingly, by those who they have a relationship with.  This could 
include, but is not limited to, those with PR, other family members, medical 
professionals, and the intended recipient.132  If a decision to donate is made as a result 
of coercion then it would not be an autonomous decision.  I will discuss in Chapter 3 
how the Human Tissue Authority (HTA) require interviews and reports to be conducted 
by an Independent Assessor (IA) or Accredited Assessor (AA) as a mechanism to 
prevent coercive situations in cases of tissue donation from living minors consequently 
protecting the minor donor’s interests.  The need for a preventative mechanism 
recognises that coercion could be an issue within tissue donation.   
 
 
131 Beauchamp and Childress (n 107) 138; Robert Nozick, ‘Coercion’ in S Morgenbesser, P Suppes, and 
M White (eds), Philosophy, Science and Method: Essays in Honour of Ernest Nagel (St Martin’s 1969) 
440-472; Bernard Gert ‘Coercion and Freedom’ in J Roland Pennock and John W Chapman (eds), 
Coercion: Nomos XIV (Aldine Atherton, 1972) 36-37.  See also A Wertheimer, Coercion (Princeton 
University Press 1987). 
132 Shih-Ning Then, Children as Tissue Donors: Regulatory Protection, Medical Ethics and Practice 
(Springer, 2018) 22. 
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Throughout my thesis the discussion and application of autonomy, and relational 
autonomy, will focus on the minor donor making the decision as to whether to donate 
or not, and I will argue that if the competent minor makes an autonomous decision then 
it should be respected by those with PR and the court.  However, if a minor is 
incompetent and cannot make an autonomous decision as to whether to donate, then 
those with PR will make the decision on their behalf.  But relational autonomy focuses 
on the individual making a decision on their own behalf and does not consider those 
making a decision on behalf of others, such as those with PR making a decision on 
behalf of an incompetent minor.  I propose that there should be a concept of relational 
parental decision-making.  This is when those with PR make decisions on behalf of an 
incompetent minor by taking into account the relationships that the minor has with 
others. 
 
2.3  Relational Parental Decision-Making 
Within legal academic literature there is no discussion about whether the relationships 
that a minor has with others should influence a decision made on their behalf by those 
with PR.  If the minor is incompetent and the decision as to whether they can be a tissue 
donor is made by those with PR, the current law states that they should make the 
decision based on what is in the minor’s best interests by taking into account a range of 
factors.133  In Chapter 5, I argue that the best interests test should continue to be used to 
determine whether a minor should be a tissue donor as it allows the decision-maker to 
take into account a range of factors, but I propose that it should be reformed so that 
familial interests, including the relationships that the minor has with others, are 
incorporated into the test.134   
 
133 Children Act 1989; Children (Scotland) Act 1995. 




If those with PR are going to take into account the relationships of a minor then these 
relationships should not be coercive or be covertly influential in the decision-making 
process.  The close intimate relationship the potential donor has with the potential 
recipient should not be the overriding factor when those with PR are determining 
whether the minor should be a donor.  Furthermore, those with PR should not directly 
compare or weigh up the interests of the minor donor and the recipient to determine 
whether they should donate.135  When those with PR make a decision on behalf of an 
incompetent minor, instead of treating the minor in isolation, I propose that the 
relationships that the minor has with others should be a contributing part of the decision-
making.  I have called this type of decision-making relational parental decision-making. 
 
In order to explain this concept, I will apply it to a tissue donation example.  There are 
two siblings who are both minors, Katrina and Chris.  Chris requires a bone marrow 
transplant otherwise he will die, and it is proposed that Katrina could be his donor.  
Katrina is aged 5, thus an incompetent minor.  In order to decide whether Katrina is to 
be a donor those with PR, her parents in this case, will need to decide whether the 
donation is in Katrina’s best interests, by considering the best interests test set out in the 
relevant statute.136  If her parents were to undertake relational parental decision-making, 
they would not only consider her best interests but also consider the relationships that 
Katrina has with others.   
 
 
135 see Chapter 5 at 5.4.2 for discussion about the best interests test considering both the minor donor and 
recipient. 
136 see Chapter 5 at 5.5 for discussion of the best interests test. 
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First, her parents would consider Katrina’s relationship with Chris, this would involve 
analysing the impact this relationship has on Katrina, so for example they may look at 
whether the siblings spend voluntary time together, the closeness of their relationship, 
and how they interact with each other.  But her parents must not conclude that Katrina 
should be a tissue donor purely on the basis that it will save Chris’ life.  This should 
merely form part of the decision-making process.   
 
Secondly, the parents would need to consider the relationship that Katrina has with the 
family unit as a whole.  Say there is a third sibling, Caitlin.  As part of the relational 
parental decision-making Katrina’s parents would need to consider the relationship that 
Katrina has with Caitlin.  If Caitlin is a much older sibling and no longer lives with the 
family then this relationship could have less of an impact compared to her relationship 
with Caitlin if she was still living in the family home.  As part of the family unit, 
Katrina’s parents will consider their relationship with Katrina, this relationship is 
important since Katrina is very young so she relies heavily on their support.  Other 
family relationships may be considered depending on who Katrina has contact with in 
her family, for example, grandparents may be considered if Katrina visits them regularly 
and has a close relationship with them.  The family unit relationships that are considered 
will be different for each minor as it is dependent on the family dynamics.   
 
Thirdly, her parents would need to consider Katrina’s relationship with society.  Society 
is a term that covers Katrina’s relationships with friends, her school such as her teachers, 
and her wider relationship with society such as the need to abide by societal 
requirements.  While Katrina’s relationships with her friends and her teachers may have 
some weighting on the decision-making, as she is only 5 years old her relationship with 
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wider society is very limited, and it is likely that in this instance it would not have a 
significant influence on the decision.   
 
Prescribing which relationships those with PR should take into account and how much 
weight should be given to each of them is difficult as it will depend on the age of the 
minor, the family dynamics, and the types of relationships the minor has.  However, at 
the same time, those with PR should not be disregarding fundamental relationships or 
only giving them minimal weight in order to achieve their desired decision.  Therefore, 
this decision-making is not objective, but, if those with PR were making a decision on 
behalf of a minor without considering relationships that are fundamental to the minor’s 
life or giving them sufficient weighting then it should be seen as defective decision-
making and should be disregarded.  Earlier in this chapter I devised a list of factors that 
a decision-maker should use when considering a particular relationship.  This list can 
also assist those with PR when making a decision on behalf of a minor to be a tissue 
donor.137  To assist the reader I have reproduced the list here with some added discussion 
in relation to sibling to sibling donation.   
 
 (1) type of relationship 
In the case of a tissue donation, one of the categories of relationship is the recipient.  As 
it is a sibling to sibling donation this relationship may also involve a close emotional 
familial bond.  However, this particular relationship will be different to other familial 




137 at 2.2.1. 
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 (2) length of the relationship 
With sibling to sibling donation, it is likely that the donor and the recipient will have 
had a relationship for the majority of their life (depending on whether they are half-
siblings and the age of the youngest sibling). 
 
 (3) potential future interaction (temporary or long-term relationship) 
As the donor and recipient are siblings there is an expectation that their relationship will 
last a life-time.  However, there is a risk that familial relationships can breakdown even 
between very close family members, therefore, the decision-maker needs to be 
pragmatic about the relationship’s potential future.     
 
 (4) frequency of interaction 
The frequency of interaction between the donor and the recipient will partially depend 
on their living arrangements.  However, the frequency of this interaction will not 
necessarily determine the weight the relationship should be given.   
 
 (5) type of interaction 
A relationship between siblings is a hybrid-type of interaction.  If they live together then 
it is a necessary interaction, but it can also be a voluntary interaction if they choose to 
spend time together.  When those with PR consider this factor, they need to particularly 
examine the voluntary types of interaction between the donor and the potential recipient.   
 
There may be additional factors that those with PR may need to consider that are unique 
to a particular relationship.  While no one relationship will determine the outcome of 
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the decision made on the minor’s behalf, I argue that these relationships are a necessary 
part of the decision-making process.   
 
So far, the discussion has focused on the ethical principle of autonomy in the form of 
relational autonomy and relational parental decision-making.  However, the principle 
of autonomy needs to be conveyed into a legal principle in order for the decision-
maker’s decision to be legally valid.  The ethical principle of autonomy is transferred 
into law through the legal concept of consent.  Respect for autonomy allows an 
individual to make a decision about themselves, for example to undergo a medical 
procedure, and consent is the permission given by that individual for the medical 
professional to perform that medical procedure on them.138  The discussion will now 
focus on the legal principle of consent in the context of tissue donation.       
 
2.4 Legal Principle of Consent  
The legal principle of consent is well-recognised and understood within academia, 
therefore, I am not going to attempt to cover ground that has already been well-trodden 
by previous academics.139  However, I do wish to examine two points that I feel are 
pertinent to the discussion in the remainder of the thesis.  First, the test for informed 
consent, and secondly, the lawfulness of tissue donation from a living minor in its 





138 Franklin Miller and Alan Wertheimer, The Ethics of Consent: Theory and Practice (OUP, 2009) 57. 
139 Chatterton v Gerson [1981] 1 All ER 257; R v Tabassum [2000] 2 Cr App R 328; R v Brown [1993] 
2 All ER 75; Sheila McLean, Autonomy, Consent and the Law (Routledge 2010); Penney Lewis, ‘The 
Medical Exception’ (2012) 65(1) Current Legal Problems 355. 
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2.4.1 Informed Consent  
In order for an individual to provide informed consent they must have received 
information about the associated risks of the procedure from the medical professional 
to be able to make a decision as to whether to undergo that procedure.  The current test 
for information disclosure is contained in Montgomery v Lanarkshire Health Board: 
 
An adult person of sound mind is entitled to decide which, if any, of the available forms 
of treatment to undergo, and her consent must be obtained before treatment interfering 
with her bodily integrity is undertaken.  The doctor is therefore under a duty to take 
reasonable care to ensure that the patient is aware of any material risks involved in any 
recommended treatment, and of any reasonable alternative or variant treatments.  The 
test of materiality is whether, in the circumstances of the particular case, a reasonable 
person in the patient’s position would be likely to attach significance to the risk, or the 
doctor is or should reasonably be aware that the particular patient would be likely to 
attach significance to it.140 
 
Lords Reed and Kerr, in Montgomery, stated that this test of materiality is not unrealistic 
because what it demands is already required by the General Medical Council (GMC).141  
The GMC expressed that: 
 
clear, accurate information about the risks of any proposed investigation, or treatment, 
presented in a way patients can understand, can help them make informed decisions.  
The amount of information about risks that you should share with patients will depend 
 
140 [2015] UKSC 11, [87]; this is subject to the therapeutic privilege which entitled doctors to withhold 
information if they reasonably consider it would be seriously detrimental to the patient’s health.   
141 Montgomery v Lanarkshire Health Board [2015] UKSC 11, [93].   
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on the individual patient and what they want or need to know.  Your discussions with 
patients should focus on their individual situation and the risk to them.142 
 
The test in Montgomery will be analysed as well as applied to tissue donation in Chapter 
3 when I consider whether there is a difference between the use of the term consent in 
the Human Tissue Act 2004 and the use of the term authorisation in the Human Tissue 
(Scotland) Act 2006.143   
 
2.4.2 Consent and Tissue Donation  
Consent is a principle that is applicable to every type of medical procedure, ranging 
from the trivial, such as applying a sticking plaster, to the life-changing, such as 
amputation.  Medical procedures that would now be considered routine, such as tissue 
donation, were once experimental and did not explicitly fall under the medical exception 
of consent.  A medical procedure may start as a procedure which society, including 
medical professionals, think of as not acceptable, and should not be offered to 
individuals, such as gender reassignment or abortion.144  However, over time opinions 
change and the view within society shifts regarding that particular medical procedure, 
which subsequently becomes a recognised procedure for medical professionals to 
offer.145  This is particularly notable within the field of tissue donation.     
 
When an innovative medical procedure is performed for the first time the lawfulness of 
the procedure could be called into question, and the consent that is provided by the 
 
142 General Medical Council, Consent: Patients and Doctors Making Decisions Together (2008) Part 2: 
Making Decisions about Investigations and Treatment, para 28.   
143 at 3.4.1. 
144 Sara Fovargue and Alex Mullock (eds), The Legitimacy of Medical Treatment: What Role for the 




patient may not be sufficient to absolve the medical professional from legal action.146  
The introduction of the Human Organ Transplant Act 1989 was the first time that tissue 
donation from a living individual was expressly included in legislation in England and 
Wales, and Scotland even though the first kidney donation from a living individual was 
performed in 1960.147  Therefore, questions are raised as to whether the first kidney 
donor could have provided legally valid consent to the procedure.  Lord Mustill 
observed that: 
 
[consent] cannot be direct explanation for it, since much of the bodily invasion involved 
in surgery lies well above any point at which consent could even arguably be regarded 
as furnishing a defence.  Why is this so?  The answer must be in my opinion that proper 
medical treatment, for which actual or deemed consent is prerequisite, is in a category 
of its own.148 
 
Lord Justice Edmund Davis went further and stated that he would: 
 
be surprised if a surgeon were successfully sued for trespass to the person or convicted 
of causing bodily harm to one of full age and intelligence who freely consented to act 
as a donor – always provided that the operation did not present unreasonable risk to the 
donor’s life or health.  That proviso is essential.  A man may declare himself ready to 
die for another, but the surgeon must not take him at his word.149  
 
Tissue donation from a living individual is different to other types of medical procedure. 
When an individual usually provides consent to a medical procedure it is because that 
 
146 R v Tabassum [2000] 2 Cr App R 328. 
147 NHS, ‘History of Donation’ (NHS Choices, 2015) <www.nhs.uk/tools/documents/transplant.htm> 
accessed 01/05/2017; see Chapter 1 at 1.2 for further discussion about the medical and legal history of 
tissue donation.   




procedure will medically benefit them.  However, as will be discussed in Chapter 4, 
tissue donation from a living individual is not curative or prophylactic but medically 
harms the donor.  Therefore, when an individual provides consent to be a tissue donor, 
they are actually consenting for a medical professional to actively harm them without a 
resultant medical benefit.  However, Lord Justice Edmund Davies contended that: 
 
the surgeon has quite enough on his hands without having to consider the legality of his 
procedure.  It is admittedly unlikely that the existing law keeps many transplant teams 
awake at night.  Nevertheless, at present they are undoubtedly exposed to an irritant 
and a theoretical risk of forensic indignity to which they ought not to be subjected.150 
 
Due to the nature of a tissue donation procedure the need for a statute to establish its 
lawfulness beyond doubt is: 
 
connected to the lack of therapeutic benefit to the donor and could be regarded as 
implying that, in the absence of clear statutory authorisation, the lack of such a benefit 
would render the practice questionable and potentially not within the boundaries of 
proper medical treatment.151 
 
Unlike other medical procedures, the lawfulness of tissue donation from a living 
individual is established by statute in England and Wales, and Scotland in the Human 
Tissue Act 2004, and the Human Tissue (Scotland) Act 2006 respectively.  This may 
provide some indication of the exceptional nature of this kind of medical procedure, 
since all medical procedures are not included in statute in order to establish their 
lawfulness.   
 
150 Lord Justice E Davies, ‘A Legal Look at Transplants’ (1969) 62 Journal of the Royal Society of 
Medicine 633, 634. 




2.5 Concluding thoughts  
This chapter has analysed the principle of autonomy, where I adopted Beauchamp and 
Childress’s notion of autonomy: an action, or a decision to undergo an action, is 
autonomous when an individual meets three requirements.  These requirements are that 
the individual acts: (1) intentionally, (2) with understanding, and (3) without control 
from internal states or external sources.  I explored the principle of relational autonomy 
concluding that my interpretation is that if an individual makes an autonomous 
relational decision then that decision is made by considering the networks of 
relationships with others.  In other words, for an individual to make a decision they need 
to take into account their relationships with others that underpin their lives, such as 
familial and societal relationships.  I used the example of Alex making a decision to go 
to the shop to assist the reader in the application of relational autonomy.  Moreover, in 
order to assist the reader as to what factors should be considered when examining a 
relationship, I devised a list of factors and applied them to the different types of 
relationships.  I introduced the new and novel principle of relational parental decision-
making, and explained it using the example of Kat, Chris, and Caitlin.  I concluded that, 
as with relational autonomy, when those with PR are making a decision on behalf of an 
incompetent minor, they need to take into account the minor’s relationships with others, 
and the list of factors can assist them when considering the weight of a particular 
relationship.   
 
The next chapter will provide a clear conception of what the regulatory framework of 
living minors as tissue donors actually says and identify where its defects lie.  The 
discussion will comprise of two predominant aspects, first, I will produce a number of 
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tables and charts that provide a summary of the legislation and professional guidance 
with regard to the donation process.  These tables and charts are merely a condensed 
and simplified form of the lengthy and complex information that is available about the 
donation process so the regulatory framework is clear to the reader.  Secondly, by 
developing the discussion in this chapter on the test for information disclosure 
established in Montgomery when considering the differences between the term consent 
as used in the 2004 Act and the term authorisation as used in the 2006 Act.  I will 
consider whether there is a material difference between the two terms, by examining 
the legal definitions as well as their interpretation in the Codes of Practice.  I shall 
conclude that the difference between the two terms is superficial as the test for informed 



















Regulatory Framework of Tissue Donation 
 
3.1 Introduction 
The regulatory framework of medicine is a combination of legal regulation and 
professional guidance, which includes codes of practice (CoP).  This is evident in 
England and Wales, and Scotland in relation to tissue donation from living minors.  The 
current legislation that regulates tissue donation from living minors in England and 
Wales, and Scotland is the Human Tissue Act 2004, and the Human Tissue (Scotland) 
Act 2006 respectively.  The Human Tissue Authority (HTA)152  have produced a 
number of CoP and guidance documents that supplement this legislation.  This 
regulatory framework was implemented following the organ retention scandals that 
became public knowledge in the late 1990s and early 2000s.    
 
There are two main aspects to this chapter.  First, as one of the aims of this thesis is to 
recommend reform to the regulatory framework, I need to provide a clear conception of 
what the regulatory framework actually says and identify where its defects lie.  In order 
to do this, I will produce a number of tables and charts that provide a summary of the 
legislation and professional guidance with regard to the donation process.  These tables 
and charts are merely a condensed and simplified form of the lengthy and complex 
information that is available about the donation process.  I will produce them to assist 
the reader so there is a basis for comparison between the current framework and my 
proposed developments.  Moreover, there is scope that they could be considered by the 
 
152 see Chapter 1 at 1.2.3 for information about role of the Human Tissue Authority.   
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HTA to assist when creating a more workable conception of the donation process for 
medical professionals as well as donors, recipients, and the general public.   
 
Secondly, I will analyse the difference between the use of the term ‘appropriate consent’ 
in the 2004 Act compared to the use of the term ‘authorisation’ in the 2006 Act.  I will 
consider whether there is a material difference between the two terms, by examining 
the legal definitions as well as their interpretation in the CoP.  I shall conclude that the 
difference between the two terms is superficial as the test for informed consent and 
informed authorisation are identical.  It would be clearer and more precise if the term 
consent is used and replaces authorisation in the 2006 Act with regard to tissue donation. 
 
3.2 Organ Retention Scandals   
In 1999 it became public knowledge that organs and tissue were being retained after 
post-mortem examinations, predominantly at the Bristol Royal Infirmary and the Royal 
Liverpool Children’s Hospital (Alder Hey).153  As a result, the Government launched 
several inquiries to investigate post-mortem practice.154  These organ retention scandals 
resulted in the Human Tissue Act 1961 and the Human Organs Transplant Act 1989 
being repealed.155  This was based on the recommendation by the Chief Medical Officer 
in The Removal, Retention and use of Human Organs and Tissue from Post-Mortem 
 
153 Valerie M Sheach Leith, ‘Consent and nothing but consent?  The organ retention scandal’ (2007) 29(7) 
Sociology of Health and Illness 1023. 
154 House of Commons, The Royal Liverpool Children’s Inquiry Report (HC12-II, The Stationery Office 
1999) (Redfern Inquiry); Bristol Royal Infirmary, The Report of the Public Inquiry into Children’s Heart 
Surgery at the Bristol Royal Infirmary 1984-1995: Learning from Bristol (Cm 5207(I), 2001) (Kennedy 
Inquiry); Scottish Executive, Independent Review Group on Retention of Organs at Post-Mortem: Final 
Report (Crown 2001); Northern Ireland Executive, The Human Organs Inquiry Report (Crown 2002); 
HM Inspector of Anatomy, Issacs Report: The investigation of events that followed the death of Cyril 
Mark Issacs (Stationery Office 2003).  See also Human Tissue Act 2004, Explanatory Notes para 5.   
155 The Anatomy Act 1984 was repealed in England and Wales, and amended in Scotland; see Chapter 1 
at 1.2.2 for further discussion about the Human Organ Transplants Act 1989. 
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Examination report that the law on consent for the retention and potential use of human 
tissue must be amended with immediate effect: 
 
to clarify that consent must be sought from those with parental responsibility for the 
retention of tissue or organs from post-mortem on children beyond the time necessary 
to establish the cause of death.156 
 
Legislation on the lawful storage and use of human bodies, body parts, organs and tissue 
from the living and the deceased was implemented in England157 and Wales158, under 
the Human Tissue Act 2004 with the introduction of an ‘appropriate consent’ regime, 
and in Scotland159, under the Human Tissue (Scotland) Act 2006 with the introduction 
of an ‘authorisation’ regime.  This was the first time that the regulation of tissue 
donation in England and Wales was separated from the regulation of tissue donation in 
Scotland by the enactment of two pieces of separate legislation.  The reasoning for this 
was because Scotland wanted to enact legislation that was different from the one 
proposed in England and Wales.  While the 2004 Act and 2006 Act provided a more 
comprehensive form of regulation of the use of human tissue, compared to previous 
legislation, they have proved to be less than satisfactory as they are supplemented with 
copious amounts of complex and incomplete CoP that fail to provide information that 
is readily understood.  I am now going to discuss the 2004 Act, and the 2006 Act, the 
corresponding regulations, and the CoP produced by the HTA that supplement them to 
provide a clearer understanding of the current regulatory framework.  
 
 
156 Department of Health, Department for Education and Employment, and Home Office, The removal, 
retention and use of human organs and tissue from post-mortem examination (London 2001) 38; Human 
Tissue Act 2004, Explanatory Notes para 6. 
157 Human Tissue Act 2004 and the Organ Donation (Deemed) Consent Act 2019. 
158 Human Tissue Act 2004 and the Human Transplantation (Wales) Act 2013. 
159 Human Tissue (Scotland) Act 2006 and the Human Tissue (Authorisation) (Scotland) Act 2019.   
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3.3 Human Tissue Act 2004 
The Act which currently regulates the removal, retention, and use of tissue from the 
living in England and Wales is the 2004 Act.160  In a departure from previous 
legislation,161 the 2004 Act made ‘appropriate consent’ a fundamental principle.  The 
‘activities’ that are lawful if ‘appropriate consent’ has been provided are set out in 
section 1(1).162  Although the 2004 Act emphasises the importance of consent, it does 
not explicitly define ‘appropriate consent’163, the presumption is that the informed 
consent test as set out in Montgomery v Lanarkshire Health Board164 is the standard 
that needs to be met.  The aim of the 2004 Act was only to be a framework so it did not 
provide extensive information about the donation procedure nor contain provisions to 
remedy all issues that arose in the organ retention scandals.  For example, the legislation 
does not create civil remedies for families and individuals distressed by the non-
consensual use of tissue,165 which could have been an important inclusion in the Act 
following the events of the organ retention scandals.   
 
The 2004 Act is supplemented by CoP that aim to provide practical guidance as to the 
application of the law of the use and storage of human tissue.166  Although updates have 
been made over time with a view to produce more workable guidance, the major 
problem is that they continue to be long and complex documents.  For instance, there 
 
160 Organ donation from deceased individuals is regulated by the Human Transplantation (Wales) Act 
2013 in Wales, and by the Organ Donation (Deemed) Consent Act 2019 in England.  
161 Human Organ Transplant Act 1989. 
162 Human Tissue Act 2004, s.1(1).  
163 HC Deb 15 January 2004 vol 416 cc984-1045. 
164 [2015] UKSC 11, [93]; see Chapter 2 at 2.4.1 for further discussion about Montgomery. 
165 Kathleen Liddell and Alison Hall, ‘Beyond Bristol and Alder Hey: The future regulation of human 
tissue’ (2005) 13 Medical Law Review 170, 184; it is possible that compensation for wrongful retention 
or use in research might now be obtained through criminal inquiry compensation schemes.  But otherwise 
wronged families and individuals will continue to find it difficult to obtain compensation; AB v Leeds 
Teaching Hospital NHS Trust [2004] EWHC 644 (QB).   
166 Human Tissue Act 2004, s.26(2); Human Tissue Authority, HTA Codes of Practice and Standards 
<https://www.hta.gov.uk/hta-codes-practice-and-standards-0> accessed 08/02/2019.   
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are separate CoP for the donation of a solid organ/non-regenerative tissue 167 (Code of 
Practice F168) and the donation of regenerative tissue (Code of Practice G169).  To 
complicate matters further, the guidance on the principle of consent is in a separate CoP 
(Code of Practice A).170  This unwieldy system requires a medical professional not only 
to collate information from a number of CoP, but also interpret them in practice.  
Following the interpretation of the CoP, the medical professional would then have to 
make a judgment as to whether the donation should proceed.  This complicated set of 
guidance could lead to inadvertent breaches of the CoP by medical professionals.  
 
 It is the norm that CoP are for the use of a medical professional, and the HTA state 
words to this effect ‘The Codes give practical guidance to professionals carrying out 
activities which lie within the HTA’s remit under the HT Act.’171  However, they further 
state that ‘they will also be of interest to members of the public’172 which infers that 
members of the public may consult the CoP, this could include the donor, the donor’s 
family, the recipient and other people who are involved in the donation process.  If the 
CoP are also targeted at a public audience then the HTA need to ensure that they are 
readily understood by this audience.  I argue that the information within the CoP is not 
set out in a readily understood manner for those involved in the donation process who 
may want to consider the finer details of the donation process.   
 
 
167 see Chapter 1 at 1.1.2 for the definition of non-regenerative tissue. 
168 Human Tissue Authority, Code of Practice F: Donation of solid organs and tissue for transplantation 
(2017).   
169 Human Tissue Authority, Code of Practice G: Donation of allogeneic bone marrow and peripheral 
blood stem cells for transplantation (2017).   
170 Human Tissue Authority, Code of Practice A: Guiding Principles and the Fundamental Principle of 
Consent (2017). 
171 HTA, Code of Practice F (n 168) para 4.   
172 HTA, Code of Practice F (n 168) para 4.   
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Not only do the CoP appear overly complex, but they are also incomplete as they are 
expected to cover such a wide number of matters.  The inclusion of CoP were a planned 
addition to the framework set out by the 2004 Act, but they were not produced by the 
HTA until the 2004 Act was enacted which meant that Members of Parliament (MPs) 
were uncertain on the final form of regulation as a whole when debating the 2004 Act: 
‘I fear that the Bill [the 2004 Act] leaves so many aspects to be covered by codes of 
practice in the future that the House can have but little idea of what the actual landscape 
that will eventually result will look like.’173  In some instances, MPs such as Mr Andrew 
Lansley, expected that the HTA in their CoP would set out relevant definitions, such as 
for ‘appropriate consent’.174  However, this did not happen, meaning that the informed 
test as set out in Montgomery is used, and if there is a dispute over whether ‘appropriate 
consent’ has been provided, this is a matter that will need to be decided by the court.  
 
I suggest that CoP can continue to be produced by the HTA, but the format and content 
of the CoP need to be revised.  At the moment, each CoP considers both adults and 
minors, but I recommend that there should be one CoP that covers living adults as tissue 
donors, and a separate CoP that covers living minors as tissue donors.  This CoP would 
include all of the relevant guidance that is required in order for a living minor to be a 
tissue donor.  This includes the information on consent that is currently included within 
CoP A.  Medical professionals are currently required to cross-reference between 
different CoP to ensure that they have all of the necessary information.  This new CoP 




173 Hansard (n 163). 
174 Hansard (n 163). 
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3.3.1 Tissue Donation from Living Minors in England and Wales 
The 2004 Act permits the removal or use of ‘transplantable material’175 from a living 
minor for the purpose of transplantation.176  In order for a donation to proceed the 
conditions specified in the Human Tissue Act 2004 (Persons who Lack Capacity to 
Consent and Transplant) Regulations 2006 must be met.177  Section 54(1) of the 2004 
Act defines minors, for the purposes of the Act, as individuals under the age of 18.   
 
My analysis of the regulatory framework will be split into two sections, first, 
incompetent minors, and secondly, competent minors.  Within these two sections I will 
consider the regulation of solid organ/non-regenerative tissue, and regenerative tissue 
separately as these are addressed separately in the CoP.  As domino transplant is a type 
of solid organ donation, since it involves the donation of the heart, it will be considered 
under solid organ/non-regenerative tissue donation.178  This structure has been used in 
an attempt to minimise confusion when discussing the relevant legislation and CoP. 
 
3.3.1.1  Incompetent Minor 
Incompetent minors are those that cannot provide consent on their own behalf to be a 
tissue donor,179 consequently, an individual with PR will provide consent on the minor’s 
behalf.  Section 2(3) of the 2004 Act states that ‘appropriate consent’ means that consent 
of a person who has parental responsibility for him’.   
 
 
175 Human Tissue Act 2004 (Persons who Lack Capacity to Consent and Transplant) Regulations 2006, 
reg.10(1) defines ‘transplantable material’ as ‘an organ or part of an organ if it is to be used for the same 
purpose as the entire organ in the human body; bone marrow; and peripheral blood stem cells, where that 
material is removed from the body of a living person with the intention that it be transplanted into another 
person.’ 
176 Human Tissue Act 2004, s.33. 
177 HTA, Code of Practice F (n 168) para 18.  See also paras 35-39 for further information.     
178 see Chapter 1 at 1.1.2 for the definition of domino transplant. 
179 see Chapter 5 for further discussion of incompetent minors as tissue donors. 
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3.3.1.1.1 Solid Organs/Non-Regenerative Tissue 
CoP F, which deals solely with the donation of solid organs/non-regenerative tissue for 
transplantation, contains limited information about the use of living minors as tissue 
donors because minors are only considered ‘in extremely rare circumstances.’180  
Therefore, in such cases the decision as to the lawfulness of the donation is heavily 
placed on court approval and HTA approval.  Normally, in relation to a medical 
procedure, the consent of just one individual with PR suffices.181  However, the courts 
have made it clear that where a major or irreversible decision needs to be made about a 
minor, or where there is disagreement between those sharing PR, both parents’ consent 
is required or the case must be referred to the court.182  Accordingly, if non-regenerative 
tissue donation from a living minor is to be considered ‘a major or irreversible decision’, 
the courts will require the consent from all of those who have PR for the minor. 
 
If the donation is going to proceed, then once consent has been provided by those with 
PR, an Independent Assessor (IA) must separately interview the potential donor, the 
recipient, and one of the individuals with PR to assess whether the HTA requirements 
have been met.183  The HTA provide guidance on what must be covered in the interview 
depending on whether it is with the donor, recipient, or those with PR for the donor.184  
In addition, as donation between siblings is a directed donation, an interview must be 
undertaken with the donor and recipient together.185  The purpose of this combined 
interview is threefold: to observe the interaction between the donor and recipient, to 
 
180 HTA, Code of Practice F (n 168) para 44.   
181 General Medical Council, Treatment and Care Towards the End of Life: good practice in decision 
making (2010) para 104.   
182 see Re J (Child’s Religious Upbringing and Circumcision) [1992] 2 FLR 1004 CA for discussion on 
parental disagreement over medical treatment of a minor.   
183 HTA, Code of Practice F (n 168) paras 35, 70 and 95; Human Tissue Act 2004 (Persons who Lack 
Capacity to Consent and Transplants) Regulation 2006, reg.11(3)(a) and (b).   
184 HTA, Code of Practice F (n 168) paras 37-38.  
185 HTA, Code of Practice F (n 168) para 84. 
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understand whether ‘duress or coercion’186 are factors in the donor’s decision to donate, 
and to consider the issue of ‘reward’ for the donation.187  These interviews are an 
independent safeguard to prevent the exploitation of minors as tissue donors as any 
concerns about coercion, or a reward should be identified during these interviews.   
 
However, while these issues should be identified within the interview, the HTA do not 
go any further and undertake any risk and benefit analysis or consider the best interests 
of the minor donor.  The absence of this extra layer of safeguards has come under 
criticism in the recent case of A NHS Foundation Trust v MC (by her Litigation Friend 
the Official Solicitor)188, however, Cohen J did not go any further by proposing 
recommendations to the current system or state whether in practice safeguards should 
be undertaken in every tissue donation.  In my opinion, this suggestion does have some 
foundation as it would provide a further layer of protection to the minor donor’s 
interests.  However, the role of the medical professionals, those with PR, and court 
approval should ensure that the minor donor’s interests have been adequately assessed 
and if the donation takes place that it is in the minor’s best interests.   
 
Once the IA has conducted the necessary interviews and produced a report it is 
submitted for approval by the HTA.189  If a medical professional intends to consider a 
living minor as a tissue donor, they are advised to discuss the case with the HTA ‘at the 
earliest opportunity’.190  But these cases must only be referred to the HTA for approval 
 
186 Even though the HTA uses both of the terms coercion and duress, for the purposes of this discussion 
I am only going to use the term coercion to cover both duress and coercion. 
187 HTA, Code of Practice F (n 168) para 84. 
188 [2020] EWCOP 33 [22].   
189 HTA, Code of Practice G (n 169) paras 11 and 29.   
190 HTA, Code of Practice G (n 169) para 44. 
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after court approval for the donation has been obtained.191  If all of these requirements 
are fulfilled then a living minor may donate a solid organ/non-regenerative tissue.   
 
With regard to a domino transplant, HTA approval is not required, only court 
approval.192  This may be because a solid organ is being donated, specifically the heart, 
but because the minor is already undergoing the operation to receive a lung transplant, 
safeguards to protect the interests of the minor donor do not need to be quite as robust 
since the donation part of the procedure is secondary to the main purpose of the 
operation.  
 
3.3.1.1.2 Regenerative Tissue  
The donation of regenerative tissue by a living minor is a more common process, and 
CoP G provides guidance for medical professionals about the requirements for the 
donation process.  The 2004 Act makes it an offence to remove bone marrow from a 
living person for the purpose of transplantation unless the HTA give permission or 
where the 2006 Regulations provide an exemption to the definition of transplantable 
material for the purpose of the Act.193  Therefore, the HTA assess applications for the 
donation of regenerative tissue from minors who are incompetent, thus requiring 
consent from an individual who has PR.194  The donation must be assessed as being in 
the minor’s overall best interests to include not only the medical but also the emotional, 
psychological, and social aspects of the donation, as well as the associated potential 
risks.195 
 
191 HTA, Code of Practice G (n 169) para 46.   
192 HTA, Code of Practice G (n 169) para 32. 
193 HTA, Code of Practice G (n 169) para 11; Human Tissue Act 2004, s.33. 
194 HTA, Code of Practice G (n 169) para 12. 




The level of information disclosure that is provided to those with PR when they are 
consenting on behalf of a minor is the same as when an individual is providing consent 
on their own behalf, subsequently satisfying the test in Montgomery.196  In addition, the 
HTA provide specific guidance for bone marrow donation as to the amount of 
information that should be provided to those with PR when consenting on behalf of a 
minor.197  Unlike for solid organ/non-regenerative tissue donation, in order for a 
regenerative tissue donation to proceed, the consent of only one individual with PR is 
necessary.198  But if there is a dispute between those with PR or any doubt as to whether 
the decision to donate is in the minor’s best interests, the matter should be referred to 
the Court of Protection for approval.199  In such instances, the HTA would then only 
approve the donation if the court was of the view that donation was in the best interests 
of the minor donor.200  Normally, court approval for the removal of regenerative tissue 
from an incompetent minor is not required.201 
 
Once consent has been provided, in all cases the Accredited Assessor (AA) must 
undertake, or attempt to undertake, an interview with the potential donor and recipient 
in order to assess whether the HTA requirements have been met.202  The only exception 
is where the donor lacks capacity, for example attempting an interview with a baby or 
pre-verbal minor would waste both time and resources.203  Interviews should take place 
with both the donor and recipient at a level appropriate to their age and understanding.204  
 
196 [2015] UKSC 11, [93]. 
197 HTA, Code of Practice G (n 169) para 78.   
198 HTA, Code of Practice G (n 169) para 74.   
199 HTA, Code of Practice G (n 169) para 77. 
200 HTA, Code of Practice G (n 169) para 77. 
201 HTA, Code of Practice G (n 169) para 48. 
202 HTA, Code of Practice G (n 169) paras 52, 97 and 112. 
203 HTA, Code of Practice G (n 169) para 97. 
204 HTA, Code of Practice G (n 169) para 112.  
88 
 
Moreover, the AA should interview younger minor donors along with those with PR 
who are providing the consent on their behalf.205  The HTA provide guidance on what 
must be covered in the interview depending on whether it is the donor, or the 
recipient.206  If all of these requirements are fulfilled then an incompetent minor can 
donate regenerative tissue.   
 
3.3.1.2  Competent Minor  
Competent minors can consent on their own behalf to be a tissue donor if they meet the 
requirements set out by the 2004 Act and the HTA.  Section 2(2) of the 2004 Act states 
that, ‘subject to subsection (3), where the child concerned is alive, ‘appropriate consent’ 
means their consent’.  The 2004 Act does not state how to assess the minor’s 
competence,207 but according to the HTA, ‘the Gillick test is considered to be the 
appropriate benchmark for assessing a child’s competence.’208  The Gillick competence 
test states that a minor under the age of 16 is considered to be competent to consent to 
a medical procedure when they ‘can demonstrate sufficient understanding and 
intelligence to enable them to fully understand what is proposed.’209  However, the 
courts are yet to consider whether a Gillick competent minor can sufficiently understand 
the risks and implications of being a tissue donor in order to provide appropriate 
consent.  In relation to a minor who is 16- or 17- years old, capacity is defined in section 
2(1) and section 3(1) of the Mental Capacity Act 2005; and section 8 of the Family Law 
 
205 HTA, Code of Practice G (n 169) para 114.   
206 HTA, Code of Practice G (n 169) paras 54-55. 
207 Hansard (n 163); HTA, Code of Practice A (n 170) para 131. 
208 HTA, Code of Practice A (n 170) paras 88 and 131; Human Tissue Authority, Code of Practice G (n 
169) para 41. 
209 Gillick v West Norfolk and Wisbech Area Health Authority [1985] 3 All ER 402, 423; see Chapter 6 
at 6.2.1 for further discussion on the Gillick competence test.   
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Reform Act 1969 permits them to consent to ‘medical, dental and surgical treatment’, 
but whether tissue donation can be classed as medical treatment is disputed.210 
 
The guidance provided by the HTA state that the consent of a competent minor will be 
respected by the medical professional, as once the minor donor has provided consent 
for the donation to proceed then no other individual has a legal right to revoke it, and 
the decision rests with the donor who is undergoing the donation.211  Therefore, consent 
from an individual with PR on behalf of a competent minor will not be treated by the 
HTA as lawful consent.212 
 
3.3.1.2.1 Solid Organs/Non-Regenerative Tissue 
As already discussed previously, there is limited information in CoP F, which deals 
solely with the donation of solid organs/non-regenerative tissue for transplantation 
purposes, about living minors as tissue donors.  Similarly, as with tissue donation from 
incompetent minors, if the donation is going to proceed then once consent has been 
provided by the minor donor an IA must separately interview the potential donor, and 
the recipient to assess whether the HTA requirements have been met.213  The HTA 
provide guidance on what must be covered in the interview depending on whether it is 
with the donor or recipient.214  As with incompetent minors, since donation between 
siblings is a directed donation, an interview must be undertaken with the donor and the 
recipient together.215  Once the IA has conducted the necessary interviews and produced 
 
210 HTA, Code of Practice G (n 169) paras 45 and 46; see Chapter 6 at 6.3 for further discussion on 16- 
and 17- year olds. 
211 HTA, Code of Practice A (n 170) para 21.   
212 HTA, Code of Practice G (169) para 44. 
213 HTA, Code of Practice F (n 168) paras 70 and 95; Human Tissue Act 2004 (Persons who Lack 
Capacity to Consent and Transplants) Regulation 2006, reg.11(3)(a) and (b). 
214 HTA, Code of Practice F (n 168) paras 54-55.  
215 HTA, Code of Practice F (n 168) para 84. 
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a report it is submitted for approval by the HTA.216  If a medical professional intends to 
consider a living minor as a tissue donor, they are advised to discuss the case with the 
HTA ‘at the earliest opportunity’.217  But these cases must only be referred to the HTA 
for approval after court approval for the donation has been obtained.218  The only 
exception to the requirement is for a domino transplant where HTA approval is not 
required.219  The HTA stipulate that court approval should be obtained before the 
donation proceeds even if the minor donor is competent.220 
 
The information disclosure test in Montgomery221 must be satisfied in order for 
informed consent to be provided by a minor.  The HTA have provided further 
information as to the level of information disclosure required in order for a competent 
minor to consent to donating a solid organ/non-regenerative tissue.222  All of these 
requirements allow for a comprehensive process of information disclosure before a 
minor provides consent to donate.  If all the requirements are fulfilled then the donation 
may proceed. 
 
3.3.1.2.2 Regenerative Tissue  
The donation of regenerative tissue by a living minor is a more common process than 
donation of solid organs/non-regenerative tissue, and CoP G provides guidance for 
medical professionals as to the requirements for the donation process.  As with donation 
from incompetent minors, the 2004 Act makes it an offence to remove bone marrow 
 
216 HTA, Code of Practice F (n 168) paras 11 and 29.   
217 HTA, Code of Practice F (n 168) para 44. 
218 HTA, Code of Practice F (n 168) para 46.   
219 HTA, Code of Practice F (n 168) para 32. 
220 HTA, Code of Practice F (n 168) para 45. 
221 [2015] UKSC 11, [93]. 
222 HTA, Code of Practice F (n 168) para 70. 
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from a living person for the purpose of transplantation unless the HTA give permission 
or where the 2006 Regulations provide an exemption to the definition of transplantable 
material for the purpose of the Act.223  In contrast to incompetent minors where HTA 
approval is required, competent minors fall under the exemption provided by the 2006 
Regulations.224  Therefore, tissue donation from a competent minor can proceed without 
HTA approval.225   
 
In all cases the AA must undertake, or attempt to undertake, an interview with the 
potential donor and recipient in order to assess whether the HTA requirements have 
been met.226  Interviews should take place both with the donor and recipient at a level 
appropriate to their age and understanding.227  There could be an instance where the 
donor is a competent minor while the recipient is much younger and have a level of 
understanding akin to an incompetent minor.  The HTA provide guidance on what must 
be covered in the interview depending on whether it is with the donor, or the recipient.228  
But unlike for incompetent minors or for solid organ/non-regenerative tissue donation, 
the HTA do not provide guidance about the amount of information disclosure for a 
competent minor.  This would indicate that the only test that needs to be satisfied for 
consent to be provided is the test in Montgomery229.  If all the requirements are fulfilled 
then the donation may proceed. 
 
 
223 HTA, Code of Practice G (n 169) para 11; Human Tissue Act 2004, s.33.  
224 HTA, Code of Practice G (n 169) para 11. 
225 HTA, Code of Practice G (n 169) para 11.  See also para 25.   
226 HTA, Code of Practice G (n 169) paras 52, 97 and 112. 
227 HTA, Code of Practice G (n 169) para 112.  
228 HTA, Code of Practice G (n 169) paras 54-55. 
229 [2015] UKSC 11, [93]. 
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Tissue donation from a competent minor can proceed without HTA approval or court 
approval.  Therefore, a regenerative tissue donation may proceed with a competent 
minor without any safeguarding approval from an independent body.  The HTA have 
not provided a reason as to why it has decided that a regenerative tissue donation may 
proceed with a competent minor without any safeguarding approval from an 
independent body.  An interview will take place with the AA, as discussed in the 
previous paragraph, and the role of the AA is to ensure that  
 
the donor has an age-appropriate understanding of the procedure, to ascertain that there 
is no evidence of duress or coercion having been placed on the donor and to ensure 
there is no evidence of the donor having sought, or been offered, a reward.230 
 
While this interview will take place, HTA approval is not required to authorise the 
donation.  Since an AA is submitting a report to the HTA as a result of the interviews it 
would seem reasonable that the HTA would then approve the donation.  It is unclear 
from the guidance what HTA approval adds to the report that is submitted by the AA, 
but it is my contention that where a competent minor is going to donate regenerative 
tissue there should be HTA approval to ensure that all of the steps of the donation 
procedure have been met as well as all of the legal requirements and professional 
guidance requirements.  This would ensure that the minor donor’s interests are 






230 HTA, Code of Practice G (n 169) para 96. 
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3.3.2 Summary of the Regulatory Framework in England and Wales  
I have produced Table 3 that provides a summary of information about whether court 
or HTA approval is required depending on the type of tissue being donated, and on 
whether the minor is competent or not.   
 
Table 3: England and Wales: HTA and Court Approval  
Type of Donation Court Approval HTA Approval 
Solid Organ/Non-regenerative Tissue √ √ 
Domino Transplant √ X 
Regenerative 
Tissue 
Competent X X 
Incompetent X231 √ 
 
I have also produced Table 4 that provides information about who should be interviewed 
depending on the type of tissue being donated, and whether the minor is competent or 
incompetent.   
 















given by IA) 
Competent √ √ X √ 
Incompetent √ √ √ √ 
Regenerative 
Tissue (Interview 
given by AA) 
Competent √ √ X X 
Incompetent √ √ √ X 
 




I suggest that tables such as these should be produced by the HTA as summary 
documents in order for the information about the donation process to be more readily 
understood to both medical professionals and members of the public.  This information 
may be useful for the donor, and recipient, as well as those with PR who are providing 
consent on behalf of an incompetent minor so they have a clear understanding of the 
stages of the donation process.  I have now provided a clear conception of the regulatory 
framework for tissue donation in England and Wales; the next section of this chapter 
will provide the same for Scotland.   
 
3.4 Human Tissue (Scotland) Act 2006 
The Act that currently regulates the use of human organs and tissue, including donation 
for the purposes of transplantation, in Scotland is the 2006 Act.  While the 2004 Act 
and the 2006 Act contain many similar provisions, unlike the 2004 Act, the 2006 Act is 
not supplemented by copious CoP.  Instead, there are two main sets of guidance: Human 
Tissue (Scotland) Act 2006: A Guide to its Implications for NHS Scotland, and 
Guidance for Transplant Teams, Independent Assessors, and Accredited Assessors in 
Scotland.232  This allows for a more streamlined set of guidance that a medical 
professional is required to refer to.  The reduced amount of information in the guidance 
may be because, unlike the 2004 Act, the 2006 Act is not a framework but is more 
substantive in its contents.  Moreover, the 2004 Act uses the term ‘appropriate consent’ 
while the 2006 Act uses the term ‘authorisation’.  The distinction between the two terms 
 
232 Human Tissue Authority, Human Tissue (Scotland) Act 2006: A guide to its implications for NHS 
Scotland (2006); Human Tissue Authority, Guidance for Transplant Teams, Independent Assessors, and 
Accredited Assessors in Scotland (2017). 
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is most prevalent in relation to information disclosure of the medical risks of a tissue 
donation procedure.  
 
3.4.1 Appropriate Consent vs Authorisation 
Before any medical procedure can be carried out, consent must be provided by either a 
competent individual, or someone on behalf of an incompetent individual.  It must also 
be ‘informed’ as set out in Montgomery233.  The 2004 Act in relation to tissue donation 
uses the term consent, but 2006 Act has instead adopted the term authorisation.  
Authorisation as defined by the Medical Research Council guidance in relation to the 
use of human tissue for transplantation purposes is: 
 
an expression intended to convey that people have the right to express, during their 
lifetime, their wishes about what should happen to their bodies after death, in the 
expectation that those wishes will be respected.234   
 
Scottish Parliament noted when debating the 2006 Bill that there is a difference between 
the term authorisation and the term consent.235  The difference is that for an individual 
to give authorisation they do not need to have received the same level of information 
disclosure about the procedure as they would have done if they were required to provide 
consent.236  So, this essentially means that, in the case of authorisation the procedure 
can be carried out without the person providing authorisation having been fully 
informed.   
 
233 [2015] UKSC 11, [93]. 
234 Medical Research Council, Summary of Legal Requirements for Research with Human Tissue in 
Scotland (2006) 1; NHS Blood and Transplant, ‘The Human Tissue Scotland Act 2006’ 
<https://www.odt.nhs.uk/odt-structures-and-standards/regulation/the-human-tissue-scotland-act-2006/> 
accessed 15/07/2018.  







The use of the term authorisation was carefully considered by the Scottish Parliament 
before being selected.  Following the organ retention scandals, Scotland’s Independent 
Review Group on the Retention of Organs at Post-Mortem was set up to review the 
current law on post-mortem examinations and make recommendations for changes to 
that law.  This review group recommended that the term consent was ‘inappropriate and 
misleading’237 and that the term authorisation be used for two main reasons.  First, 
providing consent to a procedure on behalf of a minor rests on their best interests, and 
the minor is alive when the procedure is carried out, but this obviously cannot be the 
case regarding a post-mortem examination.  It could be argued that the post-mortem 
examination of a minor may be in the best interests of surviving or future family 
members if the minor died of a hereditary disease or in the interests of medical research 
for wider society, but the interpretation of best interests should be in terms of accruing 
benefits for the minor which cannot occur after they have died.238   
 
Secondly, consent implies that the decision is based on fully informed disclosure in 
compliance with Montgomery, but it is feasible that a post-mortem examination presents 
a situation where those with PR might not want to receive detailed information about 
the procedure, but do not object to that procedure occurring.239  The Review Group 
suggested that authorisation was not constrained by this full information disclosure, 
therefore, those with PR may authorise procedures without having information forced 
on them.240  This even allows for authorisation to be given when those with PR have 
 
237 Scottish Executive (n 154) para 3. 
238 Scottish Executive (n 154) Summary of Recommendations 3, 25, para 11.   
239 Margaret Brazier, ‘Organ retention and return: problems of consent’ (2002) 29 Journal of Medical 
Ethics 30, 30. 
240 Scottish Executive (n 154) para 17; Scottish Parliament, ‘Health Committee’ (n 235). 
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refused to be given details of what exactly will happen.241  While the reasoning for the 
use of the term authorisation was based on post-mortem examinations, this term has 
also been adopted in the 2006 Act for tissue donation.  Scottish Parliament did not 
provide any reasoning as to why they decided to use the term authorisation for all uses 
of human tissue under the 2006 Act.   
 
Even though Scottish Parliament carefully chose and used the term authorisation in the 
2006 Act so it would have a different interpretation to the term consent, there are two 
main instances that have indicated that in fact the two terms have an identical 
interpretation.  First, the HTA guidance contains information on what should be 
discussed with the donor in order for them to provide ‘informed authorisation’.242  The 
information that must be given to the donor is: 
  
a)  the nature of the surgical/medical procedure and medical treatments involved 
for the donor, and any material short and long-term risks.  A material risk is 
where, in the circumstances, a reasonable person in the donor’s position would 
be likely to attach significance to the risk, or the transplant team is, or should 
be reasonably aware that, the donor would be likely to attach significance to it.  
This information should include the risk of death to the donor; 
b)  the chances of the transplant being successful, and any significant side effects 
or complications for the recipient, and in particular the donor should be made 
aware of the possibility of graft failure in the recipient; 
c)  the right to withdraw authorisation at any time before the removal of the 
transplantable material; 
 
241 Scottish Executive (n 154) 30.   
242 Human Tissue Authority, Guidance for Transplant Teams, Independent Assessors, and Accredited 
Assessors in Scotland (2017) para 68.   
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d)  that the decision to donate must be free of duress or coercion; and 
e)  that it is an offence to give or receive a reward for the supply of, or for an offer 
to supply, any organ.  It is also an offence to seek to find a person willing to 
supply any organ for reward.  If found guilty of this offence a person may face 
up to three years in prison, a fine, or both.243 
 
The definition of informed authorisation is contained in part a) above.  This definition 
is identical to the test in Montgomery which is the legal test for informed consent.  In 
Montgomery it states: 
 
the test of materiality is whether in the circumstances of the particular case the court is 
satisfied that a reasonable person in the patients position would be likely to attach 
significance to the risk. Even if the risk be material, the doctor will not be liable if upon 
a reasonable assessment of his patients condition, he takes the view that a warning 
would be detrimental to his patients health.244 
 
While the HTA guidance does not carry the same legal weight as legislation or 
jurisprudence, and there are no formal sanctions should the guidance not be followed, 
the guidance assists medical professionals when they undertake activities that are 
regulated by the HTA, therefore, the guidance needs to be clear and accurate.245  In 
practice, the medical professional ascertains whether informed authorisation is being 
provided, and since neither legislation nor case law provide a definition of authorisation 
they would use the CoP and professional guidance produced by the HTA to assist them.  
Therefore, the medical professional needs to be clear as to the test as well as its 
application, and the guidance should be identical to the law.   
 
243 ibid. 
244 [2015] UKSC 11, [93]. 




Secondly, NHSBT provide an overview of the provisions of the 2006 Act on their 
website.  While they do not provide a definition for authorisation, they state that 
‘Authorisation equates to the principle of 'consent' on which the Human Tissue Act 
2004 is based.’246  This suggests that they interpret authorisation in the 2006 Act to have 
the same definition as the term consent in the 2004 Act.  The information on the NHSBT 
website is for the use of both medical professionals and members of the public, and if 
it states that authorisation has the same interpretation as consent then the test in 
Montgomery should be used for both the test of consent under the 2004 Act and the test 
of authorisation under the 2006 Act.     
 
In conclusion, the difference in the terms used in the 2004 Act and the 2006 Act is 
superficial as the test for informed consent and informed authorisation are identical.  
The guidance produced by the HTA and NHSBT hold more weight than Parliamentary 
discussion when the 2006 Act was a Bill.  If Scottish Parliament decide that the term 
authorisation should be given the meaning that was intended when the 2006 Bill was 
passed it should amend the legislation by providing a clear definition for authorisation.  
It is my contention that it would be clearer and more precise if the term consent is used 
and replaces authorisation in the 2006 Act in relation to tissue donation.   
 
Despite this argument, I have continued to use the term consent for the discussion on 
England and Wales, and the term authorisation for the discussion on Scotland for the 
remainder of this thesis because these are the correct legal terms when discussing the 
relevant law.  I have made this decision because I want to demonstrate the current law, 
 
246 NHS Blood and Transplant, ‘The Human Tissue Scotland Act 2006’ <https://www.odt.nhs.uk/odt-
structures-and-standards/regulation/the-human-tissue-scotland-act-2006/> accessed 04/09/2020.   
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and using the term consent when referring to Scotland would not be true to this, nor 
ease clarity for the reader when referring to Scottish sources. 
 
3.4.2 Tissue Donation from Living Minors in Scotland 
Unlike the 2004 Act, the 2006 Act puts restrictions on when a living minor can be a 
tissue donor.  The 2006 Act allows a minor to be a tissue donor in two situations: 
donation of regenerative tissue, and donation as part of a domino transplant operation.247  
Therefore, a minor cannot donate non-regenerative tissue.248  The 2006 Act defines, for 
the purposes of this Act, a minor as being an individual under the age of 16.249 
 
Tissue donation from living minors is regulated by the 2006 Act, Part 4 of the Human 
Organ and Tissue Live Transplants (Scotland) Regulations 2006, and professional 
guidance.  No explicit distinction is made in the legislation or professional guidance 
between incompetent and competent minors.  Nor does the 2006 Act provide guidance 
on how a minor’s competence should be assessed.  But, the HTA state that information 
for medical professionals about assessing a minor’s competency is available in the 
GMC 0-18 years guidance.250  The legislation governing the competency of minors is 
the Age of Legal Capacity (Scotland) Act 1991, in particular the competence test under 




247 Human Tissue (Scotland) Act 2006, s.17(4); see Appendix 1; HTA, Human Tissue (Scotland) Act 
2006 (n 232) para 23; see Chapter 1 at 1.1.2 for the definition of regenerative tissue and a domino 
transplant.   
248 see Chapter 1 at 1.1.2 for discussion on why a lobe of liver is considered non-regenerative tissue in 
law, while in medicine it is considered regenerative tissue.  
249 s.60(1); this provision is in line with the Age of Legal Capacity (Scotland) Act 1991, s.1, which 
provides likewise. 
250 HTA, Guidance for Transplant Teams, Independent Assessors, and Accredited Assessors in Scotland 
(n 242) para 13.   
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Once authorisation has been provided by the minor donor or those with PR, an IA or 
AA251 must separately interview the potential donor, the recipient, and an individual 
with PR for the incompetent donor to assess whether the HTA requirements have been 
met.252  The HTA provide guidance on what must be covered in the interview depending 
on whether it is the donor, recipient, or those with PR for the donor.253  Regulation 5(7) 
of the 2006 Regulations requires that the registered medical practitioner who has 
clinical responsibility for the donor must have referred the donation to the HTA.254  The 
report produced by the IA or AA must be submitted to the HTA.  Unlike in England 
and Wales under the 2004 Act, court approval is not required for any type of donation 
from a living minor in Scotland.   
 
3.4.2.1  Domino Transplant 
In the case of a domino transplant, an IA will conduct the necessary interviews with the 
potential donor and recipient to assess whether the HTA requirements have been met.255  
There is no statutory provision for someone to be interviewed on the recipient’s behalf, 
so a recipient interview must be attempted.256  In addition, the HTA consider it good 
practice to involve those with PR in these discussions but there is no legal role for them 
to respond on behalf of the minor.257  Subsequently, the report is sent to the HTA for 
 
251 If the minor is donating regenerative tissue they will be interviewed by an AA, if it is a domino 
transplant, they will be interviewed by an IA.   
252 Human Organ and Tissue Live Transplants (Scotland) Regulations 2006, reg. 5(8), reg. 5(9); Human 
Tissue (Scotland) Act 2006, s.20. 
253 Human Organ and Tissue Live Transplants (Scotland) Regulations 2006, reg. 5(10) provides 
information on the matters that should be discussed in an interview. 
254 Human Organ and Tissue Live Transplants (Scotland) Regulations 2006, reg. 5(11); the information 
that must be contained in the donor interview on top of that previously mentioned; Human Organ and 
Tissue Live Transplants (Scotland) Regulations 2006, reg. 5(12); what should be contained in the 
interview with those with PR.  
255 HTA, Guidance for Transplant Teams, Independent Assessors, and Accredited Assessors in Scotland 
(n 242) paras 38 and 87. 
256 HTA, Guidance for Transplant Teams, Independent Assessors, and Accredited Assessors in Scotland 
(n 242) para 88.   
257 HTA, Guidance for Transplant Teams, Independent Assessors, and Accredited Assessors in Scotland 
(n 242) para 88.   
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approval.258  Once authorisation has been provided and approval from the HTA 
obtained, the donation can proceed. 
 
As argued in relation to England and Wales, safeguards to protect the interests of the 
minor donor do not need to be quite as robust since the donation part of the procedure 
is secondary to the main purpose of the operation.259  However, it is interesting to note 
that the safeguard in England and Wales is in the form of court approval, and HTA 
approval is not required, while in Scotland it is the other way around where HTA 
approval is required and court approval is not.  There does not appear to be an 
explanation as to why Scotland has adopted a different approach, but because there is 
no court involvement in a standard donation process the safeguarding measures can only 
be provided by the HTA.   
 
3.4.2.2  Regenerative Tissue 
In Scotland, all potential regenerative tissue donations must be referred to an AA.260  
The AA must interview the donor, the person with PR for the incompetent donor, and 
the recipient.261  In all cases, the AA should undertake, or attempt to undertake, an 
interview with the donor.262  This may not be possible where the donor arguably lacks 
capacity.263  The AA must then submit a report to the HTA.  HTA approval must be in 
 
258 HTA, Guidance for Transplant Teams, Independent Assessors, and Accredited Assessors in Scotland 
(n 242) para 24(f).   
259 at 3.3.1.1.1. 
260 HTA, Guidance for Transplant Teams, Independent Assessors, and Accredited Assessors in Scotland 
(n 242) para 8.   
261 HTA, Guidance for Transplant Teams, Independent Assessors, and Accredited Assessors in Scotland 
(n 242) para 12. 
262 HTA, Guidance for Transplant Teams, Independent Assessors, and Accredited Assessors in Scotland 
(n 242) para 48. 
263 HTA, Guidance for Transplant Teams, Independent Assessors, and Accredited Assessors in Scotland 
(n 242) para 48. 
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place before the donation can proceed.264  This is the case whether or not the minor 
donor is considered competent.265  Once authorisation has been provided and the HTA 
have approved the donation it can proceed. 
 
3.4.3 Summary of the Regulatory Framework in Scotland 
Below is Table 5, which sets out when HTA and court approval is required for living 
minors as tissue donors in Scotland.   
 
Table 5: Scotland: HTA and Court Approval 
Type of Donation HTA Approval Court Approval 
Domino Transplant √ X 
Regenerative Tissue √ X 
 
Table 6 sets out when IA or AA interviews need to be undertaken, depending on the 
type of the tissue donated and whether the minor is competent or incompetent. 
 
Table 6: Scotland: IA and AA Interviews 
 Donor Recipient Those with 




Competent √ √ X 
Incompetent √ √ √ 
Regenerative 
Tissue 
Competent √ √ X 
Incompetent √ √ √ 
 
 
264 HTA, Guidance for Transplant Teams, Independent Assessors, and Accredited Assessors in Scotland 
(n 242) para 9. 
265 HTA, Guidance for Transplant Teams, Independent Assessors, and Accredited Assessors in Scotland 
(n 242) para 9. 
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I suggest that tables such as these should be produced by the HTA as summary 
documents in order for the information to be more accessible to medical professionals, 
and those involved in the donation process. This information may be useful for the 
donor, recipient, or those with PR who are providing authorisation on behalf of an 
incompetent minor so they have a clear understanding of the stages of the donation 
process.  
 
3.5 The Donation Process 
The process, both legally and physically, of a living minor being a tissue donor is long 
and arduous.  As I have already demonstrated, the professional guidance set out in 
complex documents does not aid understanding, therefore, I have produced the 
following flowcharts in order to provide an overview of the donation process.  
Moreover, they could be used as a checklist for a medical professional to ensure that all 
stages of the donation process have been completed.  Figure 3 is for England and Wales, 
and Figure 4 is for Scotland.  I have produced separate flowcharts as there are different 

















Identify a potential living donor. (Check histocompatibility) 
Is the potential donor a minor? 
Yes No 
Identify relevant regulations for 
tissue donation from living adults. 
Is the minor competent to 
consent to the donation? 
Yes No 
Gain informed consent 
from the donor. 
Gain informed consent from 
those with PR for the donor. 
Is the tissue non-regenerative or regenerative? 
Non-regenerative tissue Regenerative Tissue 
An IA must 
interview the 
potential donor and 
recipient separately, 
as well as together. 
An IA must interview the 
potential donor, and 
recipient separately as 
well as together, and those 
with PR for the donor. 
















Is the tissue non-regenerative or regenerative? 
Non-regenerative tissue Regenerative Tissue 
Is there court approval? 









Is the tissue a domino transplant? 
Donation may 
proceed. 
Is there HTA approval? 
Yes No 






Figure 4: Scotland: Donation Process 
 
  
Identify a potential living donor.  (Check histocompatibility) 
Is the potential donor a minor? 
Yes No 
Identify relevant regulations for tissue 
donation from living adults. 
Is the tissue: solid organ/non-regenerative 





Find alternative donor. Is the minor competent to provide 
authorisation to the donation? 
Yes No 
Gain informed authorisation 
from the donor. 
Gain informed authorisation from 
those with PR for the donor. 
Is the tissue a domino transplant or regenerative? Is the tissue a domino transplant or regenerative? 
Domino Transplant Domino Transplant Regenerative Tissue Regenerative Tissue 
An IA must 
interview the 
potential donor and 
recipient separately. 
An IA must interview 
the potential donor, 
recipient, and those 
with PR for the donor. 
An AA must interview 
the potential donor and 
recipient separately. 
Is there HTA approval? 
An AA must interview 
the potential donor, 
recipient, and those 
with PR for the donor. 
Yes No 
Donation may proceed. Find alternative donor. 
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3.6 Concluding Thoughts 
In this chapter I have provided a clear conception of what the regulatory framework 
actually says and where its defects lie, therefore in subsequent chapters, I will make 
recommendations for reform in relation to tissue donation from living minors.  In 
England and Wales, and Scotland, the regulatory framework for tissue donation from 
living minors consists of both law and professional guidance.  I have made two main 
arguments: first, that tables and flowcharts, such as the ones I have produced, should be 
published by the HTA as summary documents.  They would aid the understanding of 
the donation process by medical professionals and other individuals involved in the 
donation process such as the donor, recipient, and those with PR providing consent or 
authorisation on behalf of an incompetent minor.  Secondly, the difference in the terms 
used in the 2004 Act and the 2006 Act is superficial as the test for informed consent and 
informed authorisation are identical.  It would be clearer and more precise if the term 
consent is used and replaces authorisation in the 2006 Act with regard to tissue donation.   
 
The following chapter will focus on the main difference between the 2004 Act and the 
2006 Act which is that living minors in Scotland can only donate regenerative tissue or 
as part of a domino transplant, while living minors in England and Wales can donate 
both regenerative and non-regenerative tissue.  I will address the first question in this 
thesis, should non-regenerative tissue donation from living minors be permitted in 
England and Wales, and Scotland?  My contention is that no living minor should be 
able to donate non-regenerative tissue because the psychological benefits do not 
outweigh the serious immediate and long-term medical risks and potential 






Non-regenerative Tissue Donation: England and Wales vs Scotland 
 
4.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter provided a clear conception of the regulatory framework for living 
minors as tissue donors in England and Wales, and Scotland.  In this chapter, I 
recommend reform to that regulatory framework by considering the first question of 
this thesis: should minors in England and Wales be permitted to donate non-
regenerative tissue?  In Scotland, living minors can only donate regenerative tissue266 
or as part of a domino transplant267, thus they cannot donate non-regenerative tissue.  In 
contrast, living minors in England and Wales can donate both regenerative and non-
regenerative tissue.   
 
My contention is that no living minor should be able to donate non-regenerative tissue268 
because the psychological benefits of the donation do not outweigh the immediate and 
long-term medical risks and potential psychological risks of the donation, even if the 
donation is to a sibling.  Therefore, the law in England and Wales should be reformed 
and the Scottish approach should be adopted.  I aim to demonstrate this by comparing 
the two most common types of regenerative tissue donation, blood and bone marrow, 
with the two most common types of non-regenerative tissue donation, a kidney and a 
lobe of liver.  I will discuss both the immediate and long-term medical risks of the 
 
266 see Chapter 1 at 1.1.2 for further discussion on the definition of regenerative tissue and the inclusion 
of a lobe of liver donation into the category of non-regenerative tissue in law. 
267 see Chapter 1 at 1.1.2 for the definition of domino transplants.  A domino transplant is “an operation 
which is designed to safeguard or promote the physical health of the person and by doing so necessitates 
the removal of an organ which is transplanted into another living person”; Human Tissue (Scotland) Act 
2006, s.17(10). 
268 except domino transplants.  
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different types of donation as well as any long-term implications to the minor’s lifestyle 
as a result of being a tissue donor.   
 
I will then move on to consider the potential psychological benefits and psychological 
harms a living minor donor can develop as a result of undergoing the donation process.  
The majority of my discussion will focus on Kenneth Kipnis’ eight discrete types of 
vulnerabilities that are applied by Lainie Friedman Ross and Richard Thistlethwaite to 
tissue donation.269  I will explore whether these psychological benefits outweigh the 
immediate and long-term medical risks and psychological risks, therefore, justifying the 
tissue donation.   
 
Put simply: psychological benefit > medical risks + psychological harm 
in order for the donation to be justified.   
 
4.2 Donor Risks vs Recipient Risks  
Before discussing the medical risks, and the psychological risks and benefits, it is 
necessary to clarify why I am only considering the risks and benefits to the donor, and 
not to the recipient.  The potential medical risks and psychological benefits that are 
considered should be the medical risks posed to the donor, and the psychological benefit 
on the donor, not the recipient.  Any suggestion that the medical risks for the donor 
must be outweighed by the medical benefit for the recipient is incorrect for three 
 
269 Kenneth Kipnis, Vulnerability in research subjects: a bioethical taxonomy in: the National Bioethics 
Advisory Commission (NBAC), Ethical and Policy Issues in Research Involving Human Participants 
Volume II Commissioned Papers and Staff Analysis (Bethesda, 2001) G1–13; Kenneth Kipnis, ‘Seven 
vulnerabilities in the pediatric research subject’ (2003) 24 Theoretical Medicine in Bioethics 107; Lainie 
Friedman Ross and J Richard Thistlethwaite, ‘Developing an ethics framework for living donor 
transplantation’ (2018) Journal of Medical Ethics 1. 
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reasons.  First, as Aaron Spital argues medical risks and benefits are fallible.270  The 
medical risks are speculative, statistically determined, and it is not definite that all or 
any of the types of morbidity will materialise.   
 
Secondly, even if these variables could be reliably estimated, a simple mathematical 
comparison of donor risk and recipient benefit would not be sufficient.271  If the medical 
risk to the donor is very high, donation should generally not be permitted even if the 
predicted benefit for the recipient is greater.272  Similarly, if the transplantation is going 
to be of no benefit to the recipient at all then it is irrelevant as to the harm it presents to 
the minor donor as the procedure would be futile.  The medical risk to the donor should 
be the primary consideration since they are the individual undergoing a non-therapeutic 
procedure and getting no medical benefit.  This is reiterated by the British 
Transplantation Society (BTS) in their guidance about kidney donation, which state 
that: ‘regardless of potential recipient benefit, the safety and welfare of the potential 
living donor must always take precedence over the needs of the potential transplant 
recipient.’273    
 
Thirdly, deciding a donor’s suitability on the extent of the donor’s medical risk and 
recipient medical benefit suggests that medical factors are the only ones that matter and 
fails to recognise ‘the importance of personal values’, 274 including the psychological 
benefit from the donation, which vary widely.  In determining whether a minor can be 
 
270 Aaron Spital, ‘Donor Benefits is the Key to Justified Living Organ Donation’ (2004) 13 Cambridge 
Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 105, 106. 
271 Spital (n 270) 106.   
272 Spital (n 270) 106.   
273 British Transplantation Society, Living Donor Liver Transplantation (2015) 28; British 
Transplantation Society, Guidelines for Living Donor Kidney Transplantation (2018) 12.   
274 Spital (n 270) 106.   
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a tissue donor, the comparison that should be made is between the medical risk of the 
procedure for the donor, and the potential psychological benefit or harm the donor will 
develop as a result of the donation.   
 
4.3 Medical Risks of Tissue Donation 
Before a minor can be a tissue donor, the medical risks of the procedure need to be 
considered.  As with any medical procedure tissue donation poses medical risks of 
varying degrees for the donor.  The medical risks of the donation depend partly on the 
type of tissue that is being donated.  I will focus on the four most common types of 
tissue donation: blood, bone marrow, a kidney, and a lobe of liver.  Blood and bone 
marrow donation are regenerative tissue, while a kidney and a lobe of liver are non-
regenerative tissue.  I am going to show that non-regenerative tissue donation poses the 
highest immediate and long-term medical risks as well as the most restrictive long-term 
implications to the minor’s lifestyle.   
 
The data I have used to compare the medical risks of regenerative tissue and non-
regenerative tissue donation has been collated from a number of sources, including 
medical academic journal articles, the BTS, NHS Blood and Transplant (NHSBT), and 
information from the UK and USA Government tissue donation websites.  Where 
possible, I have used UK sources, but if these were not available, I have used sources 
from the USA where similar procedures occur, and similar risk factors have been 
identified.  Moreover, the majority of the literature focuses on the medical risks of an 
adult being a tissue donor rather than a minor.  Unless stated, the reader can assume that 
the source does not identify whether it is addressing adults or minors.  In this discussion 
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I have highlighted some of the notable medical risks, but a full table of medical risks 
for each type of donation is provided in the appendices.   
 
4.3.1 Blood Donation 
Blood donation is the most common form of donation in England and Wales, and 
Scotland.  While NHSBT recommend that regular donors are aged between 17 and 
66,275 in exceptional circumstances, such as a rare blood group, a minor may be required 
to donate blood to a sibling.  Donating blood involves inserting a needle into the skin 
for 5-10 minutes, 276 while the blood is extracted.  The blood in the donor will 
regenerate.277  There may be a bruise left from the needle or, potentially, a scar.  But 
there are no reported long-term health implications from donating blood, so it is a safe 
procedure with minimal discomfort for the minor donor.  Therefore, almost all minors 
in England and Wales, and Scotland can donate blood without any immediate or long-
term medical risks. 
 
4.3.2 Bone Marrow Donation 
Bone marrow donation is a more complicated procedure than a blood donation, and 
requires the donor to have a general anaesthetic278 so a needle can be inserted into the 
hip bone in order for bone marrow to be extracted.  There will be marks on the skin 
 
275 or 70 if they have given blood before; NHS Blood and Transplant, ‘Who can give blood’ < 
https://www.blood.co.uk/who-can-give-blood/> accessed 15/07/2018. 
276 until 470ml of blood has been taken; NHS Blood and Transplant, ‘The donation process’ < 
https://www.blood.co.uk/the-donation-process/> accessed 15/07/2018.  The author registered to give 
blood so she could have a first-hand experience of the procedure, however, on the day of donation it was 
decided by the nurse present that it was not medically safe to donate.  Therefore, the procedure did not 
go ahead.  The author read the documentation that was provided to a donor before donation and there 
was nothing notable that needed to be added to this discussion. 
277 If the donor has donated a pint of blood then the plasma from the donation is replaced within about 24 
hours. Red cells need about four to six weeks for complete replacement.  At least eight weeks are required 
between whole blood donations; American Red Cross ‘Frequently Asked Questions’ 
<https://www.redcrossblood.org/faq.html> accessed 08/07/2018. 
278 British Bone Marrow Registry, ‘How Can I Help?’ <https://www.nhsbt.nhs.uk/british-bone-marrow-
registry/how-can-i-help/> accessed 16/01/2018. 
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made by the needle and there may be some pain and discomfort where the needle has 
been inserted.  The minor donor would be required to stay in hospital for up to 48 
hours,279 and have a period of recovery at home of up to five days.280  The bone marrow 
will regenerate in the donor.281   
 
As this donation requires general anaesthesia there are risks associated with this 
procedure that are independent of the bone marrow donation itself.  Bone marrow must 
be harvested from both the anterior and posterior iliac crest, which requires turning the 
individual over during anaesthesia, increasing the anaesthetic risk.282  It has been 
reported that 2.4% of donors experience a serious complication due to anaesthesia or 
damage to bone, nerve or muscle in their hip region.283  There is a 0.39% risk of life-
threatening complications in minor donors, but these are mainly related to the general 
anaesthetic rather than the actual removal of the bone marrow.284  The two types of 
morbidity that pose the most likely complications following a bone marrow donation 
are vomiting and sore throat.  The risk of them occurring are 11.8% and 7.1% 
respectively.285  While the risk of these morbidities occurring could be considered 
likely, the type of morbidity is not serious.  This demonstrates that not only must the 
 
279 ibid. 
280 British Bone Marrow Registry (n 278). 
281 The level of bone marrow will be back to normal after an average of 21 days; Anthony Nolan, 
‘Frequently Asked Questions’ <https://www.anthonynolan.org/8-ways-you-could-save-life/donate-
your-stem-cells/frequently-asked-questions> accessed 08/07/2018. 
282 Rebecca D Pentz,and others, ‘Designing an ethical policy for bone marrow donation by minors and 
other lacking capacity’ (2004) 13(2) Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 149, 149.   
283 I Mallick, ‘Risks of Donating Bone Marrow <https://www.verywellhealth.com/the-risks-of-donating-
bone-marrow-2252482> accessed 08/07/2018; US Department of Health and Human Services, ‘Donation 
Frequently Asked Questions’ 
<https://bloodcell.transplant.hrsa.gov/donor/donating/donation_faqs/index.html> accessed 15/07/2018;  
see Appendix 2 for full list.   
284 CD Buckner and others, ‘Marrow harvesting from normal donors’ (1984) 64(3) Blood 630; M Bortin 
and CD Buckner, ‘Major complications of marrow harvesting for transplantation’ (1983) 11(10) 
Experimental Hematology 916. 
285 Jan Styczynski and others, ‘Risk of complications during hematopoietic stem cell collection in 
pediatric sibling donors: a prospective European Group for Blood and Marrow Transplantation Pediatric 
Diseases Working Party study’ (2012) 119(12) Blood 2935, 2938. 
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likely risk of the morbidity be considered but the seriousness of the type of morbidity.  
Data on minor donors is relatively scarce in relation to the donation of bone marrow,286 
but it has been reported that two minor donors suffered with severe adverse 
complications, which included cardiac arrest287 and lung edema.288  These are more 
serious risks compared to the vomiting and sore throat that were identified in the 
previous data.  But there have been no reported deaths following the removal of bone 
marrow from a minor.289   
 
While bone marrow donation is a more complicated procedure and presents higher risks 
than blood donation, overall, there are no significant long-term health risks from being 
a bone marrow donor.  The highest risk of morbidity is as a result of the anaesthesia not 
the donation itself.  The statistics presented indicate that almost all minors can donate 
bone marrow because it is a relatively safe procedure with some discomfort for the 
minor.     
 
4.3.3 A Kidney Donation 
Unlike the two other types of donation already discussed, a kidney donation from a 
living minor is a non-regenerative tissue donation and a major surgical operation.290  
 
286 M A Pulsipher and others, ‘Safety and efficacy of allogeneic PBSC collection in normal pediatric 
donors: the pediatric blood and marrow transplant consortium experience (PBMTC) 1996-2003’ (2005) 
35(4) Bone Marrow Transplant 361; Julian Sevilla and others, ‘Peripheral blood progenitor cell collection 
adverse events for childhood allogeneic donors: variables related to the collection and safety profile’ 
(2009) 144(6) British Journal of Haematology 909. 
287 A cardiac arrest is when your heart suddenly stops pumping blood round your body, commonly 
because of a problem with electrical signals in your heart.  When your heart stops pumping blood, your 
brain is starved of oxygen.  This causes you to fall unconscious and stop breathing; British Heart 
Foundation, ‘Cardia Arrest’ <https://www.bhf.org.uk/heart-health/conditions/cardiac-arrest> accessed 
09/07/2018. 
288 Joerg Halter and others, ‘Severe events in donors after allogeneic hematopoietic stem cell donation’ 
(2009) 94(1) Haematologica 94, 98; Lung edema is an abnormal build-up of fluid in the lungs.  This 
build-up of fluid leads to shortness of breath; Medline Plus, ‘Pulmonary edema’ 
<https://medlineplus.gov/ency/article/000140.htm> accessed 09/07/2018. 
289 Jan Styczynski and others (n 285) 2941. 
290 British Transplantation Society, Guidelines for Living Donor Kidney Transplantation (n 273) 170. 
115 
 
The donor undergoes a general anaesthetic and then one of their kidneys is removed.  
The donor will usually remain in hospital for about three to seven days291 with recovery 
at home usually lasting about six weeks involving some pain and discomfort.292  Once 
the kidney has been removed the donor will be left with only one kidney for the 
remainder of their life.  As with bone marrow donation, a kidney donation requires a 
general anaesthetic therefore there are risks associated with this procedure that are 
independent of the kidney donation itself.  
 
A kidney donation poses a higher risk of morbidity as well as more serious types of 
morbidity compared to bone marrow donation.  While the highest medical risk for a 
kidney donation is a 30% risk of hypertension, the most serious risk of morbidity is end 
stage renal disease, which has a 0.38-0.5% risk of occurring.293  This is where the 
remaining kidney in the donor becomes diseased and subsequently fails resulting in the 
donor eventually requiring a kidney transplant.  Even if the potential minor donor does 
not present risk factors for kidney disease at the time they are evaluated to be a kidney 
donor they may still develop it later in life.294  A minor has more time for these risk 
factors to progress, so a 10-year old donor may have 70 years to develop the 
complications from a kidney donation, therefore, the lifetime risk of end stage renal 
 
291 American Transplant Foundation, ‘Five Questions to Ask Yourself’ 
https://www.americantransplantfoundation.org/about-transplant/living-donation/becoming-a-living-
donor/five-questions-to-ask-yourself/ accessed 15/07/2018. 
292 American Transplant Foundation (n 291); Michael Siebels and others, ‘Risks and complications in 
160 living kidney donors who underwent nephroureterectomy’ (2003) 18(12) Nephrology Dialysis 
Transplantations 1, 1. 
293 Kidney Research UK, ‘Living with one kidney’ <http://www.kidneyresearchuk.org/health-
information/living-with-one-kidney> accessed 28/01/2018; British Transplantation Society, Guidelines 
for Living Donor Kidney Transplantation (n 273) 90-92; Kidney Link, ‘Risks Involved in Living 
Donation’ <http://www.kidneylink.org/RisksInvolvedinLivingDonation.aspx> accessed 15/07/2018; 
Hassan N Ibrahim and others, ‘Long-term consequences of kidney donation’ (2009) 360 New England 
Journal of Medicine 459; Hypertension is high blood pressure which if untreated increases your risk of 
serious problems such as heart attacks or strokes; NHS Choices, ‘High Blood Pressure’ 
<https://www.nhs.uk/conditions/high-blood-pressure-hypertension/> accessed 11/07/2018. 
294 British Transplantation Society, Guidelines for Living Donor Kidney Transplantation (n 273) 77; see 
Appendix 3 for full list.   
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disease is greater in younger donors.295  Thus, living adult donors or kidneys from 
deceased individuals should be used instead of kidneys from living minors to reduce 
this risk.  While there have been no reported deaths of minors as blood or bone marrow 
donors, the United Network for Organ Sharing data on kidney donation revealed a 
surgical mortality of 0.031%,296 while another study found a 0.02% risk of mortality 
from surgical complications.297  This demonstrates that while death from bone marrow 
donation was an insignificant or even a non-existent risk, in relation to kidney donation 
the risk of mortality is a risk that should be considered before the minor undergoes the 
procedure.   
 
Following a kidney donation there are a number of long-term medical risks which result 
in subsequent lifestyle restrictions for a minor.298  If an individual has only one kidney 
then it can be more vulnerable to injury, so heavy contact or collision sports should be 
avoided.299  This restriction could result in a very young minor never having 
experienced a particular sport or a minor not being able to continue to participate in a 
sport that they are good at or enjoy.  If the minor is incompetent then these factors would 
be taken into consideration when determining what is in the best interests of the minor 
donor.  I argue that restrictions such as these should not be placed on a minor’s life, 
even though this restriction may appear to be minimal it could have a significant impact 
on the minor’s well-being and cause them psychological harm.  For instance, they could 
 
295 British Transplantation Society, Guidelines for Living Donor Kidney Transplantation (n 273) 248. 
296 Dorry L Segev and others, ‘Perioperative mortality and long-term survival following live kidney 
donation’ (2010) 303 Journal of the American Medical Association 2248; Krista L Lentine and others, 
‘Risks and outcomes of living donation’ (2012) 19(4) Advances in Chronic Kidney Disease 220. 
297 Aarthur J Matas and others, ‘Morbidity and mortality after living donor kidney donation 1999-2001: 
a survey of the United States transplant centres’ 2003) 3 American Journal of Transplantation 830. 
298 Walter Glannon, ‘The Risk in Living Kidney Donation’ (2018) 27 Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare 
Ethics 29, 31. 
299 Kidney Research UK (n 293); the sports include boxing, field hockey, football, ice hockey, martial 
arts and wrestling.   
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be excluded in participating in activities at school or with their friends or, on a more 
extreme level, the minor could be restricting their future job prospects if they are 
particularly talented at a sport.  But at the same time, this does not mean that minors 
who lack in sporting ability should be considered as kidney donors because this 
restriction could have less of an impact on their life.  If a minor is going to be a tissue 
donor then the implications of the procedure should be minimally restrictive on the 
minor’s future.   
 
Moreover, the BTS have noted specific considerations when assessing female minors 
as potential kidney donors.300  There is an increased risk of gestational hypertension or 
pre-eclampsia301 with a woman who gets pregnant post-kidney donation.302  It is 
recommended that a woman does not get pregnant for at least six months following the 
donation.303  In addition, the BTS propose that an alternative donor should be assessed 
before a woman who may still wish to bear children is a kidney donor.304  This suggests 
that female minors should not be considered as a kidney donor because it is unclear 
whether a female minor may want to bear children when they are older.  But it does not 
mean that only male minors should be considered as a kidney donor as this could result 
in males being unduly pressured to be kidney donors.  I argue that a minor should not 
be permitted to be a kidney donor because of immediate and serious risks of morbidity 
 
300 Give a Kidney, ‘How safe is donation?’ <http://www.giveakidney.org/how-safe-is-donation/> 
accessed 16/07/2018; British Transplantation Society, Guidelines for Living Donor Kidney 
Transplantation (n 273) 254. 
301 High blood pressure and a significant amount of protein in the urine. 
302 Give a Kidney (n 300); British Transplantation Society, Guidelines for Living Donor Kidney 
Transplantation (n 273) 254. 
303 National Kidney Foundation, ‘What to Expect After Donation? 
<https://www.kidney.org/transplantation/livingdonors/what-expect-after-donation> accessed 
16/07/2018. 
304 British Transplantation Society, Living Donor Liver Transplantation (n 273) 78. 
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and mortality as well as the potential adverse impact it could have on the minor’s future 
especially in relation to female donors.  
 
4.3.4 A Lobe of Liver Donation 
A lobe of liver donation from a living minor is the least common type of donation that 
I have considered and is carried out in fewer transplant units as it is a more complicated 
procedure with higher medical risks.305  For a lobe of liver donation to take place the 
minor must undergo general anaesthetic, then the liver of the donor is split into the left 
lobe and the right lobe.  One of these lobes will be removed, which can be between 40-
60% of the total liver volume.306  The donor will be required to stay in the hospital for 
about seven days with recovery at home for up to eight weeks involving some pain and 
discomfort.307  Following the donation, both the lobe that was transplanted into the 
recipient and the lobe that remains in the donor will regenerate to the full size in about 
12 weeks.308  In medicine, a lobe of liver is classed as regenerative tissue.  However as 
discussed in Chapter 1,309 there is a contradiction as to the classification of a lobe of 
liver donation in law, between the definition provided by the 2006 Act and the advice 
given by Organ Donation Scotland and the HTA.  But as stated in Chapter 1, for the 
purposes of this thesis I have adopted the approach by Organ Donation Scotland and 
the HTA by classing a lobe of liver as a non-regenerative tissue donation.   
 
 
305 British Transplantation Society, Living Donor Liver Transplantation (n 273) 68 
306 Mount Sinai, ‘Liver Donation Surgery and Recovery’ < 
https://www.mountsinai.org/care/transplant/services/living-donor/liver-surgery-recovery> accessed 
16/07/2018. 
307 ibid.  
308 NHS Blood and Transplant, ‘Living donor liver transplantation’ <http://www.odt.nhs.uk/living-
donation/living-donor-liver-transplantation/> accessed 16/07/2018. 
309 at 1.1.2. 
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The short-term medical risks for a lobe of liver donation are significantly greater than 
both bone marrow donation and kidney donation.310  The BTS state that there is a 21% 
risk of morbidity for donors following the removal of their left lobe,311 while there is a 
40% risk of morbidity for donors following the removal of their right lobe.312  The type 
of morbidity that may occur are the same regardless of whether the left or right lobe is 
removed.  The highest risk following a lobe of liver donation is a 13.2% risk of 
infection.313  The medical risks of a lobe of liver donation presents the highest medical 
risks of any type of tissue donation discussed.  Not only are there more potential types 
of morbidity but they are also more serious in nature.  However, unlike with a kidney 
donation, a lobe of liver donation does not present long-term restrictions on a minor’s 
life, once the liver has regenerated and the minor has fully recovered from the 
procedure, they should be able to live a fairly normal life.     
 
The BTS has stated that there is a 0.1% risk of mortality if the left lobe is removed,314 
with a 0.5-1% risk of mortality if the right lobe is removed.315  The risk of mortality 
following a lobe of liver donation is significantly greater than other types of tissue 
donation discussed.  Therefore, my contention is that based on the risks of morbidity 




310 British Transplantation Society, Living Donor Liver Transplantation (n 273) 21.  see Appendix 4 for 
full list.   
311 British Transplantation Society, Living Donor Liver Transplantation (n 273) 21 and 105; British 
Transplantation Society, Guidelines for Living Donor Kidney Transplantation (n 273). 
312 British Transplantation Society, Living Donor Liver Transplantation (n 273) 21 and 105; British 
Transplantation Society, Guidelines for Living Donor Kidney Transplantation (n 273). 
313 British Transplantation Society, Guidelines for Living Donor Kidney Transplantation (n 273). 
314 British Transplantation Society, Living Donor Liver Transplantation (n 273) 21 and 105; British 
Transplantation Society, Guidelines for Living Donor Kidney Transplantation (n 271). 
315 British Transplantation Society, Living Donor Liver Transplantation (n 273) 21 and 105; British 
Transplantation Society, Guidelines for Living Donor Kidney Transplantation (n 273). 
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4.3.5 Concluding thoughts on the medical risks of tissue donation 
It can be concluded that the types of tissue donation that present the highest risks of 
morbidity and mortality are non-regenerative tissue donation, specifically a lobe of liver 
donation.  A kidney donation presents the most significant long-term implications with 
the greatest lifestyle restrictions.  But regardless of this, non-regenerative tissue 
donation harms the donor.  The ethical principle of nonmaleficence obligates a medical 
professional to abstain from causing harm to others.316  Tissue donation from a living 
minor would initially breach the principle of nonmaleficence as the medical 
professional will harm the minor donor.  But instead of the procedure being justified by 
the subsequent medical benefit, tissue donation is justified by the psychological benefit 
that the minor donor develops.  The justification for allowing a living minor to undergo 
a medical procedure is that the medical risk is outweighed by the medical benefit.  As 
tissue donation is a non-therapeutic procedure for the donor the living minor does not 
receive a medical benefit from the donation.  The justification for permitting the tissue 
donation is based on the psychological benefit the donor would develop from donating 
to a sibling.   
 
Put simply: psychological benefit > medical risks + psychological harm 
in order for the donation to be justified.   
 
4.4 Psychological Benefit and Harm of Tissue Donation 
When an individual undergoes a medical procedure, that procedure can be justified by 
the principle of beneficence, as the procedure is intending to benefit the individual 
 
316 Tom L Beauchamp and James F Childress, Principles of Biomedical Ethics (OUP 2013) 150. 
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involved.317  Ian Kennedy argued that an operation was lawful as long as it was 
performed by medical professionals who concluded ‘that there is at least some risk of 
harm to the patient if surgery is not performed,’318 suggesting that the purpose of the 
surgery is to benefit the patient.319  For the procedure to be lawful, the ‘benefit’ must be 
identified.  This raises questions when considering tissue donation, including: what is a 
benefit, what is the benefit from the procedure, who determines whether there will be a 
benefit, and from whose perspective is the benefit determined?320  I propose a number 
of answers to these questions.   
 
The medical profession is likely to determine whether there is a benefit from a medical 
procedure based on medical evidence.  However, this justification is not applicable to 
tissue donation from living minors, where healthy donors who are acting to benefit 
others are exposed to potentially harmful medical outcomes.321  Whether there is a 
benefit to the donor from the donation would again have to be based on medical 
evidence, but as there would be no procedural benefit, the benefit would need to be 
quantified psychologically which is much more difficult to identify.  In general, the 
focus of a medical procedure’s benefit must be on the medical professional’s intention 
to benefit rather than the actual benefit.322  If the medical professional had to guarantee 
a benefit either medically or psychologically in order to lawfully perform a procedure, 
then tissue donation, or in fact any medical procedure, would not be performed.  For 
 
317 Jane Johnson and Wendy Rogers, ‘Innovative Surgery: the ethical challenges’ (2012) 38 Journal of 
Medical Ethics 9, 9-10. 
318 Ian Kennedy, ‘Transsexualism and Single-Sex Marriage’ in Ian Kennedy (eds), Treat Me Right: 
Essays in Medical Law and Ethics (Clarendon Press 1988) 262. 
319 Sara Fovargue and Alex Mullock (eds), The Legitimacy of Medical Treatment: What Role for the 
Medical Exception? (Routledge 2015) 18-19.  
320 ibid 19. 
321 Johnson and Rogers (n 317) 9-10. 
322 see Ian Kennedy and Andrew Grubb, Medical Law (Butterworths 2000) 768-773; Nuffield Council 
on Bioethics, Human Tissue: Ethical and Legal Issues (1995) para 6.12. 
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example, if the transplanted tissue fails in the recipient then it is likely that the minor 
donor will not develop an actual psychological benefit from the donation.  If the medical 
procedure is performed by a medically qualified professional, within professional 
norms, and the medical professional intends the individual to benefit from the 
procedure, then it can be justified under the principle of beneficence.323 
 
Psychological benefits are key when determining whether a living minor can be a tissue 
donor, but as psychological benefits are subjective, they cannot be quantified precisely.  
Therefore, in determining whether a minor can be a tissue donor the comparison is 
between the speculative medical risk and the unmeasurable psychological benefit.  But 
as the only benefit that a donor can experience is psychological, it is key that it is 
identified where possible, and an estimation is made about either the probability that a 
donor will benefit from donating or the extent of any donor benefit that may occur.324  
The psychological benefit will differ greatly depending on the individual.  But the 
transplant is not guaranteed to be successful, if the tissue fails or is rejected by the 
recipient then the donor may not develop a psychological benefit from the donation, but 
instead suffer from a psychological harm because the recipient does not recover as a 
result of the donation.  I am going to argue that the psychological benefits can outweigh 
the minimal medical risks of regenerative tissue donation, but the serious immediate as 
well as long-term medical risks of donations of non-regenerative tissue are not 
sufficiently outweighed by the potential psychological benefit of a living minor 
donating to their sibling.   
 
 
323 Fovargue and Mullock (n 319) 24. 
324 Spital (n 270) 107.   
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The likelihood of medical risks occurring during or following the medical procedure 
can be assessed from evidence-based medicine, but any judgment made regarding future 
psychological benefit or harm to the minor donor is highly speculative.325  Potential 
psychological benefit or harm could occur before, at the time of the donation, or post-
donation.  However, it is unclear how far into the future a medical professional would 
have to look to determine whether a psychological benefit may materialise or not.  Judge 
Munby stated that it:  
 
extends to and embraces everything that related to the child’s development as a human 
being and to the child’s present and future life as a human being.  The judge must 
consider the child’s welfare now, throughout the remainder of the child’s minority and 
into and through adulthood… How far into the future the judge must peer… will depend 
upon the context and the nature of the issue.  If the dispute is about whether the child 
should go on a school trip the judge will be concerned primarily with the present rather 
than the future.  If the question is whether a teenager should be sterilised the judge will 
have to think a very long way ahead indeed.326 
 
Even though Judge Munby was referring to how far into the future of a minor’s life the 
court should consider, this commentary provides some indication of the extent a medical 
professional would have to consider when determining the benefits of a medical 
procedure.  The psychological benefit may not materialise while the donor is 
undergoing the procedure or in the recovery process, it may occur much later in life 
when they understand the benefits of the recipient sibling remaining alive and living a 
reasonably normal life.  However, the longer the period of time for recovery of the 
 
325 Charles Hillel Baron, Margot Botsford, and Garrick F Cole, ‘Live organ and Tissue Transplants from 
minor donors in Massachusetts’ (1975) 55 Boston University Law Review 159,171; Nathan v Flanagan 
Civil No J74-109 (Mass, Oct 4, 1974).   
326 Re G [2012] EWCA Civ 1233 [26].   
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donor, the greater the psychological benefits need to be, meaning that the medical 
professional will have to look further into the future to determine whether a 
psychological benefit may materialise.  Regenerative tissue donation, such as blood and 
bone marrow, require short recovery periods and no long-term implications, therefore, 
the medical professional does not need to look so far into the future of the minor donor.  
There needs to be only a small psychological benefit in order to outweigh the medical 
risks.  This is in contrast to non-regenerative tissue donation where the recovery period 
is much longer and there are long-term implications, therefore, the psychological benefit 
has to be greater to outweigh the medical risks. 
 
4.4.1 The transplant fails in the recipient  
What if the transplant fails and the recipient dies, does the minor still accrue a 
psychological benefit from donating?  It has been suggested that the psychological 
benefit may even occur if the transplant fails, because the donor and family can take 
consolidation in that everything possible was done.327  However, contrary to this claim, 
if the transplantation is not successful, the donor could feel like they were complicit in 
the pain, the psychological anguish and ultimately the death of the recipient, and 
therefore, feel guilty, and that they are to blame.  The minor should be aware of and, if 
competent, understand that the donated tissue may fail, be rejected by the recipient, or 
that the original cause of the tissue failure may recur and that the outcome is beyond 
their control.328  The minor donor may be able to control their future feelings by telling 
themselves that they made the best decision possible given the circumstances, 
 
327 Laine Friedman Ross and J Richard Thistlethwaite, ‘Minors as Living Solid-Organ Donors’ (2008) 
122 Pediatrics 454,455. 
328 ibid, 458. 
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regardless of the outcome.329  But such feelings may not be able to be managed easily, 
especially by a minor donor with little or no understanding of the medical risks in the 
tissue donation process.  If the minor donor understands that the transplant could fail in 
the recipient this may help minimise the potential psychological harm to the donor, but 
such a requirement would exclude incompetent minors from donating as they may not 
have this complex level of understanding.  
 
If the minor donor does suffer from a psychological harm as a result of the failure of 
the transplant, with regenerative tissue they have undergone minimal medical risk.  
While if they have donated non-regenerative tissue the immediate and long-term risks 
of the donation could materialise without the donor having developed any type of 
psychological benefit, but instead a psychological harm.  As it is not guaranteed that the 
transplant will be successful, or the donor will not be psychologically harmed if the 
transplant fails, I am arguing that a minor should not be able to donate non-regenerative 
tissue because the minor could have undergone a medical procedure that has not 
benefitted themselves, nor the recipient.   
 
Put simply: psychological benefit < medical risks + psychological harm 
therefore, the donation is NOT justified.   
 
4.4.2 Kenneth Kipnis and the eight discrete types of vulnerability 
Minors are susceptible to vulnerabilities, especially if they are a potential tissue donor.  
Kipnis proposed a vulnerabilities taxonomy that explored the different types of 
 
329 Kimberly Strong, Ian Kerridge, and Miles Little, ‘Saviour Siblings, Parenting and the Moral 
Valorisation of Children’ (2014) 28(4) Bioethics 187, 190. 
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vulnerabilities focusing specifically on research participants.330  He offered an 
analytical approach to the concept of vulnerability, arguing that rather than focusing on 
groups, it would be more useful to consider six discrete types of vulnerability that an 
individual may face: cognitive, juridic, deferential, medical, allocational, and 
infrastructural.331  In a later work, focusing specifically on why minors may be 
vulnerable in medical research, Kipnis offered eight discrete types of vulnerabilities – 
retaining the first six, and adding two more: social and situational.332  Friedman Ross 
and Thistlethwaite applied these vulnerabilities to the living adult donor context.  I think 
this taxonomy can also provide an effective method of addressing the types of 
vulnerability a minor may experience within the tissue donation setting.  I am going to 
argue that the potential psychological benefit a minor will develop from being a non-
regenerative tissue donor is unmeasurable and cannot be predicted, therefore, it cannot 
be used to outweigh medical risks.  I will demonstrate this by applying these eight 
vulnerabilities to tissue donation from living minors using Kipnis, and Friedman Ross 
and Thistlethwaites’ commentary in order to assist my discussion and analysis.    
 
4.4.2.1  Cognitive or Incapacitational 
 
Does the potential living donor have the capacity to deliberate about and decide 
whether or not to participate as a living donor?333  
 
This type of vulnerability refers to when a potential tissue donor lacks the ability to give 
informed consent/authorisation for the donation to be carried out, for example if the 
 
330 Kipnis (n 269); Friedman Ross and Thistlethwaite (n 269). 
331 Kipnis (n 269); Friedman Ross and Thistlethwaite (n 269). 
332 Kipnis (n 269); Friedman Ross and Thistlethwaite (n 269). 
333 Kipnis (n 269); Friedman Ross and Thistlethwaite (n 269). 
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minor is incompetent.  The minor donor may be cognitively vulnerable or 
incapacitational because of immaturity of age or because of intellectual disabilities or 
mental illness.  Although those with parental responsibility (PR) are able to provide 
consent/authorisation on behalf of an incompetent minor, the tissue donation must be 
deemed to be in the minor’s best interests before it proceeds.334   
 
I am arguing that minors should not be able to donate non-regenerative tissue, but 
especially in the case of incompetent minors as at what age is a minor aware of the 
psychological benefits of the donation?  While the psychological benefits may not occur 
during the donation or immediately after it, psychological benefits that are a long way 
in the future are more difficult to predict with any degree of accuracy.  The potential 
psychological benefit may be minimal or non-existent if the minor does not currently 
understand why they are being asked to undergo the donor operation or understand the 
impact it would have on the recipient.335  Thus the extent to which incompetent minors 
can experience psychological benefits is still unclear.336   
 
Robert Crouch and Carl Elliott argue that one of the necessary preconditions of 
receiving a psychological benefit is that the donor has sufficient cognitive development 
to recognise the social benevolence of donation; that is, the donor must be aware not 
only that the tissue has been removed, but that they are helping their sibling by donating 
in a way that no one else could do.337  Without this understanding the minor donor may 
not develop the psychological benefit, even though the contrary, that a minor donor can 
 
334 see Chapter 5 at 5.4 for discussion on best interests test.   
335 Friedman Ross and Thistlethwaite (n 327) 455. 
336 Kristoff Van Assche, Gilles Genicot and Sigrid Sterckx, ‘Living organ procurement from the mentally 
incompetent: the need for more appropriate guidelines’ (2014) 28(3) Bioethics 101, 106.   
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develop a psychological benefit even without this understanding, has routinely been 
suggested by American courts when authorising kidney removal from incompetent 
individuals.338  A similar line of argument was made in the England and Wales case of 
Re Y (adult patient)(bone marrow transplant)339 which is discussed in more detail in 
Chapter 5.340  In addition, the psychological harms of being a tissue donor may be 
increased for incompetent minors.  Thus, they might for instance suffer as a result of 
their failure to understand the meaning of the tissue donation or to adapt to the 
unfamiliar environment of a hospital and the strain of the whole donation process.341   
 
This type of vulnerability may be less significant for competent minors.  Moreover, a 
minor is more likely to be competent to consent or provide authorisation for 
regenerative tissue compared to non-regenerative tissue because of the lower level of 
understanding that is required.  As incompetent minors are unlikely to be aware of the 
immediate psychological benefit stemming from a tissue donation and any 
psychological benefits may not materialise until the future then the donation process 
that the minor donor undergoes should have the smallest medical risk.  This 
vulnerability falls under the psychological harm part of the equation because if the 
minor donor cannot understand the donation process and why they are undergoing the 
donation process then they will not develop the benefit that stems from it.  Instead, they 
have undergone a medical procedure with a medical risk and not developed a 
psychological benefit, therefore, the equation is weighted towards the medical risk and 
 
338 Van Assche, Genicot and Sterckx (n 336) 106; Little v Little (1979) 576 SW 2d 493 (Tex Ct of App), 
499.   
339 [1997] 2 WLR 556. 
340 at 5.5.1. 
341 Van Assche, Genicot and Sterckx (n 336) 107.  
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psychological harm side.  Thus, in England and Wales a minor should not be permitted 
to be a tissue donor, and the Scottish approach be adopted.      
 
4.4.2.2  Juridic 
 
Is the potential living donor liable to the authority of others who may have an 
independent interest in that donation?342 
 
In relation to this type of vulnerability, the ‘authority’ referred to is meant to be legal 
and can refer to prisoners and military personnel, but Kipnis states that ‘the category 
also includes children under the authority of their parents, so for example, the juvenile 
[minor] whose parents seek for him to be a living donor to a twin sibling.’343  There are 
two issues to discuss here: the conflict of interest for those with PR for both the donor 
and the recipient, and the issue of twin sibling donation. 
 
In a sibling to sibling donation the individuals who have PR for the donor and the 
recipient are the same people.  Those with PR who give permission for their minor to 
donate have a potential conflict of interest by the nature of their relationship with both 
the donor and the recipient.  As Thomas Tomlinson explains: 
 
when the recipient is another family member parents are in a conflict of interest as 
protectors of their infant’s welfare.  Their love and desperate hope for this other child 
might blind them to the real magnitude of harms their donor child would suffer.344 
   
 
342 Kipnis (n 269); Friedman Ross and Thistlethwaite (n 269). 
343 Kipnis (n 269), G7; Friedman Ross and Thistlethwaite (n 269). 
344 Thomas Tomlinson, ‘Infants and others who cannot consent to donation’ (1993) 60(1) Mount Sinai 
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As a result of the recipient’s illness, those with PR may be prone to focus more heavily 
on the effect of their decision on the health benefits of the recipient rather than the 
debilitating effects on the donor.345  Those with PR, when consenting on behalf of the 
donor, must look at what is in the best interests of the donor, and not conflate it with the 
benefits that it will have on the recipient.  Donating non-regenerative tissue is likely to 
have a greater impact on the recipient because of the value of the donation compared to 
regenerative tissue.  Therefore, the issue of the conflict of interest could introduce 
greater bias with a non-regenerative tissue than regenerative tissue donation.  Such an 
issue would only arise in relation to incompetent minors, since competent minors can 
provide consent or authorisation on their own behalf.   
 
Those with PR can only provide consent or authorisation on behalf of a minor to a 
procedure that is in their best interests, and this should act as a safeguard against 
potential conflicts of interests.  The potential psychological benefit the donor may 
receive should not be artificially inflated so it appears that the donor would develop a 
psychological benefit resulting in the donation being in their best interests, thus 
justifying the tissue donation.  In addition, if there is an issue with whether the tissue 
donation is in the donor’s best interests the case should be referred to court.  These 
safeguards do not guarantee that there will not be a conflict of interest between those 
with PR, so an independent assessment of the minor’s interests, such as by a court, 
would be required in every situation to eliminate this conflict of interest.  As discussed 
in Chapter 3, interviews by an Independent Assessor (IA) or Accredited Assessor (AA) 
are an independent safeguard in order to prevent the potential exploitation of minors as 
tissue donors as any concerns about coercion, or a reward could be identified during 
 
345 Friedman Ross and Thistlethwaite (n 327) 457. 
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these interviews.  However, while these issues could be identified within the interview, 
the HTA do not go any further and undertake any risk and benefit analysis or consider 
the best interests of the minor donor.  The absence of this extra layer of safeguards has 
come under criticism in the recent case of A NHS Foundation Trust v MC (by her 
Litigation Friend the Official Solicitor)346.  Since these identified, fundamental and 
valuable safeguards are not currently in place, this could result in an unacceptable risk 
so I propose that minors should not be permitted to donate non-regenerative tissue.   
 
In relation to twin donation, a 1954 Massachusetts court ruling permitted the use of a 
kidney by an identical twin for transplantation into their sibling.347  The legal opinion 
reflected the probability that identical twins were so close, emotionally as well as 
physically that the loss of a kidney by the donor would be less devastating than the loss 
of an identical twin sibling.348  Moreover, the World Health Organisation (WHO) has 
stated that: 
 
some regard the use of an identical twin as an acceptable child [minor] donor, on the 
basis that the outcome for the recipient is exceptional and because the relationship 
between identical twins is so close that restoring the health of the recipient confers 
major psychological benefit for the donor.349 
 
However, I am challenging this argument twofold. First, that twins should not be 
obligated to donate tissue in order to save their siblings life purely because they are a 
twin.  There is no legal obligation for a twin to donate to their twin, nor should an 
 
346 [2020] EWCOP 33 [22].   
347 Thomas Starzl, Memoirs of a Transplant Surgeon: the Puzzle People (University of Pittsburgh Press 
1992) 147. 
348 ibid.   
349 World Health Organisation, ‘Guiding principles on human cell, tissue and organ transplantation’ 
(2010) 90 Transplantation 229.   
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additional moral obligation be placed on them by the potential recipient, those with PR, 
or society, and an expectation by the potential recipient.350    
 
Secondly, that the benefit to the donor and the benefit to the recipient of the donation 
should be assessed separately.  As already discussed, the medical risk and psychological 
benefit consideration as to whether the minor should donate should focus solely on the 
donor and not the benefit to the recipient.  The focus on the donor is to ensure that the 
donation promotes the donor’s interests and respects the donor as an end in themselves 
and not merely as a utilitarian tissue source.351  While separate clinical teams for the 
donor and the recipient are considered best practice, at the same time healthcare 
professionals must work together to ensure effective communication and co-ordination 
of the transplant process without compromising the independence of the donor.352  In 
addition, if the need for the transplant is related to a genetic condition in the recipient, 
there is a risk that a genetically related donor may develop the same health problem in 
the future and ultimately also need a transplant; this may be particularly true of identical 
twins.353  Moreover, twins may be at a higher risk of coercion compared to other siblings 
because of the bond they have with their sibling.  In fact, the risk of coercion and the 
inability to implement effective safeguards to protect the donor from coercion was one 
of the main reasons why Scotland does not allow non-regenerative tissue donation by 
living minors.     
 
The HTA have recognised that a potential minor donor can be subject to coercion, 
therefore, they have put safeguards in place and require the donor, the recipient, and 
 
350 Legal and moral obligations are discussed in Chapter 6 at 6.2.1.4.1. 
351 Friedman Ross and Thistlethwaite (n 327) 455. 
352 British Transplantation Society, Guidelines for Living Donor Kidney Transplantation (n 273) 32.   
353 Friedman Ross and Thistlethwaite (n 327) 455. 
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sometimes those with PR to undergo an interview.354  The minor donor can be subject 
to coercion from, but not limited to, those with PR, the recipient, or a medical 
professional when donating tissue to their sibling.  The Human Tissue Act 2004, which 
is applicable in England and Wales, allows minors to donate all types of tissue and puts 
safeguards in place to minimise the risk of coercion.355  However, when enacting the 
Human Tissue (Scotland) Act 2006, the Scottish Parliament did not allow a minor to 
donate non-regenerative tissue in Scotland ‘to protect against the possibility of 
coercion.’356  This implies that the Scottish Parliament felt that the safeguards in place 
in the 2004 Act to minimise the risk of coercion were not sufficient, and a ban on a 
minor donating non-regenerative tissue was a more appropriate outcome.  However, 
this argument was met with some disagreement, as the General Medical Council (GMC) 
stated that: 
 
While we agree that measures should be in place to protect children’s interests, we do 
not believe that it is appropriate to make the removal of organs or tissue from a living 
child an offence without exception, since exceptional circumstances can be envisaged.  
We propose therefore that the Bill [2006 Act] be amended to require that where such 
situations arise, a court ruling should be sought on whether it is appropriate to 
proceed.357   
 
In agreement with the GMC, the British Medical Association (BMA) stated ‘that those 
who are able to give valid authorisation, including mature minors, should be able to be 
 
354 see Chapter 3 at 3.3.2 for further information about the interviews including Tables 3 and 4. 
355 see Chapter 3 at 3.3 for further information about the safeguards. 
356 Scottish Parliament, ‘Health Committee Report’, 
<https://archive.parliament.scot/business/committees/health/reports-05/her05-19-03.htm> accessed 
16/07/2018. 
357 Scottish Executive, Independent Review Group on Retention of Organs at Post-Mortem: Final Report 





altruistic living donors of whole organs provided there are adequate safeguards in place 
to avoid the risk of coercion.’358  The BMA identified that there is a potential risk of 
coercion if a living donor is going to donate tissue, but they did not propose what, if 
any, safeguards they would implement in order to prevent this risk of coercion.  Kate 
Maclean, a Scottish MP stated:  
 
I agree with the BMA that no one, regardless of their age, could be coerced into making 
a living donation, but human nature being what it is, we cannot realistically legislate 
for that and we certainly cannot legislate for how people would feel afterwards.359  
 
Like all individuals, minors are vulnerable to a risk of coercion, but especially in a 
familial setting, since they might not want to disagree with their parents or refuse to 
donate tissue to a sibling.  Therefore, it is my contention that living minors should not 
be permitted to donate non-regenerative tissue due to the risk of coercion and the lack 
of effective safeguards in place to minimise or eliminate this risk.    
 
4.4.2.3  Deferential 
 
Is the potential living donor given to patterns of deferential behaviour that may 
mask an underlying unwillingness to participate?360 
 
Deferential vulnerability may be seen in a decision made by a minor who seeks to please 
his or her parents or the potential recipient.  In addition, a minor may also express 
 
358 Scottish Parliament, ‘Official Report’ 
<http://www.parliament.scot/parliamentarybusiness/report.aspx?r=4617&i=35916> accessed 
15/03/2019.   
359 ibid.   
360 Kipnis (n 269); Friedman Ross and Thistlethwaite (n 269). 
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deferential vulnerability to requests by medical professionals.  Kipnis explains that the 
challenge is to devise a process that eliminates as much as possible the social pressures 
that the potential living donor may feel.361  It may be difficult for a healthy minor to tell 
those with PR, their sibling, or a medical professional that they refuse to be a living 
donor.  For instance, if a minor refuses to donate they may feel guilty, especially if their 
sibling dies.362  Thomas Starzl363 has noted that refusal of donation by a minor has led 
to ostracism within their family,364 this is an example of when the presence of 
deferential vulnerability has resulted in a psychological harm to the sibling minor who 
could have donated.  By restricting the type of tissue a minor can donate, this reduces 
the donation operations available and therefore reduces the number of minors who could 
potentially suffer with this type of vulnerability. 
 
4.4.2.4  Social 
 
Does the potential living donor belong to a group whose rights and interests have 
been socially disvalued?365 
 
In order to decide who is going to donate tissue to the potential recipient a number of 
members of the family may have to undergo screening in order to determine 
histocompatibility.  When a family discuss who should undergo this test, they may look 
at family members who are ‘expendable’ or those who if suffer with post-operative 
issues will have less impact on the family unit, for example non-wage earners.  
 
361 Kipnis (n 269); Friedman Ross and Thistlethwaite (n 269). 
362 Friedman Ross and Thistlethwaite (n 327) 455. 
363 A prominent transplant surgeon who performed the first liver transplant.   
364 Starzl (n 347) 147. 
365 Kipnis (n 269); Friedman Ross and Thistlethwaite (n 269). 
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However, I argue that an individual’s potential expendability should not be a 
consideration when determining whether they should be a tissue donor, as this could 
lead to minor’s being susceptible for selection as they have limited social standing 
within the family.   The minor donor should be treated with the same deference as any 
other family member and should not exploited or used as means to an end.  If a minor 
does not earn money or ‘contribute’ to the family this does not mean that they are 
required to donate tissue in order to provide this ‘contribution’.  A competent minor 
who is of wage-earning age but is still dependent on their family may be more 
susceptible to coercion from their family in order to contribute through the use of their 
tissue.  There is no direct evidence that this is a potential issue within tissue donation, 
however, it is still a factor that must be examined.   
 
4.4.2.5  Medical 
 
Has the potential living donor been selected, in part, because of the presence of 
a serious health-related condition in the intended recipient for which there are 
only less satisfactory alternative remedies?366 
 
This vulnerability applies when there is a serious health-related condition in the 
intended recipient and there are only less satisfactory alternative remedies.  A remedy 
is less satisfactory if it leads to either worse outcomes (higher morbidity and/or 
mortality) or the remedy is not readily available.  For example, in relation to tissue 
donation a less satisfactory alternative to a kidney transplant is dialysis which has a less 
effective outcome and may not be readily available.  Transplantation of tissue from a 
 
366 Kipnis (n 269); Friedman Ross and Thistlethwaite (n 269). 
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living donor is the preferred treatment with better transplant and recipient survival, 
however, demand for tissue greatly outpaces supply.  The uncertainty of whether the 
intended recipient will receive tissue, even from a deceased donor promptly puts 
pressure on potential living donors potentially thus exposing them to varying degrees 
of psychological harm.  By prohibiting the donation of non-regenerative tissue from a 
living minor this would in fact be reducing the amount of tissue available to potential 
recipients.  But as discussed in chapter 1,367 the number of minors who donate non-
regenerative tissue is limited.   
 
Scotland does not allow minors to donate non-regenerative tissue, but Scottish minor 
recipients still receive tissue from other sources.  While not medically the best source 
of donation, minors can receive tissue from a living adult donor or a deceased donor.  
The change in the law with regard to deceased donation in England and Wales, and 
Scotland from an opt-in system to an opt-out system may increase the supply of donated 
tissue, but this is not guaranteed.  This vulnerability would be prominent amongst both 
incompetent and competent living donors because of the preferred treatment option that 
living donation provides to the recipient of the transplant.  If the recipient benefit was 
the main focus when considering treatment options then medical vulnerability would be 







367 at 1.2.4. 
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4.4.2.6  Situational 
 
Is the potential living donor in a situation in which medical exigency of the 
intended recipient prevents the education and deliberation needed by the 
potential living donor to decide whether to participate as a living donor?368 
 
The need for a potential recipient to receive a tissue donation may be urgent, and if their 
sibling is quickly identified as a match, thus a potential donor, this may preclude the 
minor donor from receiving adequate education and having appropriate time to 
deliberate and make an informed decision.  However, in law it is necessary that if the 
minor donor is competent, they receive full information about the donation process, and 
the informed consent test in Montgomery369 is met in all situations.  In addition, in all 
circumstances the minor donor has to be interviewed by an AA or an IA, depending on 
the type of tissue donated, in order to provide an independent check that the donor is 
not subject to coercion by the recipient, a medical professional, those with PR or their 
family.  The role of the AA and IA interviews is a planned and necessary safeguard and 
sufficient time should be set aside for the interviews to be conducted properly and a 
comprehensive report produced.   
 
A competent donor should be given ample opportunity to consider the gravity of the 
donation process in an independent environment away from the recipient, their family, 
and the medical professionals in order to come to terms with what is being asked of 
them, and decide whether they are going to donate.  Similarly, if the donor is 
incompetent and those with PR can consent or provide authorisation on the donor’s 
 
368 Kipnis (n 269); Friedman Ross and Thistlethwaite (n 269). 
369 Montgomery v Lanarkshire Health Board [2015] UKSC 11, [93]. 
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behalf, then they will need time to process: first that one of their children is sick; 
secondly, that their other child can likely save their sibling’s life; and thirdly, whether 
that child should be a tissue donor, the issues associated with this and the ramifications 
of the decision to be made.  This must not be a knee-jerk decision given the limited time 
constraints, all options must be carefully explored making sure that the donor’s interests 
are the focus of the decision and any alternatives courses of treatment that are also 
available for the recipient are fully considered.  In relation to non-regenerative tissue 
donation there is more information about the donation process to take into account, and 
the decision is very likely to have a greater impact on the donor, therefore, the decision-
making process could take longer and be more difficult to arrive at compared to a 
regenerative tissue donation.   
 
This vulnerability potentially falls under the psychological harm part of the equation 
because the urgency of the donation could interfere with the education and deliberation 
needed by the minor donor or those with PR to make a decision.  The amount of time 
that is required for an individual to make a decision is not a set period, but will depend 
on the individual and how they perceive the gravity of the decision.  The potential 
immediate and long-term medical risks of donating non-regenerative tissue and its 
irreversibility means that it is a more difficult decision to make by a competent minor 
and those with PR compared to a decision about the donation of regenerative tissue.  
Thus, in relation to non-regenerative tissue there is a bigger risk of this vulnerability 
materialising.  Subsequently, in England and Wales a minor should not be permitted to 





4.4.2.7  Allocational 
 
Is the potential living donor lacking in subjectively important social goods that 
will be provided as a consequence of participation as a donor?370 
 
This vulnerability focuses on the potential social goods a minor donor believes they will 
be provided with as a consequence of being a donor.  Social goods can include, for 
example, improved community social status or improved intra-familial relationships.  If 
the transplant is successful then the family of the minor donor may be relieved of the 
burden of caring for the sick minor.  This could lead to more parental time for the donor, 
as well as a better intra-familial relationship between the donor, the recipient, and the 
family.  In addition, the financial situation of the family could improve because they 
may not have to pay to take their sick child to the hospital for treatment or pay for 
hospital bills if it is private treatment.  However, in England and Wales, and Scotland it 
is more common that any medical procedures will be undertaken under the NHS which 
is free of charge.  All of these situations will benefit the minor donor, but they must be 
aware of and understand that these social goods may be transient or may never occur.   
 
Both pre- and post-donation, the family may focus their attention on the recipient in the 
hope that the transplant will be a success and the recipient will remain alive.  This may 
result in the minor donor feeling they are not receiving sufficient attention and being 
marginalised.  This could mean that they may not develop the initial psychological 
benefit from donating to their sibling, and it could result in the minor donor developing 
a psychological harm.  On the other hand, as a result of the donation, the minor donor 
 
370 Kipnis (n 269); Friedman Ross and Thistlethwaite (n 269). 
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may develop greater self-esteem and could be seen as a ‘hero’ by family, friends, and 
the larger community for donating to their sibling.371  But again, if the family focus their 
attention on the recipient rather than the minor donor, the donor may subsequently 
develop a sense of neglect resulting in low self-esteem, and feel that there has been a 
lack of appreciation after the donation,372 especially if the donation was of non-
regenerative tissue. 
 
If the minor donor has donated non-regenerative tissue then they will need to receive 
more support from their family during recovery, compared to a minor donor who has 
donated regenerative tissue.  But this may be diminished if the focus of the family is on 
the recipient rather than the minor donor.  Therefore, I suggest that if the minor donor 
has donated regenerative tissue because the medical risks are lower and recovery 
process shorter the donor requires less support from their family and the potential 
psychological harm as a result of this type of vulnerability will be reduced.   
 
4.4.2.8  Infrastructural 
 
Does the political, organisational, economic, and social context of the donor care 
setting possess the integrity and resources needed to manage the living donation 
process and follow-up?373 
 
This vulnerability examines the ability of the transplant programme and the hospital to 
adequately perform a donation procedure for transplantation purposes from a living 
 
371 Friedman Ross and Thistlethwaite (n 327) 455. 
372 Soren Holm, The child as organ and tissue donor: discussions in the Danish Council of Ethics’ (2004) 
13(2) Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 156, 156.   
373 Kipnis (n 269); Friedman Ross and Thistlethwaite (n 269). 
142 
 
minor.  This requires a wide range of resources: not just surgeons, but appropriate 
intensive care unit medical professionals as well as subspecialists to deal with both 
expected and unexpected complications of these procedures.  This vulnerability has two 
components: the institutional support system, as well as the social situation.  The 
institutional support system component of this vulnerability does not have a 
considerable impact on a minor donor in England and Wales, or Scotland because of 
the high standard of health care that is available and provided by the NHS free of charge 
or through the private sector. 
 
This vulnerability relates to the social situation of the potential donor themselves, not 
the medical risks posed by the medical procedure.  Do they have an adequate support 
system to help them through their recovery from surgery?  With regard to sibling to 
sibling donation this process is undertaken within a family who should be able to 
provide a support mechanism for the minor donor, but the emotional support mechanism 
will be different depending on the circumstances of the family.  Therefore, I suggest 
that if the minor donor has donated regenerative tissue because they require less support 
from their family, the potential psychological harm as a result of this type of 
vulnerability will be reduced compared to non-regenerative tissue.  Therefore, a minor 
should not be permitted to donate non-regenerative tissue.   
 
4.4.3  Concluding thoughts on psychological benefits and psychological harms 
A psychological benefit that is greater than the medical risks and psychological harm 





Put simply: psychological benefit > medical risks + psychological harm  
in order for the donation to be justified.   
 
But a psychological benefit cannot be guaranteed, and even less so if the transplant is 
not a success in the recipient.  The success of the donation can have a considerable 
impact on the donor’s psychological well-being.  The minor donor may not develop a 
psychological benefit at all, but instead suffer from a psychological harm.   
 
If the minor donor does develop a psychological benefit, there is no guarantee at what 
point in the donation process this will develop or whether it will develop in the future.  
If the minor is very young it is unlikely that the psychological benefit will materialise 
immediately, but it may be delayed until the minor donor is fully aware of the donation 
and the impact that it had on their sibling and their family.  When those with PR, the 
minor donor, or the medical professionals are considering the potential psychological 
benefits the donor may receive from the donation they will have to consider future 
potential benefits, but at the same time this consideration has to be reasonable.  For 
example, if the donor was very young it may not be reasonable to consider in the 
decision-making process a potential psychological benefit they may receive when they 
are a teenager.  When considering the future, the decision-maker has to examine how 
lives change and evolve, what may seem like a strong relationship between the minor 
donor and the recipient at the time of the donation may breakdown a number of years 
later.       
 
Both incompetent and competent minors are susceptible to some or all of the types of 
vulnerability discussed, depending on the circumstances of the donation.  I have 
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demonstrated that in relation to the donation of non-regenerative tissue, a minor donor 
has a higher susceptibility to these vulnerabilities.  Therefore, there is a greater chance 
that the donor will develop a psychological harm from the donation of non-regenerative 
tissue compared to regenerative tissue.  The only safeguards to protect a minor donor 
are court approval, HTA approval, and interviews by an AA or IA.  However, as I 
discussed in Chapter 3, the primary role of the AA or IA is to minimise the risk of 
coercion, which is only one of the potential vulnerabilities discussed in this chapter.374  
These safeguards do not attempt to minimise the risk of the other vulnerabilities from 
materialising.  Furthermore, these safeguards cannot guarantee the protection of the 
minor donor.  In this discussion I have identified different types of vulnerabilities, but 
this does not mean that minors should never be allowed to be a tissue donor, rather, that 
it is critical that these vulnerabilities be explored, and if these threats cannot be 
adequately addressed with safeguards, such as with non-regenerative tissue, the minor 
should be prevented from donating.   
 
4.5 Concluding thoughts 
The main argument in this chapter is that the law in England and Wales should be 
reformed.  When considering the first research question of this thesis: should minors in 
England and Wales be permitted to donate non-regenerative tissue?  My contention is 
that no living minor should be able to donate non-regenerative tissue because the 
psychological benefits of the donation do not outweigh the immediate and long-term 
medical risks and potential psychological harms of the donation.  I have explored a 
number of potential vulnerabilities that a minor donor may experience when donating 
 
374 at 3.3. 
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non-regenerative tissue and I suggest that they are not adequately safeguarded against 
in the current regulatory framework.    
 
Put simply: psychological benefit < medical risks + psychological harm 
therefore, the donation is NOT justified.   
 
Therefore, the Scottish approach should be adopted in England and Wales.   
 
The medical risks of a donation procedure are speculative, and it is not definite that all 
or any type of morbidity will materialise.  Psychological benefits are key when 
determining whether a living minor could be a tissue donor, but as psychological 
benefits are subjective, they cannot be quantified precisely.  Therefore, in determining 
whether a minor could be a tissue donor the comparison is between the donor’s 
speculative medical risks and the donor’s unmeasurable psychological benefit.  If the 
vulnerabilities a minor donor may be susceptible to can be identified then this does not 
mean that minors should never be allowed to be a tissue donor, but rather, that it is 
critical that their vulnerabilities be explored, and if these threats cannot be adequately 
addressed with safeguards, such as with non-regenerative tissue donation, the minor 
should be prevented from donating.  The gravity of donating non-regenerative tissue 
and the irreversibility of the procedure suggests that no potential psychological benefits 
can outweigh the potential medical risks, psychological harm and long-term 
implications of a living minor donating this type of tissue.   
 
As I have argued in this chapter that minors should not be allowed to donate non-
regenerative tissue, the remaining chapters will only address regenerative tissue 
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donation from living minors.  The following chapter will consider the second and third 
research questions of this thesis in relation to incompetent minors: who can and should 
be able to provide consent/authorisation for living minors to be regenerative tissue 
donors? and what test(s) should be used to determine whether consent/authorisation can 
be provided for a living minor to be a tissue donor?  First, I conclude that those with PR 
can and should be able to provide consent/authorisation on behalf of an incompetent 
minor to be a tissue donor as long as it is in their best interests.  Secondly, I argue that 
the best interests test should continue to be used to determine whether a minor should 
be at tissue donor, as it allows the decision-maker to take into account a range of factors.  
However, it should be amended by developing the factor that considers the minor’s view 
in the decision-making process.  Also, I recommend that an additional section should 











Incompetent Minors as Regenerative Tissue Donors 
 
5.1 Introduction 
In this chapter I will consider the second and third research questions of this thesis in 
relation to incompetent minors: who can and should be able to provide 
consent/authorisation for living minors to be regenerative tissue donors? and what 
test(s) should be used to determine whether consent/authorisation can be provided for a 
living minor to be a tissue donor?  First, I conclude that those with parental 
responsibility (PR) can and should be able to provide consent/authorisation on behalf 
of an incompetent minor to be a tissue donor as long as it is in their best interests.  Also, 
I propose that if those with PR have made a best interests decision which does not appear 
to be flawed, the court should not see necessary to override it because I argue that the 
best possible decision in those circumstances has already been made.  It is irrelevant 
who makes the decision for the minor, either those with PR or the court, as long as the 
decision is in the best interests of the minor.   
 
Secondly, I argue that the best interests test should continue to be used to determine 
whether a minor should be a tissue donor, as it allows the decision-maker to take into 
account a range of factors.  However, I suggest that it should be amended by developing 
the factor that considers the minor’s view in the decision-making process.  Furthermore, 
I recommend that an additional section should be added that deals exclusively with 
tissue donation from living minors.  It would include a factor that considers the harm of 
the procedure, and a requirement that takes into account relational parental decision-
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making.  The requirements in both the best interests test and this additional section 
would need to be met in order for a donation to occur.   
 
In order to demonstrate my argument, I will set out the role and responsibilities of those 
with PR, and the role of the court in the decision-making process.  In England and 
Wales, the best interests test is contained in the Children Act 1989, while in Scotland it 
is contained in the Children (Scotland) Act 1995.  The best interests test applies to all 
medical procedures, but I shall argue that in England and Wales it fails to adequately 
consider the potential donor’s view in the decision-making process.  Furthermore, the 
best interests test fails to give sufficient weight to the potential harm of tissue donation; 
and the test does not consider the relationships that the minor donor has with their family 
with whom their interests are inextricably bound up, such as a decision that incorporates 
the principle of relational parental decision-making.  I will consider four other tests that 
the court and other academics have suggested could be used instead of or in addition to 
the best interests test to determine whether a minor could be a tissue donor.  The 
alternative tests I have selected are: substituted judgement; constrained parental 
autonomy as defined by Lainie Friedman Ross; “strong” and “weak” family interests; 
and the harm threshold.    
 
5.2 Parental Responsibility  
Minors who are incompetent, particularly pre-verbal or the very young, cannot make 
healthcare decisions for themselves, and so this responsibility must fall on someone 
who can make those decisions.  In the first instance, to those with PR, and if not, to the 
court.  Legislation determines who has PR for a minor.  In England and Wales, PR is 
defined in section 3(1) of the 1989 Act as ‘all the rights, duties, powers, responsibilities 
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and authority which by law a parent of a child has in relation to the child and his 
property.’  These rights are not defined further in the Act,375 but case law clarifies that 
those with PR have a right to give consent for a medical procedure on behalf of a 
minor.376  In Scotland, the equivalent provisions are more specific, and those with PR 
under section 1(1) of the 1995 have the responsibility: 
 
 (a)  to safeguard and promote the child’s health, development and welfare; 
 (b)  to provide, in a manner appropriate to the stage of development of the child- 
  (i)  direction; 
  (ii)  guidance, to the child; 
(c)  if the child is not living with the parent, to maintain personal relations and direct 
contact with the child on a regular basis; and 
 (d)  to act as the child’s legal representative 
but only in so far as compliance with this section is practicable and in the interests of 
the child. 
 
The 1995 Act in Scotland explicitly includes the right to provide authorisation on behalf 
of a minor to undergo a medical procedure.377   
 
In England and Wales, and Scotland when the minor’s father and mother are married to 
each other at the time the minor is born, both will automatically have PR for that 
minor.378  If they are not married, then the woman who gave birth will be the minor’s 
legal mother, and also have PR for the minor.  In this situation, the unmarried father, 
 
375 Sarah Elliston, The Best Interests of the Child in Healthcare (Routledge 2007) 28.   
376 Gillick v West Norfolk and Wisbech Area Health Authority [1985] 3 All ER 402, 432.   
377 Children (Scotland) Act 1995, s.1. 
378 Children Act 1989, s.2(1); Children (Scotland) Act 1995, s.3(1).  
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may acquire PR if certain conditions are fulfilled.379  In England and Wales, and 
Scotland it is explicitly stated, in statute, that ‘more than one person may have parental 
responsibility for the same child at the same time.’380  In general, in relation to a medical 
procedure, if two individuals share PR, consent of only one of those with PR is 
required.381  However, the Human Tissue Authority (HTA) state in Code of Practice G, 
which is applicable only in England and Wales, that consent of only one person with 
PR is required.382  But where there is more than one person who has PR, and there is a 
dispute between them, the matter should be referred to court for them to make a decision 
on how to proceed.383  Even though there is no specific guidance on this in Scotland, 
there is no evidence to suggest that Scotland would take a contrary view to the one 
adopted in England and Wales. 
 
In conclusion, those with PR can and should be able to provide consent/authorisation 
on behalf of an incompetent minor to be a tissue donor if it is in the minor’s best 
interests.  As to what constitutes ‘best interests’ and also the role of the minor donor in 
the decision-making process this is examined at 5.4 in this chapter.  I will now consider 
the role of the court in the decision-making process.       
 
5.3 The Court 
The court has a role to play in making a decision when those with PR or those with PR 
and the medical professionals disagree between themselves, or if there is any doubt as 
 
379 Children Act 1989, s.2(2).  See Children Act 1989, s.4 as amended by the Adoption and Children Act 
2002; Children (Scotland) Act 1995, s.4 and s.4A.   
380 Children Act 1989, s.2(5); Children (Scotland) Act 1995, s.2(2) respectively.   
381 Children Act 1989, s.2(7); Children (Scotland) Act 1995, s.2(2); General Medical Council, Treatment 
and Care Towards the End of Life (2010) para 104.   
382 Human Tissue Authority, Code of Practice G: Donation of allogeneic bone marrow and peripheral 
blood stem cells for transplantation (2017) para 74.   
383 HTA, Code of Practice G (n 382) para 77; See Re J (Child’s Religious Upbringing and Circumcision) 
[1999] 2 FLR 1004 CA for discussion on parental disagreement over medical treatment of a minor.   
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to whether the medical procedure is in the best interests of the minor.  The case could 
have been brought under a specific issue order,384 or the court will be invoking their 
inherent jurisdiction – the parens patriae jurisdiction.385  However, in Scotland, the 
inherent jurisdiction is used specifically in relation to adults who lack capacity and its 
scope for use in respect of a minor’s medical procedure is unclear.386  In theory, the 
court can consider any person who lacks capacity regardless of age.387  There is 
ambiguity as to whether the inherent jurisdiction confers the court with the same power 
over the minor as those with PR or whether it confers the court with extra-parental 
powers.  If it is the latter, then the court can make decision on behalf of a minor, as 
those with PR can, but it can also override a decision made by those with PR on behalf 
of the minor.   
 
The authority that those with PR have over a minor, also known as parental authority, 
is not absolute.388  While those with PR are generally presumed to be best placed to 
make decisions for the minor, as they know the minor better than anyone else, the 
threshold for court intervention will be met if a person with PR makes a decision that 
will potentially cause ‘significant harm’ to the minor.389  It is unclear what is considered 
to be significant harm.  In Re Z, in the Court of Appeal, Sir Thomas Bingham stated 
that: 
 
384 Children Act 1989, s.8; Children (Scotland) Act 1995, s.11(2).   
385 Children Act 1989, s.11 and s.100; Re X (A Minor)(Wardship: restriction on publication) [1975] 1 All 
ER 697 at 706; South Glamorgan County Council v W and B [1993] 1 FCR 626.  See also John Seymour, 
‘Parens Patriae and Wardship powers: their nature and origins’ (1994) 14(2) Oxford Journal of Legal 
Studies 159; Graeme Laurie, ‘Parens Patriae jurisdiction in the medico-legal context: the vagaries of 
judicial activism’ (1999) 3(1) Edinburgh Law Review 96.   
386 see L, Petitioner, 1996 SCLR 538, CS; Law Hospital NHS Trust v Lord Advocate 1996 SCLR 49, 
IHCS. 
387 Alexander B Wilkinson and Kenneth Norrie, The Law Relating to Parent and Child in Scotland (W 
Green, 1999) para 853. 
388 Jeanne Snelling, ‘Minors and Contested Medical-Surgical Treatment: Where Are We with Best 
Interests? (2016) 25(1) Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 50, 50. 
389 Snelling (n 388), 50; Re Wyatt (A child) (Medical Treatment: Parent’s Consent) [2004] EWHC 2247 




I would for my part accept without reservation that the decision of a devoted and 
responsible parent should be treated with respect.  It should certainly not be disregarded 
or lightly set aside.  But the role of the court is to exercise an independent and objective 
judgment.  If that judgment is in accord with that of the devoted and responsible parent, 
well and good.  If it is not, then it is the duty of the court, after giving due weight to the 
view of the devoted and responsible parent, to give effect to its own judgment.  That is 
what it is there for.  Its judgment may of course be wrong.  So may that of the parents.  
But once the jurisdiction of the court is invoked its clear duty is to reach and express 
the best judgment it can.390 
 
In agreement with Douglas Diekema, it is my opinion that not all decisions should 
trigger court intervention as those with PR should be allowed to make decisions on 
behalf of their minors with ‘sufficient space and freedom from intrusion by others’.391  
But it is unclear what is considered ‘sufficient space and freedom’.   
 
In both the Charlie Gard and Alfie Evans litigation,392 the courts made clear that they 
have the power to make medical decisions for minors at the point that the minor’s 
welfare is engaged.393  In other words, the threshold for judicial intervention in disputes 
about medical care for a minor is at the point when the procedure is not in the best 
interests of the minor.  Cressida Auckland and Imogen Goold argue that prima facie 
decision-making authority about a minor’s medical care should rest with the minor’s 
 
390 Re Z (a minor)(freedom of publication) [1995] 4 All ER 961, 986. 
391 Douglas S Diekema, ‘Parental Refusals of Medical Treatment: The Harm Principle as Threshold for 
State Intervention’ (2004) 25 Theoretical Medicine 243, 244. 
392 Evans & Anor v Alder Hey Children's NHS Foundation Trust & Anor [2018] EWCA Civ 805; Yates 
and Gard v Great Ormond Street Hospital [2017] EWCA Civ 410. 
393 Cressida Auckland and Imogen Goold, ‘Parental Rights, Best Interests and Significant Harms: who 
should have the final say over a child’s medical care?’ (2019) 78(2) Cambridge Law Journal 287, 287.  
See also Natasha Hammond-Browning, ‘When Doctors and Parents Don’t Agree: The story of Charlie 
Gard’ (2017) 14 Journal of Bioethical Inquiry 461; Emma Cave and Emma Nottingham, ‘Who knows 
best (interests)?  The case of Charlie Gard’ (2018) 26(3) Medical Law Review 500.   
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parents, affording them the ability to choose between the range of medical options 
available.394  Their reasoning is that many decisions about minors are not solely medical 
decisions, but decisions involving a number of different aspects of the minor’s interests 
and values that those with PR are best placed to understand.395  I proposed in Chapter 2 
that my introduction of the concept of relational parental decision-making should form 
part of the decision-making when determining whether a minor should be a tissue 
donor.396  Since those with PR are best placed to identify the relationships that the minor 
has with others, as well as give them sufficient weighting and apply them to the 
decision-making process, it would follow that those with PR would have decision-
making authority.  But Lord Fraser in Gillick v West Norfolk and Wisbech Area Health 
Authority stated: 
  
parental rights to control a child do not exist for the benefit of the parent.  They exist 
for the benefit of the child and they are justified only in so far as they enable the parent 
to perform his duties towards the child, and towards other children in the family.397 
 
It is my view that only when those with PR have not made a best interests decision, 
should the court become involved.  Court intervention can be seen as an independent 
perspective on the decisions made by those with PR, and will provide a judgment taking 
all factors on the impact of the decision into account. 
 
Sarah Elliston has argued that for the decision of those with PR to be overridden by the 
court, the court’s decision will be a “better” one.398  In other words, the court’s decision 
 
394 Auckland and Goold (n 393), 287. 
395 Auckland and Goold (n 393), 288. 
396 at 2.3. 
397 Gillick (n 376) 170. 
398 Elliston (n 375) 20. 
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would be better for the minor than a decision made by those with PR.  This prompts me 
to ask the following questions: what is considered to be a “better” decision in relation 
to a minor’s medical procedure?  Does the decision have to be what is “best” for the 
minor or is “better” enough?  I will now offer possible answers to these questions.  
Whether a decision is better for the minor is dependent on a number of factors.  I argue 
that it must be better overall rather than better in relation to only one aspect of the 
decision.  Whether a decision is considered better will depend on the factors that the 
decision-maker has taken into account when making the decision and, what weight these 
factors have been given.  A number of factors are considered in a best interests decision, 
such as the harm, physical, emotional, and psychological needs of the minor.399  For 
instance, if the decision-maker just focuses on the psychological needs of the minor 
then one decision could be better than another, but at the same time this decision may 
not be better if they had only considered the physical needs of the minor instead.  The 
decision-making process should collectively take account of all of the factors and decide 
what is best overall rather than focusing on one particular aspect of the decision.   
 
If those with PR made a best interests decision on behalf of minor then theoretically the 
court could not make a better decision since a best interests decision should be the best 
possible decision made in those particular circumstances.  If the court could make a 
better decision, it must be ascertained what this decision is better than.  If those with PR 
have failed to make a best interests decision then the court can make a better decision.  
Their better decision will be the best decision for the minor, ie the best interests 
decision, in other words, better decision = the best interests decision = best decision.   
 
 
399 see 5.4 for a discussion of the best interests test.  
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Furthermore, Elliston has argued that when overriding parental decisions the court 
should only be concerned with ensuring that the ‘significant interests of the minor are 
not put at risk and that the decision made by those with parental responsibility meet a 
reasonableness standard.’400  She argues that to go further would be to usurp the 
legitimate authority and function of those with PR.401  But, if the court is only 
considering whether the decision made by those with PR is reasonable, then they are 
not considering whether those with PR have met the best interests standard.  Moreover, 
this still leaves the unanswered question of what is considered reasonable?  Or 
reasonable for whom?  Elliston does not provide a definition.   
 
Elliston purports to use these two different tests to decide whether a court should 
override the decision of those with PR, namely, the better decision test and the 
reasonableness test, but both fail to provide a clear test for a court to use and apply.  I 
suggest that the more appropriate test is the one that is currently used, which is whether 
those with PR have made a best interests decision for the minor.  If those with PR have 
not made a best interests decision, then the court can and should be able to override that 
decision and make a best interests decision on the minor’s behalf.  If those with PR have 
made a best interests decision which does not appear to be flawed, the court should not 
see necessary to override it because the best possible decision for the minor in those 
circumstances has already been made.  It is irrelevant who makes the decision for the 
minor, either those with PR or the court, as long as the decision is in the best interests 




400 Elliston (n 375) 2. 
401 Elliston (n 375) 3.   
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5.4 The Best Interests Test 
Those with PR make decisions that should be in the minor’s best interests.402  
Determining best interests is a ‘critical equation [that] cannot be done with mathematics 
or any precision’.403  The issue of whether a procedure is in the best interests of a minor 
is simplest when the procedure is for the medical benefit of the minor.404  There is 
difficulty in determining what is in a minor’s best interests where the benefit is indirect; 
for instance, in tissue donation from a living minor.  Loretta Kopelman has questioned: 
 
whether we can really know what is in people’s best interest.  The best interest standard 
… seems to suppose we can always agree about what is best, consider all options, 
calculate all their benefits and harms, and pick the alternative that maximises benefits 
and minimises harms … This is not just a daunting task, but virtually impossible, 
especially when one contemplates the myriad possibilities of the indefinite future.405 
 
Even where the relevant factors can be agreed, Claire Breen has stated that: 
  
… in spite of the decision-makers best efforts, there remains a wide variety of 
circumstances that cannot be accounted for both in the present and in the future, which 
may distort the validity of the decision as being in the child’s best interests.  
Consequently, according such ability to a decision-maker is to bestow upon him or her 
shamen-like qualities for the prediction of future events.406 
 
Before the enactment of the relevant legislation in the different jurisdictions, the 1989 
Act and the 1995 Act, the factors to be taken into account when determining best 
 
402 An NHS Trust v MB [2006] EWHC 507 (Fam). 
403 Re J (a minor) (wardship: medical treatment) [1990] 3 All ER 930, 938 per Lord Donaldson.  
404 PDG Skegg, ‘Consent to Medical Procedures on Minors’ (1973) 36(4) Modern Law Review 370, 377. 
405 Loretta M Kopelman, ‘The best interests standard as threshold, ideal and standard of reasonableness’ 
(1997) 22(3) Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 271, 284.   
406 Claire Breen, The Standard of the Best Interests of the Child: A Western Tradition in International 
and Comparative Law, International Studies in Human Rights Vol.72 (Martinus Nijhoff 2002) 17. 
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interests or, as it was known, the welfare of the minor, were set out in common law.  In 
re McGrath Lindley LJ said that: 
 
the word welfare must be taken in its widest sense.  The moral and religious welfare of 
the child must be considered as well as its physical well-being, nor can the ties of 
affection be disregarded.407 
 
In England and Wales, the current law on the best interests test for minors is contained 
in the 1989 Act.  For proceedings under the Act, when a court determines any question 
with respect to the upbringing of a minor, ‘the child’s welfare shall be the court’s 
paramount consideration.’408  The same principle is found in the 1995 Scottish Act when 
a court is making an order in respect of PR or guardianship.409  This is reiterated in 
professional guidance where the General Medical Council (GMC), British Medical 
Association (BMA), and Nuffield Council on Bioethics all emphasise that decisions 
should be made in the minor’s best interests:  
 
Doctors should always act in the best interest of children and young people.410  The 
moral authority behind parental responsibility depends in large part on the entirely 
reasonable supposition that parents will act in the best interests of their children.411  … 
the best interests of a baby must be a central consideration in determining whether and 
how to treat him or her.412 
 
 
407 [1893] 1 Ch 143, 148. 
408 Children Act 1989, s.1(1). 
409 Children (Scotland) Act 1995, s11(1) and 11(7)(a).  
410 General Medical Council, 0-18 years: guidance for all doctors (2007) para 8. 
411 British Medical Association, Parental Responsibility (Ethics Department, 2008) 2. 
412 Nuffield Council on Bioethics, Critical care decisions in fetal and neonatal medicine: ethical issues 
(2006) para 10. 
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This is also confirmed in international law, Article 18 of the United Nations Convention 
of the Rights of Children (UNCRC) states that: 
 
Parents or, as the case may be, legal guardians, have the primary responsibility for the 
upbringing and development of the child.  The best interests of the child will be their 
basic concern. 
 
In England and Wales, the 1989 Act contains a welfare “checklist” that a court must 
consider when making, varying or discharging an order.  Under section 3(1) of the 1989 
Act, the court must consider:  
 
(a)  the ascertainable wishes and feelings of the child concerned (considered in light 
of the child’s age and understanding); 
 (b)  the child’s physical, emotional and/or education needs; 
 (c)  the likely effect on the child of any change in his/her circumstances; 
(d)  the child’s age, sex, background and any other characteristics, which the court 
considers relevant; 
(e)  any harm which the child has suffered or is at risk of suffering; 
(f)  how capable each of the child’s parents, and any other person in relation to 
whom the court considers the question to be relevant, is of meeting his/her 
needs; 
(g)  the range of powers available to the court under the Children Act 1989 in the 
proceedings in question.413 
 
In contrast, in Scotland, following the recommendations of the Scottish Law 
Commission, there is no general welfare checklist.414  The Scottish Law Commission 
 
413 Children Act 1989, s.1(3). 
414 Scottish Law Commission, Report on Family Law (HC Paper [Session 1992-93]) (HMSO, 1992) Law 
Commission No. 135; The Law Commission, Family Law Review of Child Law Guardianship and 
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argued that section 3(2) of the Law Reform (Parent and Child) (Scotland) Act 1986, 
which was the legislation in force at the time of the recommendations, already refers to 
the paramountcy of the minor’s welfare and that embraces ‘practically everything’ that 
would be in a checklist, however long.415   
 
Re A (Medical Treatment: Male Sterilisation)416 has provided some guidance as to how 
the best interests test set out in the 1989 Act should be assessed.  It requires the judge 
to draw up a balance sheet document that considers the benefits and the risks of the 
medical procedure.  However, this simple way of weighing up the medical risks and 
benefits to the donor does not indicate what other factors the judge should take into 
account, such as whether the list should contain only medical factors or include other 
aspects such as social or emotional elements.  Also, it is not clear as to how much weight 
should be placed on each risk or benefit.   
 
The notable difference between the 1989 Act and the 1995 Act is in relation to the 
minor’s own views.417  The 1995 Act specifically mentions the need to involve the 
minor when making a decision on their behalf, while the 1989 Act states ‘the 
ascertainable wishes and feelings of the child concerned’.  The Scottish Law 
Commission (SLC) suggested that a minor’s own views should be taken into account in 
their own right, and even though the 1995 Act does not have a welfare checklist, unlike 
the 1989 Act, there is a separate subsection that deals with the minor’s views.418  I argue 
 
Custody (Law Com. No. 172, 1988) paras 3.17 to 3.21.  The checklist recommended by the Commission 
was essentially the same as that enacted in the Children Act, although there are some differences in 
wording.   
415 Scottish Law Commission (n 414) para 5.23. 
416 Re A (medical treatment: male sterilisation) [2000] 1 FCR 193, 206 per Thorpe LJ.   
417 Scottish Law Commission (n 414) para 5.23. 
418 Scottish Law Commission (n 414) para 5.23. 
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that, in relation to tissue donation, even though the minor is incompetent they can 
express their opinion about the donation which should be given weight by those with 
PR in the decision-making process and the legislative provision should be framed the 
same as in Scotland.   
 
5.4.1 The minor’s role in the decision-making process  
As part of the best interests test, specific mention is made in the 1995 Act of the need 
to involve the minor when making a decision on their behalf.419  A court is required to 
take into account the minor’s age and maturity and so far, as practicable: 
 
(i) give him an opportunity to indicate whether he wishes to express his views; 
(ii) if he does so wish, give him an opportunity to express them; and  
(iii) have regard to such views as he may express.420 
 
In section 11(10) of the 1995 Act, it is stated that a minor aged 12 and above is presumed 
to be of sufficient age and maturity to form a view about whether to undergo the medical 
procedure.  There is no equivalent provision in the 1989 Act, and there is no minimum 
age restriction for a minor to participate in either statute.  The 1995 Act deals more 
comprehensively with a minor’s view on the decision compared to the 1989 Act.  I 
suggest that this shows that Scottish Parliament wanted to give the minor’s view greater 
weighting, therefore, they adopted a different approach to the one taken in the 1989 Act 
in England and Wales.   
 
 
419 Children (Scotland) Act 1995, s.6. 
420 Children (Scotland) Act 1995, s.11(7)(b).  
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The need to consider the minor’s views in relation to tissue donation is set out in 
professional guidance.  The HTA state in Code of Practice G that the minor donor 
should be provided with information about the procedure and its risks to an appropriate 
level.421  This is reiterated by the GMC who have stated in their guidance that medical 
professionals ‘should involve children and young people as much as possible in 
decisions about their care, even when they are not able to make decisions on their 
own’.422  The Royal College of Paediatrics states that ‘paediatricians must listen to 
children and young people and respect their views.’423  The level of communication 
required for the minor donor depends on their ability to understand the donation 
procedure,424 and ‘understanding can be assisted by involving a play therapist, 
psychologist or specialist nurse in the communication process.’425  In some instances, it 
is clear when a minor is agreeing to the medical procedure; for example, they may 
voluntarily hold out their arm for a nurse to take blood.  However, very young minors, 
for instance pre-verbal minors, may not be able to show any indication.  Another 
indication as to the minor donor’s view could be if the procedures surrounding the tissue 
donation, such as tests to determine histocompatibility, cause them to suffer medical, 
psychological or emotional harm, not usually experienced by a minor donor.  The 
presence of any of these types of harm may indicate that the minor should not 
considered as a tissue donor. 
 
Taking account of a minor’s view could be considered to be assent, although not legally 
binding in England and Wales, and Scotland it is ‘an active agreement to participate and 
 
421 HTA, Code of Practice G (n 382) para 80.   
422 General Medical Council (n 410) para 23. 
423 Royal College of Paediatrics, Good Medical Practice in Paediatrics and Child Health: Duties and 
Responsibilities of Paediatricians (RCP 2002) para 21. 
424 HTA, Code of Practice G (n 382) para 80. 
425 HTA, Code of Practice G (n 382) para 82. 
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not a mere failure to object.’426  Minors may be able to assent to the tissue donation, but 
this is not the same as providing informed consent or informed authorisation as it will 
not conclusively determine whether the procedure will occur.  Even though the minor 
donor would not be providing consent or authorisation they can still be given 
information about the medical procedure in a simple format that they can understand so 
they can express their opinion.   
 
If a minor donor has been provided with basic information about the donation, but 
makes a statement such as ‘I don’t want to give my sister my bone marrow because she 
took my toy’ or ‘I want to have the operation because mummy said I will get lots of 
sweets’, then it is apparent that their understanding is not developed enough for their 
opinion to carry a significant weight in the decision-making process.  While their 
reasoning does not have to reach the standard of the Gillick competence or section 2(4) 
competence tests,427 the minor’s reasoning cannot be superficial or based on receiving 
a reward for donating as this invokes a risk of coercion.  However, if the minor says ‘I 
don’t want to give her my bone marrow because it will hurt me a lot’, or ‘I want to have 
the operation because it will help my sister get better’, even though they might not 
understand why the procedure will hurt them or why it will help their sister, they have 
some understanding of the donation procedure.  The amount of weight given to a 




426 L Friedman Ross, R Thistlethwaite and the Committee on Bioethics, ‘Minors as Living Solid Organ 
Donors’ (2008) 122(2) Paediatrics 454, 458. 
427 see Chapter 6 at 6.2.1 and 6.2.2 for further information about the competency tests. 
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[a]ll children, whatever their age and circumstances, can provide valuable perceptions 
that can improve their clinical care … with appropriate techniques, children as young 
as four can make helpful comments about their experience of health services.428 
 
The role of the minor’s views serves only to help the decision-maker determine what, 
on balance, is in the minor’s best interests.429   It does not mean that the decision-maker 
would regard the minor’s own views as decisive.430  Therefore, the minor’s view is 
consultative rather than authoritative.431  But, the decision-maker should still take into 
account the minor’s view regardless of whether it is in agreement with those with PR 
or the medical professional.  
 
If the 1989 Act was to be reformed to adopt the same wording as the 1995 Act in order 
to emphasise the use of the minor’s view in the decision-making process it would read 
as follows, with the amendments in italics: 
 
(a)  the minor’s age and maturity and so far, as practicable: 
(i)  give him an opportunity to indicate whether he wishes to express 
his views; 
(ii)  if he does so wish, give him an opportunity to express them; and  
(iii)  have regard to such views as he may express; 
 (b)  the child’s physical, emotional and/or education needs; 
 (c)  the likely effect on the child of any change in his/her circumstances; 
 
428 Lynn Hagger, The Child as Vulnerable Patient: Protection and Empowerment (Routledge 2009) 56. 
429 David Archard and Marit Skivenes, ‘Balancing a Child’s Best Interests and a Child’s View’ (2009) 
17(1) International Journal of Children’s Rights 1, 17. 
430 Elliston (n 375) 16. 
431 Archard and Skivenes (n 429) 15. 
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(d)  the child’s age, sex, background and any other characteristics, which the 
court considers relevant; 
(e)  any harm which the child has suffered or is at risk of suffering; 
(f)  how capable each of the child’s parents, and any other person in relation 
to whom the court considers the question to be relevant, is of meeting 
his/her needs; 
(g)  the range of powers available to the court under the Children Act 1989 
in the proceedings in question. 
   
5.4.2 Donor Interests vs Recipient Interests 
Tissue donation is different to other medical procedures as it directly affects two 
individuals.  In Chapter 4, I clarified why I was only considering the risks and benefits 
to the donor, and not to the recipient in relation to non-regenerative tissue.432  I will now 
argue that when considering whether a minor should be a tissue donor, only the best 
interests of the minor donor should be considered and not those of the potential 
recipient.  In contrast, Elliston has suggested that the interests of both minors should be 
given equal weight.433  However, this creates a conflict between the donor and the 
recipient as a tissue donation is a non-therapeutic procedure for the donor, whether it is 
in their best interests will rest on factors other than just the medical risks and benefits.  
If both the donor and the recipient’s interests are to be considered together then there 
are many more factors that have to be taken into account, and there is a risk that the 
donor’s interests could be unreasonably marginalised and not given priority in a 
particular area because of the profound effect the donation would have on the recipient’s 
life.     
 
432 at 4.2. 




If the decision-making process in relation to tissue donation needs to consider the best 
interests of two minors simultaneously the way that the best interests test is framed 
would have to be modified.  The current test makes it difficult to take into account the 
interests of both the donor and the recipient at the same time.434  This view is taken by 
the Department of Health (DoH), they state in guidance on bone marrow donation from 
incompetent minors that receiving a bone marrow donation will clearly be in the 
interests of the recipient minor, however: 
 
in relation to medical interventions it is not acceptable for the needs of one sibling to 
be balanced against the needs of another.  The legal test is whether donating bone 
marrow is in the best interest of the healthy child.435   
 
In the remainder of this thesis, any discussion about the best interests test focuses on 
the donor’s best interests and does not take into account the recipient’s interests.   
 
5.5 Proposed Reforms of the Best Interests Test 
This section of the chapter will focus on the third research question of this thesis: what 
test(s) should be used to determine whether consent/authorisation can be provided for a 
living minor to be a tissue donor?  The best interests test currently applies to all types 
of medical procedures including tissue donation.  But I argue that there are two main 
criticisms of the best interests test in relation to tissue donation.  First, that it does not 
give sufficient weight to the potential harm to the donor of a tissue donation procedure.  
Tissue donation is a non-therapeutic procedure for the donor; therefore, it is paramount 
 
434 Elliston (n 375) 22. 
435 Department of Health, Reference Guide to Consent for Examination and Treatment (DoH 2001) Chp 
3, para 16.   
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that both the potential medical and psychological harms are considered before a 
decision is made as to whether the minor should donate.  Secondly, the test does not 
consider the relationships that the minor donor has with their family with whom their 
interests are inextricably bound up, such as a decision that incorporates the principle 
relational parental decision-making.436  As discussed in Chapter 2, relational parental 
decision-making should form part of the decision-making process.437  As a result of 
these criticisms, I shall consider four other tests to determine whether they could be 
used instead of or in addition to the best interests test to determine whether a minor 
could be a tissue donor.   
 
The alternative tests I have selected are: substituted judgement; constrained parental 
autonomy as defined by Friedman Ross; ‘strong’ and ‘weak’ family interests; and the 
harm threshold.  I have selected these particular tests because substituted judgement 
was considered by a court in England and Wales to determine whether an individual 
who lacks capacity should undergo a medical procedure.438  Both constrained parental 
autonomy, and ‘strong’ and ‘weak’ family interests are tests defined by academics that 
take into account the relational aspect of the decision-making process.  Finally, the harm 
threshold is a test that focuses on the harm that a medical procedure inflicts on the 
individual, which is particularly notable in tissue donation since it is a non-therapeutic 
procedure for the donor.  I will now consider each test in turn analysing its strengths 
and weaknesses and concluding whether it is a suitable test to be used in relation to 
living minors as tissue donors.  
 
 
436 Lainie Friedman Ross, Children, Families, and Healthcare (OUP 1998) 43. 
437 at 2.3. 
438 Re Y (adult patient)(bone marrow transplant) [1997] 2 WLR 556. 
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5.5.1  Substituted Judgement  
The substituted judgement test allows the decision-maker to choose what they think the 
minor would have decided if the minor was competent.439  The test could allow the 
decision-maker to consent to or authorise tissue donation, even though it poses a risk to 
the potential donor, because they believe that the donor would have chosen to donate, 
had they been able to do so.440  There has been one case in England and Wales that 
considered this test.  In In re Y (adult patient)(bone marrow transplant),441 the High 
Court authorised a bone marrow donation from Y, a 25-year old woman with physical 
and learning disabilities, to her sister, who was likely to die without it.  In a rather 
convoluted chain of reasoning, Connell J concluded that the bone marrow donation 
would, in fact, be in Y’s interests.  It was argued that Y’s mother would be extremely 
distressed if Y’s sister died, and she would also be obliged to assume the care of Y’s 
sister’s young daughter.442  Subsequently, this would limit the amount of time the 
mother could spend with Y.443  But the deciding factor seemed to be the impact that 
non-intervention would have had on the relationship between Y and her mother: 
 
It was to the emotional, psychological and social benefit of the defendant to act as donor 
to her sister because in this way her positive relationship with her mother was most 
likely to be prolonged.  The disadvantages to the defendant of the harvesting procedure 
were very small.  The bone marrow donated by the defendant would cause her no loss 
and she would suffer no real long-term risk.444 
 
 
439 SE Mumford, ‘Donation without consent?’  Legal Developments in Bone Marrow Transplantation’ 
(1998) 101(4) British Journal of Haematology 599, 600. 
440 Mumford (n 439) 600. 
441 Re Y (n 438). 
442 Re Y (n 438) 599. 
443 Re Y (n 438) 599. 
444 Re Y (n 438) 562. 
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In this case, it is unclear whether the court was concerned with Y’s best interests or her 
better interests, which is a similar argument to that taken by Elliston that I discussed 
earlier in this chapter.445  In relation to that argument, I concluded that the court is unable 
to use and apply the better decision test as it is unclear and unworkable when attempting 
to make a judgment.  The reason is because if the decision-maker made a best interests 
decision on behalf of the minor then theoretically a better decision could not be made 
as the best possible decision has already be made in those particular circumstances.  In 
relation to Re Y, it may be in her better interests to improve her relationship with her 
mother, but whether, when considering all of the factors, it is in her best interests to 
undergo non-therapeutic medical procedure in order to do so is less obvious.446  Taking 
into account her psychological well-being, the court concluded that she should donate 
bone marrow to her sister.447   
 
Re Y has been criticised for a number of reasons, including the apparent weak evidence 
relied upon by the court.448  Trying to determine how someone would act is difficult, 
especially if they have never been competent, and making a decision based on 
substituted judgement has been described as ‘equivalent to guesswork’.449  An 
incompetent minor would never have been able to consent to or authorise a medical 
procedure, therefore, trying to determine what decision they would make about a 
medical procedure is difficult since there is no previous pattern of decision-making to 
examine.   
 
445 see Chapter 5 at 5.3. 
446 Laurie (n 385) 103. 
447 Mumford (n 439) 599. 
448 Shih-Ning Then, ‘Best interests: The ‘best’ way for courts to decide if young children should act as 
bone marrow donors? (2017) 17 Medical Law International 3, 25; Andrew Grubb, ‘Commentary: Adult 
incompetent: Legality of Non-therapeutic Procedure: Re Y ’ (1996) 4 Medical Law Review 204, 206. 
449 Sheila McLean, ‘Consent and the law: review of the current provisions in the Human Fertilisation and 




I argue that the substituted judgement test would not be suitable to use to decide whether 
a minor should be a tissue donor as it is based on speculative evidence.  It cannot be 
conclusively decided what weight the minor donor would place on different factors such 
as the medical risks, their psychological well-being, or the impact of the donation on 
the recipient.  The decision-maker could erroneously place greater weight on the impact 
the donation would have on the recipient, by arguing that the minor donor would want 
to donate so their sibling becomes healthy or remains alive.  This presents a risk of 
exploitation of the potential minor donor as they could be a means to an end.  As the 
decision-maker is predicting what the minor may have decided if they were competent, 
the decision-maker’s decision could be accepted without question unless explicit 
evidence is provided contrary to the reasoning given.  The HTA have put in safeguards 
to try to prevent the coercion of minor donors through the use of HTA and/or court 
approval.  It may be argued that those with PR are best placed to determine what 
decision the minor donor would make if they were competent as they know the minor 
better them anyone else, but this could potentially lead to the exploitation of the minor 
donor if those with PR were to base their decision on weak evidence.  Therefore, I argue 
that the substituted judgement test should be not be used as a replacement to or in 
addition to the current best interests test.   
 
5.5.2  Constrained Parental Autonomy as defined by Lainie Friedman Ross 
Friedman Ross has argued that those with PR are the best decision-makers for a minor 
since they are generally presumed to be best placed to determine what is in their minor’s 
interests as they know the minor better than anyone else.450  She has suggested a model 
 
450 Friedman Ross (n 436) 131-141. 
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of constrained parental autonomy that allows those with PR to trade the best interests 
of one minor against the familial interests as long as all of the basic needs of that minor 
are secured.451  In other words, those with PR do not have to necessarily act in the best 
interests of the minor if that decision promotes the interests of the family as a whole, as 
long as those with PR have met the basic needs of the minor.  Friedman Ross defines 
“basic needs” as ‘the basic goods, skills, and liberties, and opportunities essential for 
the adequate development and full exercise of moral personality.’452  I am arguing that 
this model is not suitable to replace or as an addition to the current best interests test to 
determine whether a living minor should be a tissue donor because it is too broad and 
focuses too much on the interests of the recipient minor and the family unit as a whole, 
rather than on the potential donor.   
 
Often in families, the well-being of one minor is intertwined with the well-being of 
other family members,453 and decisions are made collectively to improve the interests 
of the family as a whole.  This is particularly true in relation to tissue donation where 
the donor and recipient are siblings.  Allowing a minor to be a tissue donor promotes 
the interests of the family as a whole since the transplant would be life-saving or life-
prolonging for the recipient resulting in the family staying intact.  Under this model of 
constrained parental autonomy, those with PR have a wide discretionary power in 
making decisions for incompetent minors.454  But, if those with PR do not fulfil all of 
the basic needs of the minor, then court intervention is justified.455   
 
 
451 Friedman Ross (n 436) 131-141. 
452 Friedman Ross (n 436) 5-6. 
453 Friedman Ross (n 436) 114. 
454 Friedman Ross (n 436) 120. 
455 Friedman Ross (n 436) 24.   
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Friedman Ross suggests three criteria that need to be fulfilled in order for court 
intervention in parental decision-making to be justified.456  First, medical professionals 
must agree that the medical procedure is non-experimental and medically appropriate 
for the minor.457  Secondly, denial of that medical procedure would result in the 
deprivation of the minor donor’s basic needs.458  Finally, the anticipated result of the 
medical procedure gives the minor donor ‘a chance for normal healthy growth or a life 
worth living’ from the minor donor’s own perspective.459  Friedman Ross argues that 
the low risk of long-term morbidity means that donation of bone marrow satisfies these 
conditions.460  She argues that those with PR should be allowed to authorise a minor’s 
participation in intra-familial donations that entail minimal risk.461  Donations that entail 
significant medical risks and harms, such as non-regenerative tissue donation, seriously 
threatens the normal healthy growth and life of the minor donor so would contravene 
the third condition.462  Thus, those with PR cannot “sacrifice” one minor for another 
even if it is for the wider interests of the family.463 
 
Unlike the best interests test, the constrained parental autonomy model allows the 
familial interests of the family including the interests of the recipient, as they are part 
of the family unit, to be taken into account.  However, there is a risk that the interests 
of the donor will not be the paramount consideration as those with PR only need to 
maintain the basic needs of the minor donor rather than meet the higher threshold of the 
best interests test.  Moreover, Friedman Ross’ model may allow those with PR to use 
 
456 Friedman Ross (n 436) 140. 
457 Friedman Ross (n 436) 140.   
458 Friedman Ross (n 436) 140.   
459 Friedman Ross (n 436) 140.   
460 Friedman Ross (n 436) 113-115. 
461 Friedman Ross (n 436) 115; however, I have argued in Chapter 4 that no minor should be permitted 
to donate non-regenerative tissue. 
462 Friedman Ross (n 436) 115. 
463 Friedman Ross (n 436) 115. 
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their minor as a means to an end, as long as they simultaneously respect the basic needs 
of the minor.464  This means that a minor could be used purely as a tissue donor with 
little consideration for their interests and welfare as long as only their basic needs are 
met.  The threshold for a minor’s basic needs to be met is low.    
 
The recipient’s interests and those of the wider family should be a consideration, but 
should not solely determine whether the donation takes place because otherwise the 
donation would always take place without ever considering the interests of the donor.  
Those with PR should not be able to make decisions purely for the benefit of the family 
unit, while only having to maintain the basic needs of the minor donor as this does not 
protect them from potential exploitation.  The idea of including a test that fulfils the 
principle of relational parental decision-making as an addition to the best interest test is 
attractive and will be further explored in the next section.465  But, the familial interests 
should not be the dominant factor when determining whether a minor should be a tissue 
donor, therefore, the best interests test should contain a model of constrained parental 
autonomy as defined by Friedman Ross.   
 
5.5.3  ‘Strong’ and ‘Weak’ Family Interests 
As with the constrained parental autonomy model, the strong and weak interests model 
also considers wider family interests when making a decision.  But unlike the 
constrained parental autonomy model, I argue that the weak family interests model 
should be part of an additional test to the best interests test specifically for living minors 
as tissue donors.  Paul Baines puts forward an argument that two senses of family 
interests may be discerned, a weak sense, which is the amalgamated interests of family 
 
464 Friedman Ross (n 436) 114. 
465 at 5.5.3. 
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members, and a strong sense, in that the family itself has interests over and above the 
interests of the individuals.466  The strong sense requires that: 
 
familial considerations must be taken into account in medical decision-making, and that 
sometimes these considerations have a greater claim on healthcare professionals than 
do the best interest of the pediatric patient.467 
 
The strong conception is that the family is intrinsically valuable, over and above the 
benefits to individuals of being in a family.468  Friedman Ross commented on the strong 
conception and argued that: 
 
parents perceive themselves as a representative of the family’s interests, and this can 
be separated from their role as representatives of their own interests.  As such parents 
can serve as both moderator and disputant in intimate family decisions.469 
 
Her claim is that in theory those with PR can stand above the family and take a more 
objective view of the decisions, but that this does not mean that those with PR will act 
in this way.470  In situations where those with PR have to decide as both ‘moderator and 
disputant’, it is difficult for those with PR to be objective.471  On some occasions, those 
with PR must make decisions that are not in a particular minor’s best interests, but are 
for the good of others in the family.472  These decisions cannot be justified by the minor 
donor’s interests, but can only be justified by the family interests.473  As with the 
constrained parental autonomy model, I argue that the strong sense focuses too much 
 
466 Paul Baines, ‘Family Interests and Medical Decisions for Children’ (2017) 31(8) Bioethics 599. 
467 Hilde Lindemann, ‘Why families matter’ (2014) 134 Pediatrics 134, S98.   
468 Baines (n 466) 604. 
469 Baines (n 466) 605; Friedman Ross (n 436) 32. 
470 Baines (n 466) 605. 
471 Baines (n 466) 605. 
472 Baines (n 466) 606. 
473 Baines (n 466) 606. 
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on the wider family interests and neglects the interests of the minor donor.  This means 
that in some situations, the wider family is given greater consideration than the minor’s 
interests meaning that there is a risk that the minor could be used as a means to an end 
as a tissue donor.  If the strong sense model was used in determining whether a minor 
should be a tissue donor there is a risk that the minor’s interests may not be considered 
at all because it will always be in the family interests for the minor to donate and provide 
the recipient sibling with a life-saving or life-prolonging transplant.     
 
Baines argues that the weak sense of family interests is a more plausible model474 
because it views family interests as no more than the combined interests of family 
members.475  This type of model has previously been suggested by Andrew Bainham 
who argued for a ‘collective family interest’ characterised as: 
 
… children are not just individuals, with individual interests.  They are also members 
of a family unit and have an interest which forms part of the collective interests of the 
unit … There may also be a collective interest of the family (of which they are part) 
which needs to be taken into account … in some instances, the combined interests of 
the parents and the family taken as a whole may outweigh the interests of a particular 
child.476 
 
This links with the concept of relational parental decision-making that was discussed in 
Chapter 2.477  Instead of those with PR making a decision as if the minor is an isolated 
being, the relationships that the minor maintains should be a contributing part of the 
 
474 Baines (n 466) 599.   
475 Baines (n 466) 602. 
476 Baines (n 466) 602; A Bainham, ‘Honour thy father and thy mother: Children’s rights and children’s 
duties’ in Gillian Douglas and Leslie Seba (eds) Children’s rights and traditional values (Ashgate 1998) 
Chp 6, 199. 
477 at 2.3. 
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decision-making, resulting in relational parental decision-making.  In other words, for 
those with PR to make a decision on behalf of a minor they need to take into account 
the minor’s relationships with others that underpin their lives, such as familial and 
societal relationships.  The degree that a particular relationship is taken into account is 
dependent on the situation; including the importance of the relationship and the weight 
it has on the individual’s life.  The minor’s interests are still the paramount consideration 
but the familial relationships that a minor donor has are also a consideration in the 
decision-making process.  All members of a family can be affected by decisions for one 
family member: 
 
Decisions about a child’s course of treatment affect not only the life and welfare of that 
child, but they often involve very significant financial, relational, and emotional 
consequences for the rest of the family.478 
 
It is unlikely that any particular course will offer each individual maximal benefit, and 
so there needs to be a balancing of the interests of the individual family members.479  If 
so, the interests of the family members should be amalgamated.480  The weak interests 
model is more suitable to be an addition to the best interests test.  It reflects the concept 
of relational parental decision-making in that decisions are made through networks of 
relationships and decisions are not made in isolation.  Family interests are important in 
the tissue donation decision-making process since the donation is between siblings and 
has a direct impact on the family.  As this model does not encompass other factors that 
the best interests test already covers, which I argue should continue to be considered in 
 
478 Baines (n 466) 602; Erica K Salter, ‘Deciding for the child: a comprehensive analysis of the best 
interest standard’ (2012) 33(3) Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 180, 183.   
479 Baines (n 466) 602. 
480 Baines (n 466) 600. 
176 
 
the decision-making process, this weak interests model would be an addition to the best 
interests test rather than a replacement for it.   
 
The checklist in section 1(3) of the 1989 Act, which is applicable in England and Wales, 
is far-reaching as it applies to all aspects of a minor’s welfare and upbringing.  
Therefore, as I am arguing that relational parental decision-making should only form 
part of the decision-making for tissue donation it needs to be contained in a separate 
section of the 1989 Act rather than incorporated into the best interests test.  I am now 
going to demonstrate how this reform would apply in practice.  The new factor would 
be set out in section 1A of the 1989 Act and it would state: ‘the inclusion of relational 
parental decision-making’.  If this factor was not explicitly incorporated into the statute, 
but just a factor that the decision-maker should take into account when deciding whether 
a minor should be a tissue donor, there is a risk that it could be overlooked and not given 
sufficient weight.  Therefore, if it is incorporated into the 1989 Act, regardless of 
whether those with PR or the court is the decision-maker, relational parental decision-
making will be a consideration when determining whether it is in a minor’s best interests 
to be a tissue donor.  Subsequently, the additional test under section 1A of the 1989 Act, 
set out in italics would state: 
 
(1) In relation to tissue donation from a living minor, the following 
additional factor must be considered in addition to the best interests test 
as stated at section 1(3): 




This reform would only be applicable in England and Wales as the 1995 Act in Scotland 
does not have a general welfare checklist, therefore, it could not be incorporated directly 
after the best interests test as has been suggested in England and Wales.  
 
Alternatively, it is suggested that it should constitute a standalone section that deals 
explicitly with tissue donation in the 1995 Act.  This would alleviate the concern I raised 
previously that if the factor was not explicitly incorporated into the statute, but just a 
factor that the decision-maker should take into account when deciding whether a living 
minor should be a tissue donor, there is a risk that it would be overlooked and not given 
sufficient weight.  Therefore, I would implement section 6A to include the 
recommended provision.  However, this additional section could be included anywhere 
within the statute as it is a standalone section involving only living minors as tissue 
donors.  Subsequently, the additional test under section 6A of the 1995 Act, set out in 
italics, would state: 
 
(1) In relation to tissue donation from a living minor, the following factor 
must be considered when determining whether it is in the minor’s best 
interests to undergo the procedure: 
 (a) the inclusion of relational parental decision-making. 
 
5.5.4  Harm Threshold 
Under section 1(3)(e) of the 1989 Act, ‘any harm which the child has suffered or is at 
risk of suffering’ is already a factor when determining the best interests of a minor, and 
similarly in Scotland under the 1995 Act the harm or risk of harm of the procedure 
would be a factor considered by the decision-maker.  But my contention is that sufficient 
weight is not placed on this factor in relation to tissue donation.  Douglas Diekema has 
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argued that best interests can be difficult to define, are conceived differently by those 
with PR and the court, and do not represent the standard applied in practice.481  He 
proposes a harm standard, and contends that: 
 
the biggest problem with a best interest standard is not its subjectivity, but that it 
represents that wrong standard.  State intervention is not justified because a decision is 
contrary to the child’s best interest, but because it places the child at significant risk of 
serious harm.  Discussing the child’s ‘best interest’ fails to focus on the relevant 
standard for determining when state action is justified.  The harm standard focuses 
discussion in the proper place.482 
 
He suggests that harm is, in fact, the central concept to be considered when determining 
whether a minor should undergo a medical procedure.483  If the threshold for court 
intervention is determined by the amount of harm placed on the child as a result of the 
decision, then it would follow that the test should place more emphasis on the harm of 
the procedure.   
 
According to Diekema’s harm threshold test, a medical professional is justified in 
seeking court intervention when those with PR make a decision that ‘significantly 
increase[s] the likelihood of serious harm as compared to other options.’484  If, however, 
the decision as to whether a minor can donate tissue is purely based on whether it 
medically harms the minor, it would never be permitted because donating tissue inflicts 
harm on them.  But if the standard is “serious harm” as indicated by Diekema, then 
 
481 Douglas S Diekema, ‘Parental Refusals of Medical Treatment: The Harm Principle as Threshold for 
State Intervention’ (2004) 25 Theoretical Medicine 243, 247. 
482 Diekema (n 482) 253. 
483 Rosalind J McDougall and Lauren Notini, ‘Overriding parents’ medical decisions for their children: a 
systematic review of normative literature’ (2013) 40(7) Journal of Medical Ethics 448, 450. 
484 Diekema (n 482) 252.   
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regenerative tissue donation would be permitted since it only amounts to minimal harm.  
So far, a presumption is being made that “harm” only covers medical harm.  While 
Diekema does not explicitly define “harm”, his discussion suggests that relevant harms 
go beyond the medical, including the minor’s future autonomy.485  For instance, it 
would be considered a harm if the decision made by those with PR restricts the minor’s 
autonomous future decision-making abilities, such as life-style restrictions posed 
following kidney donation.486  Diekema has proposed a series of eight conditions that 
‘must [all] be met before considering the use of state intervention to require medical 
treatment of children over parental objections.’487  These are: 
 
 (1)  The refusal puts the child at ‘significant risk of serious harm’ 
 (2)  The harm is imminent 
 (3)  The refused intervention is necessary to prevent the harm 
 (4)  The refused intervention is ‘of proven efficacy’ 
(5)  The projected benefit to burden ratio of the refused intervention is ‘significantly 
more favourable’ than that associated with the parents’ preferred option 
(6)  No other option would prevent serious harm to the child in a way that is more 
acceptable to the parents 
(7)  The state would intervene in ‘all other similar situations; regardless of the 
nature of the parents’ reasons’ 
(8)  Most parents agree that the state intervention was reasonable.488 
 
 
485 Diekema (n 482) 251; Douglas S Diekema, ‘Parental refusals of recommended medical interventions’ 
in Douglas S Diekema, Mark R Mercurio, and Mary B Adam (eds), Clinical Ethics in Pediatrics: A Case-
Based Textbook (2011 CUP) 15-16; Douglas S Diekema, ‘Revisiting the best interest standard: uses and 
misuses’ (2011) 22(2) Journal of Clinical ethics 128, 132. 
486 see Chapter 4 at 4.3.3 for further discussion about the life-style restrictions of kidney donation. 
487 Diekema (n 482) 252. 
488 Diekema (n 482) 252. 
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Diekema proposed that these criteria come into play when those with PR have refused 
to consent to or authorise a medical procedure, and the court’s intervention would be 
the final arbiter in determining whether that procedure should occur.  If these criteria 
are applied to tissue donation, then some aspects of them would have to be adapted.  
They would be used where there has been some disagreement between those with PR 
and the medical professionals or between those with PR.    
 
If these are applied to tissue donation, the first criterion is fulfilled because as I 
discussed in Chapter 4, regenerative tissue donation does not normally pose a significant 
medical risk of harm to the minor.489  Moving on to the second criterion, the harm would 
be imminent as it would be as a direct result of the donation procedure.  Thirdly, if the 
donation did not proceed, then the harm to the donor would never occur.  In relation to 
the efficacy of the procedure, regenerative tissue donations are common procedures 
with a high success rate.  However, there are always risks of morbidity and mortality 
that cannot be avoided with any type of medical procedure.  If the fifth criterion is 
applied to tissue donation, either the minor donates or they do not, there is no alternative 
option.  Therefore, this criterion would rest on whether the psychological benefit (PB) 
outweighs the medical risk (MR) and the psychological risk (PR) of the procedure, if 
the PB > MR+PR then the donation is justified and can proceed.490  The sixth criterion 
would have to be disregarded for tissue donation, since refusal of the tissue donation 
procedure would not prevent any serious harm to the minor donor.   
 
The seventh criterion relates to the court’s intervention.  The court does not 
automatically become involved when a minor is a tissue donor since the HTA do not 
 
489 at 4.3.1 and 4.3.2. 
490 see Chapter 4 at 4.4 for further discussion and application of this equation. 
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require court approval for a regenerative tissue donation from a living incompetent 
minor to proceed, only HTA approval is required.491  The court would only intervene 
when those with PR make a decision that is not in the minor’s best interests.  It is 
questionable whether those with PR would agree that court intervention was reasonable.  
Some may argue that it is a decision made within a family, so it is a private decision 
that should not be interfered with.  On the other hand, it may be argued that court 
intervention is an independent check and an extra safeguard.  Since the decision has to 
be authorised by the HTA who provides an independent check, court intervention 
should not be automatically required.   
 
Diekema, whose views are supported by other academics, argues that the harm 
threshold is more readily understood by medical professionals and those with PR, 
compared to the best interests test.  This is because medical professionals are more 
familiar with medical risks as they deal with them on a day-to-day basis, and those with 
PR would have the medical risks explained to them by the medical professional as part 
of the consent or authorisation process.492  However, Giles Birchley claims that this 
argument is problematic because although harm may appear a readily understandable 
concept, this hides the fact that judgements about harm are often complex.493  This was 
made apparent in Chapter 4 when I presented the risks of morbidity and mortality for 
the different types of tissue donation.494   
 
 
491 see Chapter 3 and Tables 3-6 for further discussion about the requirements.   
492 Elliston (n 375) 28; Seema K Shah, ‘Does research with children violate the best interests standard?  
An empirical and conceptual analysis’ (2013) 8 Northwest Journal of Law and Social Policy 121; 
Diekema, ‘Revisiting the best interest standard’ (n 486). 
493 Giles Birchley, ‘Harm is all you need?  Best interests and disputes about parental decision-making’ 
(2015) 42(2) Journal of Medical Ethics 111, 112. 
494 see Chapter 4 at 4.3 and Appendices 5,6 and 7.  
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Unlike the best interests test, the harm threshold test does not contain all of the factors 
that need to be considered when making a decision, such as the psychological and 
emotional impact of the medical procedure.495  In a best interests decision, the true 
extent of the harm of the procedure could be concealed if the decision-maker gives more 
weight to the factors that benefit the minor donor than just focus on the harm that the 
procedure poses.  I am arguing that the potential harm of the medical procedure is 
already a factor when determining whether it is in a minor’s best interests to be a tissue 
donor, but more weight should be given to this factor when considering tissue donation 
because it is a non-therapeutic procedure for the donor.   
 
As Diekema has identified, if harm is the only factor considered when determining 
whether a minor can be a tissue donor, then it would never be permitted.  The best 
interests test in section 1(3) is a list of factors that provides no indication of the weight 
that should be given to each factor.  As I have argued that the potential harm of the 
medical procedure should be given more weight, the best interests test would have to 
be amended to reflect this.  But as the best interests test is generic and covers all types 
of medical procedures I cannot amend the current test.  Instead, I recommend that a 
caveat needs to be included in a section after section 1(3) of the 1989 Act stating that in 
relation to tissue donation from living minors section 1(3)(e) should be given the 
greatest weight when the decision-maker is determining whether the procedure is in the 
minor’s best interests. Subsequently, this factor could be included in the new section 
1A that I recommended in the previous section that focuses specifically on tissue 
donation.  The new section, set out in italics, will state: 
 
 
495 Birchley (n 494) 112. 
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(2) In relation to tissue donation from a living minor when considering the 
best interests test in section 1(3), the factor under section 1(3)(e) should 
be given the greatest weight.   
 
This reform would only be applicable in England and Wales as the 1995 Act in Scotland 
does not have a general welfare checklist.  But I suggest that it should be included in 
the 1995 Act because this would alleviate the concern I raised previously that if the 
factor was not explicitly incorporated into the statute, but just a factor that the decision-
maker should take into account when deciding whether a living minor should be a tissue 
donor, there is a risk that it could be overlooked and not given sufficient weight.  
Therefore, I would include it in a standalone section, in fact it could be included in the 
new section 6A that I devised in the previous section that covers relational parental 
decision-making.  The new section, set out in italics, will state: 
 
(2) In relation to tissue donation from a living minor when considering their 
best interests, the consideration of the harm of the procedure should be 
given the greatest weight.   
 
5.6 Concluding thoughts 
In this chapter I considered the second research question of this thesis in relation to 
incompetent minors: who can and should be able to provide consent/authorisation for 
living minors to be regenerative tissue donors?  I concluded that those with PR can and 
should be able to provide consent/authorisation on behalf of an incompetent minor to 
be a tissue donor as long as it is in their best interests.  Also, I proposed that if those 
with PR have made a best interests decision which does not appear to be flawed, the 
court should not see necessary to override it because the best possible decision in the 
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minor’s interest has already been made.  It is irrelevant who makes the decision for the 
minor, either those with PR or the court, as long as the decision is in the best interests 
of the minor.   
 
I also examined the third research question of this thesis in relation to incompetent 
minors: what test(s) should be used to determine whether consent/authorisation can be 
provided for a living minor to be a tissue donor?  I have recommended reform to the 
best interests test in section 1(3) of the 1989 Act, which would result in the development 
of the factor that considers the minor’s view in the decision-making process.  
Furthermore, I have implemented an additional test in both the 1989 Act and the 1995 
Act that is specific to tissue donation.  This test introduces the additional requirement 
that the minor donor’s familial relationships have to be incorporated into the decision-
making process through relational parental decision-making.  Also, that the harm 
principle is given the greatest weight when considering the minor’s best interests.  The 
aim is that the combination of the best interests test and this new test is more suitable to 
determine whether an incompetent living minor should be a tissue donor than just the 
current best interests test.  It simultaneously protects the minor’s interests and prevents 
their exploitation as well as takes account of all factors that may be relevant in the 
decision-making process.  Subsequently, my argument is that the amended best interests 
test under section 1(3) of the 1989 Act would read as follows, with the amendments in 
italics: 
(a)  the minor’s age and maturity and so far, as practicable: 
(i)  give him an opportunity to indicate whether he wishes to express 
his views; 
(ii)  if he does so wish, give him an opportunity to express them; and  
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(iii)  have regard to such views as he may express; 
 (b)  the child’s physical, emotional and/or education needs; 
 (c)  the likely effect on the child of any change in his/her circumstances; 
(d)  the child’s age, sex, background and any other characteristics, which the 
court considers relevant; 
(e)  any harm which the child has suffered or is at risk of suffering; 
(f)  how capable each of the child’s parents, and any other person in relation 
to whom the court considers the question to be relevant, is of meeting 
his/her needs; 
(g)  the range of powers available to the court under the Children Act 1989 
in the proceedings in question. 
 
Subsequently, there would be an additional section in the 1989 Act which would read 
as follows, in italics: 
 
 Section 1A 
(1) In relation to tissue donation from a living minor, the following 
additional factor must be considered in addition to the best interests test 
as stated at section 1(3): 
  (a) the inclusion of relational parental decision-making.  
 
(2) In relation to tissue donation from a living minor when considering the 
best interests test in section 1(3), the factor under section 1(3)(e) should 




In Scotland, I have recommended that an additional section in the 1995 Act would read 
as follows, in italics: 
 
 Section 6A 
(1) In relation to tissue donation from a living minor, the following 
additional factor must be considered when determining whether it is in 
the minor’s best interests to undergo the procedure: 
 (a) the inclusion of relational parental decision-making. 
 
(2) In relation to tissue donation from a living minor when considering their 
best interests the consideration of the harm of the procedure should be 
given the greatest weight.   
 
In the following chapter, I will consider the second and third research questions of this 
thesis in relation to a competent minor: who can and should be able to provide 
consent/authorisation for living minors to be regenerative tissue donors? and what 
test(s) should be used to determine whether consent/authorisation can be provided for a 
living minor to be a tissue donor?  I conclude that if a minor meets the relevant 
competency test, they should be able to provide consent or authorisation on their own 
behalf.  I recommend clarification to the Gillick496 competence test and section 2(4) of 
the Age of Legal Capacity (Scotland) Act 1991 competence test which are applicable 
to under 16s as well as section 8 of the Family Law Reform Act 1969.  Furthermore, I 
argue that those with PR currently can, but should not be permitted to override a 
 
496 Gillick (n 376). 
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competent minor’s consent/authorisation, and once a minor is competent a court can but 




Competent Minors as Regenerative Tissue Donors 
 
6.1 Introduction 
In this chapter I will consider the second and third research questions of this thesis in 
relation to competent minors: who can and should be able to provide 
consent/authorisation for living minors to be regenerative tissue donors? and what 
test(s) should be used to determine whether consent/authorisation can be provided for a 
living minor to be a tissue donor?  This chapter is the longest in this thesis because it 
covers all competent minors in both England and Wales, and Scotland, but I have 
chosen to incorporate all competent minors into this one chapter to avoid repetition of 
argument.   
 
I conclude that if a minor meets the relevant competency test, they should be able to 
provide consent or authorisation on their own behalf to be a tissue donor.  As to whether 
they can currently do this, the law is unclear as there has been no application by the 
court of tissue donation to the competency tests.  For those under 16 in England and 
Wales, the competency test is established by common law in Gillick v West Norfolk and 
Wisbech Area Health Authority497, while in Scotland the test is outlined in section 2(4) 
of the Age of Legal Capacity (Scotland) Act 1991.  I will argue that for a minor to be 
either Gillick or section 2(4) competent they should require an understanding of the 
moral, family, emotional, and long-term implications of the donation, as well as an 
understanding of the potential consequences if they refuse the procedure.   
 
 
497 [1985] 3 All ER 402. 
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For those aged 16- and 17- years old in England and Wales the test that governs capacity 
is contained in the Mental Capacity Act 2005, and section 8 of the Family Law Reform 
Act 1969.  It permits a minor to consent to ‘surgical, medical, or dental treatment’ as if 
they were full age.  Section 8 uses the term ‘treatment’ and my contention is that while, 
prima facie, the term ‘treatment’ does not include tissue donation from living minors as 
it is a non-therapeutic procedure for the donor, section 8 should be interpreted broadly 
to cover such procedures. 
 
Furthermore, I argue that those with parental responsibility (PR) currently can, but 
should not be permitted to override a competent minor’s consent/authorisation for three 
reasons, including that those with PR hold their power as agents or trustees on behalf 
of the minor until they are mature enough to begin to make decisions for themselves.  
Also, I argue that once a minor is competent a court can, but should not be able to, 
override their decision about whether to be a tissue donor.  The role of the court is to 
protect the interests of the minor, and once the minor is competent to make their own 
decisions then the role of the court is obsolete.   
 
6.2 Minors under 16 
A minor can be considered competent under the age of 16, and the competency test in 
England and Wales is from the common law as set out in Gillick v West Norfolk and 
Wisbech Area Health Authority498 while the competency test in Scotland is enshrined 
in statute in section 2(4) of the 1991 Act.  As these are two separate tests for two separate 
jurisdictions, I will deal with them separately.   
 
 
498 Gillick (n 498). 
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When the 1991 Act was introduced in Scotland, tissue donation by living minors was 
permitted under the Human Organ Transplants Act 1989, which was later repealed by 
the Human Tissue (Scotland) Act 2006.499  Under the 2006 Act, a living minor can only 
donate regenerative tissue or tissue as a result of a domino transplant operation.  
Therefore, medical professionals will never be required to apply the section 2(4) 
competency test to a minor who would be providing authorisation to a non-regenerative 
tissue donation, such as donation of a kidney or a lobe of liver.  This is in contrast to 
the Gillick competence test, which, in practice, will be applied to all types of tissue 
donation as the Human Tissue Act 2004, the applicable legislation in England and 
Wales, does not put restrictions on the type of tissue a minor can donate.500  However, 
as I have argued in Chapter 4, minors in England and Wales should not be permitted to 
donate non-regenerative tissue, therefore, in the discussion which follows I will only 
focus on the application of the Gillick test to the donation of regenerative tissue. 
 
6.2.1 Gillick v West Norfolk and Wisbech Area Health Authority  
The Gillick competence test is a common law evidential test of capacity for those under 
16 in England and Wales.  Even though the case of Gillick was specifically about 
consent to contraceptive treatment, the judgment had implications for all types of 
medical procedures.  Following the decision, minors under the age of 16, if deemed 
competent, are able to consent to medical procedures on their own behalf. 
 
The background of the Gillick competence test has been well-trodden by previous 
academics, therefore, I will not attempt to cover this ground again.501  Gillick was 
 
499 see Chapter 3 at 3.4 for further discussion of the Human Tissue (Scotland) Act 2006. 
500 see Chapter 3 at 3.3 for further discussion of the Human Tissue Act 2004. 
501 Department of Health and Social Security, Family planning services for young people (HN 80(46, 
1980); Gillick v West Norfolk and Wisbech Area Health Authority [1984] QB 581; Gillick v West Norfolk 
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decided in the House of Lords by a 3-2 majority, and Lords Scarman and Fraser 
diverged in their approaches to minor competence.  Lord Scarman’s approach centred 
on assessing a minor’s competency by their understanding and knowledge of the 
medical procedure proposed.  Lord Fraser, in contrast, set out a five-point test which 
focused on the specific facts of Gillick, and sought to make it a condition that the 
proposed medical procedure would be in the best interests of the minor.  I am going to 
examine these approaches in more detail because it is my opinion that as the two tests 
are different this could result in different outcomes as to whether a minor is considered 
competent to be a tissue donor.   
 
6.2.1.1  Lord Scarman 
Lord Scarman took the view that once a minor ‘achieves sufficient understanding and 
intelligence to enable him or her to understand fully what is proposed’,502 then the 
parental right to determine whether they have a medical procedure terminates or ‘yields 
to the child’s right to make his own decisions.’503  While Lord Scarman did not define 
‘sufficient understanding and intelligence’, he stated that the court must take into 
account: 
 
moral and family questions, especially her relationship with her parents; long-term 
problems associated with the emotional impact of pregnancy and its termination; and 
there are the risks to health of sexual intercourse at her age, risks which contraception 
may diminish but cannot eliminate.504 
 
 
and Wisbech Area Health Authority [1985] 1 All ER 533 (Court of Appeal); SP de Cruz, ‘Parents, Doctors 
and Children: the Gillick Case and Beyond’ (1987) Journal of Social Welfare Law 93; Glanville 
Williams. ‘The Gillick Saga’ (1985) New Law Journal 1156. 
502 Gillick (n 498) 423. 
503 Gillick (n 498) 422.  
504 Gillick (n 498) 424. 
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It thus appears that in order for a minor to be deemed competent they must have 
‘sufficient maturity’ to understand the moral, family, emotional, and long-term 
implications of their decision for that particular medical procedure.505  Applying this 
same approach to tissue donation, a minor donor must understand the moral 
implications of the decision to donate which includes, but is not limited to, whether they 
have a moral duty to donate to their sibling.  In addition, they must understand the 
relational consideration of their decision as would occur in a relational autonomous 
decision;506 the emotional impact of the donation; and any long-term medical risks, 
potential complications, and restrictions on their future lifestyle choices.   
 
6.2.1.2  Lord Fraser 
In contrast to Lord Scarman, Lord Fraser set out a five-point test which was based on 
the specific facts of Gillick.  He stated, in relation to the consent of a minor under 16, 
that: 
 
[p]rovided the patient … is capable of understanding what is proposed, and of 
expressing his or her own wishes, I see no good reason for holding that he or she lacks 
the capacity to express them validly and effectively and to authorise the medical man 
to make the examination or give the treatment which he advises.507 
 
Lord Fraser set out a checklist of five factors (often referred to as ‘the Fraser 
Guidelines’) for doctors to consider when assessing a minor’s competence.  Where the 
girl refuses to tell her parents, the doctor is justified in proceeding without the parents’ 
 
505 Kirsty Moreton, ‘Gillick reinstated: Judging Mid-Childhood Competence in Healthcare Law’ (2015) 
23(2) Medical Law Review 303, 305.   
506 See Chapter 2 at 2.2.1 for further discussion on relational autonomy.   
507 Gillick (n 498) 409. 
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consent or even knowledge provided that the doctor is satisfied on the following 
matters: 
 
(1) that the girl (although under 16 years of age) will understand his advice; (2) that he 
cannot persuade her to inform her parents or to allow him to inform the parents that she 
is seeking contraceptive advice; (3) that she is very likely to being or to continue having 
sexual intercourse with or without contraceptive treatment; (4) that unless she receives 
contraceptive advice or treatment her physical or mental health or both are likely to 
suffer; (5) that her best interests require him to give her contraceptive advice, treatment 
or both without the parental consent.508 
 
This test is specific to contraceptive advice and treatment, which was the issue in 
Gillick.  However, if the five factors are applied to tissue donation then only points (1), 
(4), and (5) are relevant because point (3) is specific to contraceptive advice and 
treatment.  In addition, point (2) may only be applicable in certain circumstances 
because it is unlikely that those with PR would be unaware that one of their children 
was donating tissue to a sibling.  In order to fulfil the requirement of point (1) the minor 
donor would have to understand the tissue donation process, including pre- and post-
operative care and assessment.   
 
For point (4) the minor’s physical health will not be affected if they do not donate.  But 
their mental health may suffer if the proposed recipient is their sibling because if the 
sibling does not receive the tissue then this could result in the continuation of the 
sibling’s illness or even lead to their death.  As discussed in Chapter 4, when considering 
whether a minor should donate tissue the medical professional needs to consider the 
 
508 Gillick (n 498) 413. 
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associated medical risks (MR), psychological benefits (PB) and psychological risks 
(PR) of donating.  If PB > MR + PR then the minor can donate tissue.  Finally, for point 
(5) the doctor must be satisfied that the tissue donation is in the minor’s best interests.  
This involves the consideration of a number of different factors such has harm, physical, 
emotional, and psychological needs of the minor.509  The medical professional would 
have to be satisfied that points (1), (4), and (5) have been met before deciding whether 
a minor was competent to be a tissue donor.   
 
6.2.1.3  Lord Scarman vs Lord Fraser 
In relation to Gillick competence, I am going to adopt Lord Scarman’s approach in this 
thesis because it is a functional test and not an outcome test.  This means that those 
assessing the competence of a minor must focus on the minor’s functional ability to 
make the decision, and not determine their competence based on the outcome of that 
decision.  Therefore, the competency of the minor donor will be dependent on whether 
they have sufficient understanding and intelligence to understand the tissue donation 
they may undergo, rather than whether they make a particular decision in agreement 
with the medical professionals, those with PR, or the court.  If a competent minor 
provides consent to a procedure which is not in their best interests and they have 
sufficient ability to understand the proposed procedure, then their decision should be 
respected by medical professionals, their family, and the court.  There have been cases 
where the court has been unwilling to find that a minor is competent if their decision 
 
509 see Chapter 5 at 5.4 for further information about the best interests test.   
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conflicts with the court’s view of what is in their best interests.510  However, in An NHS 
Trust v ABC & A Local Authority511 for example Mostyn J said that: 
 
she can then be lawfully prescribed with contraception even if the result of that would 
lead her to take steps which are wholly contrary to her best interests.  So, the question 
of best interests does not really inform the primary decision I have to make which is 
whether she has the necessary capacity.512 
 
I agree with the view taken by Mostyn J that whether the procedure is in the minor’s 
best interests does not inform whether they are competent, because a court should be 
deciding whether a minor has the sufficient ability to understand the proposed 
procedure; therefore, the consideration of whether the procedure is in their best interests 
is irrelevant.  Moreover, the court should not be permitted to decide that minors who 
make a decision that is not in agreement with the court, so not considered to be in their 
best interests, are thereby demonstrating that they are not mature enough to make them, 
otherwise, minors would never be competent to consent to procedures that are not 
considered to be in their best interests.   
 
6.2.1.4  Proposed Clarification of the Gillick competence test 
In this section I will examine the Gillick competence test in detail and apply it to tissue 
donation.  I will recommend that clarification of the Gillick competence test is required.  
I will argue that if a minor in England and Wales meets the requirements of the Gillick 
competence test, in relation to the donation of regenerative tissue, then they should be 
 
510 Re E (A Minor)(Wardship: Medical Treatment) [1993] 1 FLR 386; Rachel Taylor, ‘Reversing the 
Retreat from Gillick – R (Axon) v Secretary of State for Health’ (2007) 19 Child and Family Law 
Quarterly 81, 82; JA Devereux, DP Jones and DL Dickenson, ‘Can children withhold consent to 
treatment?’ (1993) 306 BMJ 1459. 
511 [2014] EWHC 1445. 
512 ABC (n 512) [10]. 
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able to provide consent on their own behalf.  I will argue that for a minor to be Gillick 
competent they require an understanding of the moral, family, emotional, and long-term 
implications of the donation, as well as an understanding of the potential consequences 
if they refuse the procedure.   
 
Even though Gillick was a decision that was made in the specific context of 
contraceptive advice and treatment, the Gillick competence test has been applied to a 
wide range of medical procedures.513  Indeed, in that case Lord Fraser said: 
 
It seems to me verging on the absurd to suggest that a girl or boy aged 15 could not 
effectively consent, for example, to have a medical examination of some trivial injury 
to his body or even to have a broken bone set.514 
 
Lord Templeman was a dissenting judge in Gillick, but he provided a similar example: 
‘a doctor with the consent of an intelligent boy or girl of 15 could in my opinion safely 
remove tonsils or a troublesome appendix.’515  These examples are therapeutic 
procedures that are intended to medically benefit the minor, they are forms of medical 
treatment.  Under the Gillick competence test minors can be competent to consent to 
these procedures if they have sufficient understanding of them.  However, a question 
arises as to whether a minor can be competent to consent to a tissue donation.  The 
degree of understanding required by the minor, in law, is different depending on the 
complexity of the medical procedure and the risks involved.  For example, 
understanding what the donation of a lobe of liver entails is more difficult than 
understanding the procedure of donating blood.  While the Gillick competence test has 
 
513 Moreton (n 506) 306. 
514 Gillick (n 498) 409. 
515 Gillick (n 498) 409. 
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been applied to more complex medical procedures, such as blood transfusions516 and 
abortions517 it has yet to be applied by the court to tissue donation.   
 
As part of Lord Scarman’s test, in order for a minor to be Gillick competent they need 
to understand the proposed procedure as well as the moral, family, emotional, and long-
term implications of it.518  The minor is required to have sufficient understanding of 
what the medical procedure entails as well as any pre- and post-operative care and 
assessments, including the anaesthetic process (if this is required).  Moreover, they must 
understand the long-term implications of the procedure which involves understanding 
the temporary and permanent life-style restrictions following the procedure.519  I will 
now consider these parts of the test separately by examining them in relation to tissue 
donation.   
 
 6.2.1.4.1 Moral implications of the decision 
The first question that needs to be answered is: does a minor have an obligation to 
donate tissue to their sibling to potentially save their life? An obligation can take the 
form of either a moral obligation or a legal obligation.  While these types of obligations 
have similarities, their main difference lies in ‘the specific nature of legal rules, and the 
form of sanction applied in the case of non-conformity.’520  In relation to a moral 
obligation, ‘disapproval is expressed in an attempt to elicit guilt, shame, or remorse, and 
possibly a change in behaviour.’521  In contrast, a breach of a legal obligation can result 
 
516 Re E (n 511); Re S (A Minor)(Consent to Medical Treatment) [1994] 2 FLR 1065; Re L (Medical 
Treatment: Gillick Competency) [1998] 2 FLR 810. 
517 An NHS Trust v ABC & A Local Authority [2014] EWHC 1445. 
518 Gillick (n 498) 424. 
519 see Chapter 4 at 4.3.3 and 4.3.4 for further discussion on lifestyle restrictions of tissue donation.  
520 Barry Lyons, ‘Obliging Children’ (2011) 19 Medical Law Review 55, 64. 
521 HLA Hart, The Concept of Law (Clarendon Press 1961) 165-76. 
198 
 
in specific sanctions being imposed.522  While adults are subject to both moral and legal 
obligations, it is questionable whether minors can also be subject to these obligations.  
Minors are certainly subject to legal obligations, for instance, at the age of 10 they are 
under an obligation to obey the criminal law at the risk of sanctions should they breach 
it.523  But there is no legal obligation for a minor in England, Wales, or Scotland to 
donate tissue to a sibling.   
 
My view, in respect of a moral obligation, is that minors should not have this moral 
obligation to donate tissue to a sibling.  My reasoning for this view is that individual 
family members do not have obligations towards each other, and in the case of the 
relationship between siblings this relationship is not entered into voluntarily.524  A minor 
does not choose to have a sibling.  Glannon and Friedman Ross suggest that where a 
moral obligation is imposed depends on the level of intimacy between the individuals: 
 
there must be a certain degree of intimacy within the family for there to be moral 
obligations between family members, an intimacy that develops over time through 
shared needs and interests.  The greater the degree of intimacy in the relationship, the 
greater the obligation we have to those with whom we stand in that relationship.525 
 
However, the potential impact that a tissue donation could have on the recipient has 
prompted some kidney donors to say ‘I had to do it, I couldn’t have backed out, not that 
I had the feeling of being trapped, because the doctors offered to get me out.  I just had 
 
522 Hart (n 522) 165-76. 
523 Children and Young Persons Act 1963, s.16.   
524 Walter Glannon and Lainie Friedman Ross, ‘Do Genetic Relationships Create Moral Obligations in 
Organ Transplantation?’ (2002) 11(2) Cambridge Quarterly Healthcare Ethics 153, 156. 
525 ibid 157.   
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to do it.’526  Statements such as these indicate that the minor donor may feel as if they 
have a moral obligation imposed on them whether consequences ensued or not from 
failing to meet the moral obligation.  It has been argued, in opposition to my view, that 
tissue donation is a general moral obligation and that failure to do so is morally 
indefensible.527  Those who propose the moral obligation model argue that minors 
possess significant and potentially burdensome moral obligations with regard to 
healthcare.528  In some situations, it becomes obligatory for the minor to sacrifice their 
personal interests for the good of another member of the family or the family unit as a 
whole.529  However, as I argued in relation to incompetent minors,530  the recipient’s 
interests and those of the wider family should be a consideration but should not solely 
determine whether the donation takes place because otherwise the donation would 
always take place without ever considering the interests of the donor.  Therefore, as it 
is not obligatory for the minor to sacrifice themselves for the benefit of the family unit, 
this could potentially reduce the risk of exploitation to the minor donor.    
 
One approach to the argument that a minor should have a moral obligation to donate 
tissue is Peter Singer’s position on the ethics of famine relief.531  He articulates two 




526 Tom L Beauchamp and James F Childress, Principles of Biomedical Ethics (OUP 2013) 43; Carl H 
Fellner, ‘Organ Donation for whose sake?’ (1973) 79 Annals of Internal Medicine 591. 
527 Ben Almassi, ‘Trust and the Duty of Organ Donation (2014) 28(6) Bioethics 275, 275.   
528 Lyons (n 521) 66-67. 
529 T John and others, ‘Children’s consent and Paediatric Research: Is it Appropriate for Healthy Children 
to be the Decision-makers in clinical research?’  (2008) 93 Archive of Disease in Childhood 379, 382. 
530 see Chapter 5 at 5.5.2 and 5.5.3. 
531 Peter Singer, ‘Famine, affluence, and morality’ (1972) 1(3) Philosophy and Public Affairs 229. 
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(i)  if it is in our power to prevent something bad from happening, without thereby 
sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance, we ought, morally to do 
it. 
(ii)  if it is in our power to prevent something very bad from happening, without 
thereby sacrificing anything morally significant, we ought, morally to do it.532 
 
Therefore, if the risks of the tissue donation are not considered to be sacrificing anything 
of moral importance or morally significant then according to Singer the tissue donation 
should be performed.  Using an example, the American case of McFall and Shimp533, 
while is not legally binding in England, Wales, or Scotland, provides reasoning as to 
why a moral obligation may be owed by an individual to their relative in relation to a 
tissue donation.534  Robert McFall was a 39- year old who had aplastic anaemia.535  His 
adult cousin, David Shimp, refused to donate bone marrow, citing his immediate family 
responsibilities as having more weight than his cousin’s need.536  The court refused to 
force the bone marrow donation.537   Judge John P Flaherty Jr stated that: 
 
one human being is under no legal compulsion to give aid or to take action to save 
[another] human being …  [Yet] in the view of the courts, the refusal of the defendant 
[Shimp] is morally indefensible.538 
 
Beauchamp and Childress have commented on this case arguing that the judge’s moral 
assessment is questionable because it is unclear if Shimp had in fact bypassed an 
 
532 Singer (n 532). 
533 10 Pa. D. & C. 3d 90 (July 26, 1978). 
534 See Rebecca D Pentz and others, ‘Designing an Ethical Policy for Bone Marrow Donation by Minors 
and Others Lacking Capacity’ (2004) 13(2) Cambridge Quarterly Healthcare Ethics 149. 
535 McFall (n 534) 90. 
536 McFall (n 534) 90. 
537 McFall (n 534) 92. 
538 McFall (n 534) 91. 
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obligation.539  Beauchamp and Childress list five conditions which if met results in an 
individual having an obligation to make a beneficent act: 
 
Condition 1: Y is at risk of significant loss of or danger to life, health, or some other 
basic interest. 
Condition 2: X’s action is necessary (singly or in concert with others) to prevent this 
loss or damage. 
Condition 3: X’s action (singly or in concert with others) will probably prevent this loss 
or damage. 
Condition 4: X’s action would not present significant risks, costs or burdens to X. 
Condition 5: the benefit that Y can be expected to gain outweighs any harms, costs or 
burdens that X is likely to incur.540 
 
I argue that no moral obligation should be imposed on a minor to donate tissue to their 
sibling, even if the conditions proposed by Beauchamp and Childress are met.  To 
demonstrate this, I am going to apply these conditions to McFall v Shimp.  Condition 1 
was fulfilled as McFall was at risk of significant loss of or danger to life since he 
suffered from aplastic anaemia and required a bone marrow transplant.  Furthermore, 
in compliance with condition 2, Shimp’s action is necessary to prevent this loss since 
he is histocompatible and can donate bone marrow to McFall.   
 
Condition 3 has not been fulfilled.541  This third condition is problematic because if 
there is a small probability of saving millions of lives at a minimal cost to an individual 
then it is not plausible to hold that an individual has no obligation to act.542  Condition 
 
539 Beauchamp and Childress (n 527) 207. 
540 Beauchamp and Childress (n 527) 207. 
541 Beauchamp and Childress (n 527) 207. 
542 Beauchamp and Childress (n 527) 207. 
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3 could be interpreted to show that ‘there must be some appropriate proportionality 
between probability of success, the value of outcome to be achieved, and the sacrifice 
that the agent would incur’, or that there should be ‘a high ratio of probable benefit 
relative to the sacrifice made.’543  In this particular case, McFall’s chance of surviving 
one year, at the time, following a successful transplantation would have only increased 
from 25% to between 40% and 60%544  These statistics are speculative and there is a 
risk that the transplantation would not be a success, therefore, it is difficult to determine 
whether the principle of beneficence can demand a particular course of action in this 
case.   
 
Moreover, Shimp was concerned about condition 4 as he had been informed that bone 
marrow donations required 100 to 150 punctures of the pelvic bone.545  These punctures 
can be painlessly performed under anaesthesia, and the major risk at the time was a 1 in 
10,000 chance of death from anaesthesia.546  Shimp, however, believed that the risks 
were greater and that they outweighed the probability and magnitude of benefit to 
McFall, subsequently, condition 5 would not be satisfied.  Therefore, in the opinion of 
Beauchamp and Childress, Shimp did not have an obligation to donate to McFall since 
all of the conditions were not fulfilled.  It is my opinion that the decision as to whether 
a minor is a tissue donor should focus on the minor donor’s interests rather than 
weighing up the interests of the donor and the recipient which is condition 5.  The donor 
and recipient are separate individuals and whether they undergo a medical procedure 
should be based on their own interests and not conflated with others.547   
 
543 Beauchamp and Childress (n 527) 207. 
544 Beauchamp and Childress (n 527) 207. 
545 Beauchamp and Childress (n 527) 207. 
546 Beauchamp and Childress (n 527) 207. 
547 see Chapter 5 at 5.4.2 for a discussion on determining the best interests of an incompetent minor donor 




In relation to this potential moral obligation, Herbert Hart argued that there is confusion 
between ‘the assertion that someone was obliged to do something and the assertion that 
he had an obligation to do it.’548  The essential difference lies in the notion of coercion 
and the concept of voluntariness.  Whether an adult fulfils any moral or legal obligation, 
or not, is down to choice.  If the adult chooses not to perform an act when under an 
obligation to do so, they face reactive attitudes and possible sanctions.  If, on the other 
hand, an adult is obliged to perform an act, then they will be coerced or compelled to 
do so.  In other words, an individual can refuse to fulfil their obligations, moral or legal, 
and face the punishment from the court or society.  But, being obliged to do something 
is premised on the notion that that thing will be done.  This reasoning, when applied to 
living minors, suggests that an incompetent minor is obliged to be a tissue donor since 
those with PR make the decision on their behalf while a competent minor could have 
an obligation to be a tissue donor since they make a decision on their own behalf.  But 
if adults are not obliged nor have an obligation to donate tissue to a relative then neither 
should a minor.  A minor should have a choice as to whether to donate tissue without 
the fear of eliciting guilt, shame, or remorse from society if they fail to undergo the 
donation.      
 
Therefore, in relation to the competency test, a minor donor should be required to 
understand that there is no moral duty to donate to their sibling.549  But the moral 
considerations under Lord Scarman’s test encompasses more than just whether a minor 
has a moral duty to donate.  Just because there is no moral duty does not mean that there 
 
548 Hart (n 522) 80; emphasis added. 
549 Susan Zinner, ‘Cognitive Development and Pediatric Consent to Organ Donation’ (2004) 13 
Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 125, 129.  
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is a complete absence of moral considerations.  In a decision about whether a minor 
donates tissue to their sibling the moral considerations will form part of the reasoning, 
since their tissue could result in a life-saving or life-prolonging transplant for the 
recipient. The minor needs to understand the moral considerations of the decision as 
well as the moral pressures that those, with PR, the sibling, or the wider community 
may place on them to donate tissue.  A failure to understand these moral considerations, 
or being susceptible to the moral pressures placed on them would result in the minor 
being considered incompetent.   
 
6.2.1.4.2 Family implications of the decision 
A factor when determining whether a minor is competent is that of the minor’s 
relationship with their parents and family.  Looking at it more broadly, relational 
considerations should be a factor in determining a minor’s competence, encompassing 
the impact the minor’s decision has on their family as whole, this would include both 
their parents and their siblings.550  This stems from the concept of relational autonomy 
discussed in Chapter 2,551 which involves recognition and acceptance of the fact that 
most people do not make decisions as freestanding,552 isolated beings, but are ‘socially, 
culturally and embedded individual[s]’ who ‘exercise self-determination in and through 
networks of relations with others’.553  In order to be competent, the minor donor should 
understand that familial considerations can have a twofold impact on their decision-
making.   
 
 
550 Re E (n 511). 
551 at 2.2.1. 
552 Jennifer Nedelsky, Law’s Relations: A Relational Theory of Self, Autonomy, and Law (OUP 2011) 19. 
553 Edward S Dove and others, ‘Elberte v. Latvia: Whose tissue is it anyway – Relational Autonomy or 
the Autonomy of Relations?’ (2015) 15 Medical Law International 79, 80. 
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First, due to the nature of the procedure, it is inevitable that the minor donor will 
consider their family since it is a donation to a sibling, but this factor should not solely 
determine the outcome of the decision.  In An NHS Trust v ABC & A Local Authority,554 
Mostyn J stated that if A continued with the pregnancy then ‘her family and, indeed, 
social services will need to give her considerable support and assistance’ while in the 
event of termination ‘her family will need to be, at her side and to assist her and support 
her’.555  The support that the minor donor receives from their family, regardless of the 
decision they make, will enable them to either have a successful recovery from the 
procedure or manage the consequences of refusing to donate.   
 
Secondly, the impact that familial considerations have on their decision-making could 
be negative, for instance their family may not support the minor’s decision.  As was 
noted in the Danish Council of Ethics Report, on organ and tissue donation from living 
donors, donating tissue within a family ‘is not a simple case of gift giving’ because a 
tissue cannot be moved from one family member to another without often-profound 
consequences for the family dynamics.556  These consequences could result in the donor 
receiving an elevated status within the family as the donation could lead to a member 
of the family recovering from an illness.  But the familial dynamics will mostly be 
emotional and psychological.   
 
Minors may be susceptible to coercion, and might be more easily influenced than other 
family members because they need to impress or please their parents, or do the ‘right’ 
 
554 ABC (n 518). 
555 ABC (n 518) [15]. 
556 Soren Holm, ‘The Child as Organ Donor and Tissue Donor: Discussions in the Danish Council of 
Ethics’ (2004) 13 Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 156, 157. 
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thing, or may be pressured by their sibling to donate.557  Minors should be able to discuss 
their decision with their parents so that they can receive ‘the necessary information to 
make the decision and help in deciding what her wishes are.’558  If a minor is to be 
deemed Gillick competent, they need to be able to make an autonomous decision that is 
free from family pressure, so they must cast aside direct and indirect opinions.  They 
need to be aware of both the positive and negative aspects of family considerations, and 
make a relational autonomous decision, but at the same time they must not base their 
decision solely on the impact the donation would have on their family.   
 
6.2.1.4.3 Emotional implications of the decision 
In this section, I argue that not only should a minor donor understand the physical 
implications of the donation on themselves, they should also understand the emotional 
implications of the decision.  In Re E (A Minor)(Wardship: Medical Treatment)559, a 15 
year old boy, A, who had leukaemia, refused a blood transfusion because of his 
Jehovah’s Witness beliefs.560  Ward J explained the level of understanding required by 
A to be considered Gillick competent:  
 
He may have some concept of the fact that he will die, but as to the manner of his death 
and the extent to his and his family’s suffering I find he has not the ability to turn his 
mind to it nor the will to do so.561 
 
Similarly, in Re S (A Minor)(Consent to Medical Treatment)562 Johnson J concluded 
that ‘for the decision to carry weight she should have a greater understanding of the 
 
557 see further discussion about a minor’s vulnerabilities in Chapter 4 at 4.4.2. 
558 Moreton (n 506) 312. 
559 Re E (n 511). 
560 Re E (n 511) 388. 
561 Re E (n 511) 391. 
562 [1994] 2 FLR 1065. 
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manner of the death and pain and the distress.’563  These cases indicate that a minor 
needs to have an understanding of the emotional and psychological distress their 
decision may have on themselves.   
 
In relation to tissue donation, this would involve the minor donor understanding the 
emotional implications of undergoing a procedure that is medically harming them, in 
order to benefit their sibling.  To be competent, they would be required to understand 
the emotional implications of the donation, regardless of whether the donation was 
successful.  Indeed, if the donation was not a success then they may feel guilty or a 
sense of failure.  The minor donor should be aware of and understand that the donated 
tissue may fail, be rejected by the recipient, or that the original cause of the tissue failure 
may recur and that the outcome is beyond their control.564  One argument is that the 
minor donor may be able to control their future feelings by telling themselves that they 
made the best decision possible given the circumstances, regardless of the outcome, but 
this is not guaranteed.565  However, if the donation was a success then they may feel 
happiness and a sense of relief.  The emotional implications of an unsuccessful donation 
are more difficult for a minor donor to understand than those of a successful donation, 
but if the minor is aware that they may occur then this could help minimise any negative 





563 Re S (n 563) 1076. 
564 Laine Friedman Ross and J Richard Thistlethwaite, ‘Minors as Living Solid-Organ Donors’ (2008) 
122 Pediatrics 454, 458. 
565 Kimberly Strong, Ian Kerridge, and Miles Little, ‘Saviour Siblings, Parenting and the Moral 
Valorisation of Children’ (2014) 28(4) Bioethics 187, 190. 
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6.2.1.4.4 Long-term implications of the decision 
The long-term implications of a tissue donation include the future medical risks and any 
lifestyle restrictions following it.  For instance, a minor would be required to understand 
whether they are predisposed to particular medical complications as a result of a 
donation, and any check-ups or measures needed in order to prevent such complications 
from occurring.  In relation to lifestyle restrictions, these are more common with non-
regenerative tissue donation than regenerative tissue donation, but a minor would be 
required to understand whether they have to make any lifestyle changes in the future as 
a result of being a tissue donor.   
 
This requirement of the Gillick competence test expects the minor to be able to consider 
implications in the future that may not materialise for a number of years.  While minors 
may find it easy to consider the immediate impact of the donation, it may be harder for 
them to consider the future implications as this will require them to have foresight.  
Determining what will happen in the future can be difficult to predict, while they can 
take the advice of the medical professionals about the future medical risks these are not 
definitive.  But at the same time, the Gillick competence test does not require the minor 
to understand every possible consequence of the donation procedure to be competent.  
If the threshold for competency was set too high then no minor would be able to meet 
the test and be competent to consent to being a tissue donor.     
 
6.2.1.4.5 Refusal of the procedure 
Even though understanding the implications of refusing the procedure was not explicitly 
included within Lord Scarman’s competency test, subsequent jurisprudence has 
incorporated it into the test.  I argue that for a minor to be Gillick competent they should 
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understand the consequences of refusing the medical procedure.  This is in agreement 
with Lord Donaldson who stated: 
 
what is involved is not merely an ability to understand the nature of the proposed 
treatment … but a full understanding and appreciation of the consequences both of the 
treatment, in terms of intended and possible side-effects and equally important, the 
anticipated consequences of a failure to treat.566 
 
The approach taken by Lord Donaldson has been reiterated in guidance produced by the 
General Medical Council (GMC) for medical professionals which states that: 
 
you must decide whether a young person is able to understand the nature, purpose and 
possible consequences of investigations or treatments you propose, as well as the 
consequences of not having the treatment.567 
 
In contrast, the Department of Health’s (DoH) guidance on consent does not require the 
minor to understand the consequences of not having the treatment: 
 
in the case of Gillick, the court held that children who have sufficient understanding 
and intelligence to enable them to understand fully what is involved in a proposed 
intervention will also have the capacity to consent to that intervention.568 
 
Thus, there appears to be conflicting guidance for medical professionals as to whether 
a minor is required to understand the consequences of refusing a medical procedure.  
Therefore, it is unclear for medical professionals within their guidance as to whether a 
 
566 Re R (A Minor)(Wardship: Medical Treatment) [1991] 4 All ER 177, 187. 
567 General Medical Council, 0-18: Guidance for all doctors (2007) para 24. 
568 Department of Health, Reference Guide to Consent for Examination or Treatment (2009) 16. 
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minor should understand the refusal of a medical procedure or not in order to be 
competent.    
 
Even if a minor was required to understand the refusal of the procedure to be competent, 
Stephen Gilmore and Jonathan Herring have raised doubts about whether a minor is 
actually capable of understanding the implications of not having a medical procedure.569  
They suggest that this requirement would be setting the threshold for competency too 
high for minors.  They use the example of a 10-year-old who cuts himself at school and 
needs a sticking plaster.  He only needs to understand what it means to have a plaster in 
order to consent; he does not need to understand the nature of septicaemia as a possible 
consequence of not having the plaster.570  There are a range of medical procedures 
varying from the simple to the complex, and the level of understanding required for 
refusing the procedure varies.  A procedure could be simple for a minor to understand 
but have complex consequences if refused.  Therefore, a minor could have sufficient 
understanding of the procedure, but not of the refusal and so would be found 
incompetent.  In contrast, if it was a complex procedure but had simple consequences 
if refused, it is likely that if they were found to have a sufficient understanding of 
procedure then they would also understand the consequences and be found competent.  
 
A distinction can be drawn between a minor having to understand the consequences of 
refusing a medical procedure and refusing to be a tissue donor, because if a minor 
refuses to consent to be a donor then there are no medical consequences for them.  But 
if they refuse to donate, are they required to understand the medical consequences for 
 
569 Stephen Gilmore and Jonathan Herring, ‘No is the Hardest Word: Consent and Children’s Autonomy’ 
(2011) 23 Child and Family Law Quarterly 3, 11. 
570 Gilmore and Herring (n 570) 11. 
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the potential recipient?  This would involve a minor donor having to understand the 
recipient’s condition and the medical consequences if they did not receive the 
transplant.  I argue that the threshold for competency would be too high for a minor 
donor if they were required to understand the medical consequences for another 
individual.  Therefore, for a minor to be competent to consent to being a tissue donor 
they should be required to understand that if they refuse there would be no medical 
impact on them, but it would have an impact on the potential recipient.  They should be 
expected to understand an outline of the consequences but not be expected to understand 
the finer details of the impact it would have on the potential recipient, even if the 
recipient is a sibling, as this would set the competency threshold too high. 
 
I have now considered and applied the Gillick competence test to tissue donation which 
is applicable to minors under 16 in England and Wales.  I have argued that if a minor in 
England and Wales meets the requirements of the Gillick competence test in relation to 
the donation of regenerative tissue, then they should be able to provide consent on their 
own behalf.  Furthermore, in order for a minor to be Gillick competent they require an 
understanding of the moral, family, emotional, and long-term implications of the 
donation, as well as an understanding of the potential consequences if they refuse the 
procedure.  I will now consider the competency test applicable in Scotland under section 
2(4) of the 1991 Act and apply it to tissue donation.    
 
6.2.2 Age of Legal Capacity (Scotland) Act 1991 
Unlike the Gillick competence test in England and Wales, the Scottish competence test 
is enshrined in statute under section 2(4) of the 1991 Act.  The 1991 Act was introduced 
as a result of the Scottish Law Commission’s (SLC) Report on the Legal Capacity and 
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Responsibility of Minors and Pupils.571  The 1991 Act provides an exception to the 
general rule that a minor under 16 has no capacity to enter into legal transactions.572  
Section 2(4) of the Act sets out the medical treatment exception and states that: 
 
A person under the age of 16 years shall have legal capacity to consent on his own 
behalf to any surgical, medical or dental procedure or treatment where, in the opinion 
of a qualified medical practitioner attending him, he is capable of understanding the 
nature and possible consequences of the procedure or treatment. 
    
The SLC considered section 8 of the Family Law Reform Act 1969, which applies to 
England and Wales, when deciding on the definition of ‘medical treatment’ to use in 
section 2(4).573  Section 8 states that ‘surgical, medical or dental treatment’574 includes:  
 
any procedure undertaken for the purposes of diagnosis and any procedure (including, 
in particular, the administration of anaesthetic) ancillary to surgical, medical or dental 
treatment.575 
 
The SLC acknowledged that this definition in section 8 did not cover medical 
procedures that were not considered treatment such as tissue donation, and so, it adopted 
the explicit phrasing of ‘procedure or treatment’ in order to encompass all types of 
medical procedures within the definition.  This wider definition allows a minor to 
provide authorisation for experimental and non-therapeutic procedures, therefore, there 
is no debate as to whether tissue donation is included under this definition.   
 
 
571 Scottish Law Commission, Report on the Legal Capacity and Responsibility of Minors and Pupils 
(Cmd 110, 1987).  
572 Age of Legal Capacity (Scotland) Act 1991, s.2(1). 
573 see below at 6.3.2.   
574 Family Law Reform Act 1969, s.8(1). 
575 Family Law Reform Act 1969, s.8(2). 
213 
 
6.2.2.1  Proposed Clarification of the section 2(4) competence test 
In this section I will examine the section 2(4) competence test in detail and apply it to 
tissue donation.  I will recommend that clarification of the section 2(4) competence test 
is required.  I will argue that if a minor in Scotland meets the requirements of the section 
2(4) competence test, in relation to the donation of regenerative tissue, then they should 
be able to provide authorisation on their own behalf.  Section 2(4) requires that the 
minor ‘is capable of understanding the nature and possible consequences of the 
procedure or treatment’.  However, the Act does not define what kind of understanding 
the minor should have, and there is no Scottish legal authority defining or applying 
section 2(4) to a minor’s authorisation to a medical procedure, let alone any application 
to tissue donation.   
 
Section 2(4) refers to the ‘nature’ of the procedure, which suggests that a minor should 
understand what the medical procedure itself entails, as well as any pre- and post-
operative care and assessment.  Furthermore, they must be capable of understanding the 
‘possible consequences of the procedure’, which suggests understanding both the 
medical consequences of the procedure as well as the temporary or permanent lifestyle 
restrictions following the procedure.  The SLC cited Lord Scarman’s judgement in 
Gillick with approval,576 indicating that a minor needs to have the ability to make a 
mature judgement, taking into account broader considerations – more than a mere 
understanding of the medical procedure.  However, the explicit wording of section 2(4) 
does not seem to be as far reaching as the one proposed by Lord Scarman, as there is no 
mention that a minor must consider the moral, family or emotional considerations of 
 
576 Scottish Law Commission (n 572) paras 3.72-3.77. 
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their decision.  Nor does it mention whether the minor has to understand the 
consequences if they refuse the medical procedure.     
 
In my opinion, when the Scottish courts apply section 2(4), they should require a minor 
to have an understanding that is akin to what is required under the Gillick competence 
test.  A minor donor should be required to understand that there is no moral duty to 
donate to their sibling.577  But just because there is no moral duty it does not mean that 
there is a complete absence of moral considerations.  The minor donor needs to 
understand the moral considerations of the decision as well as the moral pressures that 
the family, the sibling, or the wider community may place on them to donate tissue.  A 
failure to understand these moral considerations, or being susceptible to the moral 
pressures placed on them would result in the minor being considered incompetent.   
 
The minor donor would be required to understand the impact of the decision on the 
family dynamics and the family unit as a whole, similar to the competency test in 
Gillick, before they can be considered competent.  In other words, the relational 
considerations of the donation cannot be ignored.  If a minor donor exercises their 
relational autonomy then they would be making the decision taking into consideration 
the relationships they have with others.  This includes the relationship they have with 
their sibling, who is also the potential recipient.  As previously discussed,578 family 
considerations could have both positive and negative aspects on the minor’s 
psychological well-being.  This understanding could prevent or reduce the risk of the 
minor donor suffering from a negative psychological impact of the donation because 
they would understand the risks before undergoing the donation.   
 
577 Zinner (n 550) 129.  




Furthermore, the Gillick competence test requires the minor to understand the emotional 
considerations of the decision, but there is no mention of this in section 2(4).  Emotional 
considerations of a tissue donation could be both positive and negative, and if the 
negative emotions materialise their impact could be reduced if the minor donor has a 
prior understanding of them.  Therefore, to be competent, they should be required to 
understand the emotional implications of the donation, regardless of whether the 
donation was successful.  Indeed, if the donation was not a success then the minor donor 
may feel guilt or a sense of failure, but should be aware of and understand that the 
donated tissue may fail, be rejected by the recipient, or that the original cause of the 
organ failure may recur and that the outcome is beyond their control.579 
 
As with the Gillick competence test, I argue that a minor should be required to 
understand the consequences if they refuse the medical procedure.  But because of the 
nature of a tissue donation procedure, it is my contention that for a minor to be 
competent to provide authorisation to be a tissue donor they should be required to 
understand that if they refuse there would be no medical impact on them, but it would 
have an impact on the potential recipient.  I argue that the minor donor should be 
expected to understand an outline of the consequences but not be expected to understand 
the finer details of the impact it would have on the potential recipient, even if the 
recipient is a sibling, as this would set the competency threshold too high. 
 
In Scotland, a clear stance was taken on whether best interests is considered in the 
section 2(4) competence test.  The SLC recommended that it should not be included 
 
579 Friedman Ross and Thistlethwaite (n 565) 458. 
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because it would be ‘too restrictive’ and could prevent minors from being deemed 
competent because medical professionals may have different concepts of what is in the 
minor’s best interests.580  For instance, if a tissue donation is going to be in a minor 
donor’s best interests then a number of factors should be taken into account to determine 
this, such as harm, physical, emotional, and psychological needs of the minor.  But as 
tissue donation is a non-therapeutic procedure that medically harms the minor donor, in 
order for it to be justified the psychological benefits have to outweigh the medical risks 
and psychological risks.  But as discussed in Chapter 4,581 psychological benefits cannot 
be measured and are dependent on the minor, thus assessed on a case-by-case basis.  
Therefore, the weight placed on a minor’s psychological benefit is open to 
interpretation.   
 
To avoid the differing opinions of medical professionals as to a minor’s best interests, 
it was suggested that a second medical professional must agree that a minor should 
undergo that particular medical procedure.  However, the SLC rejected this because it 
would be too cumbersome and the medical professional may seek a second opinion 
from a colleague known to be sympathetic towards the proposed medical procedure.582  
This indicates that if a minor is competent under the 1991 Act and makes a decision 
then this decision is respected even if it is not in their best interests.583  I argue that this 
is the preferable interpretation of the section 2(4) competency test because it allows a 
competent minor’s autonomy to be respected by others.  Therefore, if a minor is 
competent to consent to being a tissue donor, they should be free to make a decision 
 
580 Scottish Law Commission (n 572) para 3.76. 
581 at 4.4. 
582 Scottish Law Commission (n 572) paras 3.75 and 3.77. 
583 Scottish Law Commission (n 572) para 3.77. 
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even if this is not considered to be in their best interests and it conflicts with the opinion 
of those with PR, the medical professionals, or the court.   
 
In conclusion, clarification is required to understand the finer details of the section 2(4) 
competency test and its application to tissue donation.  Once the court has applied this 
test to a living minor as a tissue donor then it can be clarified as to what approach the 
court will take, and what the minor is required to understand to be a tissue donor.  But 
it is my argument that for a minor to be competent under the section 2(4) competency 
test they should have an understanding that is akin to what is required under the Gillick 
competence test.  I have now considered the competency tests in England and Wales, 
and Scotland in relation to those under 16 and I will now move on to consider minors 
who are aged 16- and 17- years old.     
 
6.3 16- and 17- year olds 
For those aged 16 and 17 in England and Wales, they are assumed to have capacity 
under the 2005 Act.  The ability for a minor to be able to consent to medical treatment 
is found in section 8 of the 1969 Act.  I do not consider the position of 16- and 17- year 
olds in Scotland, since section 1(1)(b) of the Age of Legal Capacity (Scotland) Act 1991 
states that ‘a person of or over the age of 16 years shall have legal capacity to enter into 
any transaction’.584 
 
6.3.1 Mental Capacity Act 2005 
The 2005 Act contains the statutory test of capacity for those aged 16 and above in 
England and Wales.  Section 1(2) states that ‘a person must be assumed to have capacity 
 
584 see Chapter 1 at 1.1.1 for further information.  
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unless it is established that he lacks capacity’.  Therefore, 16- and 17- year olds are 
assumed to have capacity unless it can be proved otherwise.  Section 1(4) states that ‘a 
person is not to be treated as unable to make a decision merely because he makes an 
unwise decision.’  This means that those aged 16 or 17 can make a decision that is not 
in their best interests.  A 16- or 17- year old lacks capacity if ‘at the material time he is 
unable to make a decision for himself in relation to the matter because of an impairment 
of, or a disturbance in the functioning of, the mind or brain.’585  Section 3(1) states that 
a minor is ‘unable to make a decision for himself if he is unable’: 
 
 (a) to understand the information relevant to the decision586 
 (b) to retain that information587 
(c) to use or weigh that information as part of the process of making the decision,588 or 
(d) to communicate his decision (whether by talking, using sign language or any other 
means)589 
 
This demonstrates that minors, to have capacity to be a tissue donor, would have to 
understand the information relevant to the type of tissue donation they would be 
undergoing, retain this information, and then use or weigh up the information in order 
to make and communicate their decision.  The Mental Capacity Act 2005: Code of 
Practice provides further clarification that ‘relevant information’ includes ‘the likely 
effects of deciding one way or another or making no decision at all.’590  This indicates 
that in order for a 16- or 17- year old to have capacity they must also be able to 
understand the consequences of not undergoing the procedure.  Therefore, in order for 
 
585 Mental Capacity Act 2005, s.2(1). 
586 Further guidance about the interpretation of this criteria is provided in the Department of 
Constitutional Affairs, Mental Capacity Act 2005 Code of Practice (TSO 2007) paras 4.16-4.19. 
587 Department of Constitutional Affairs (n 587) para 4.20. 
588 Department of Constitutional Affairs (n 587) paras 4.21 and 4.22. 
589 Department of Constitutional Affairs (n 587) paras 4.23-4.25. 
590 Department of Constitutional Affairs (n 587) para 4.16. 
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a 16- or 17- year old to meet the requirements of ‘relevant information’ in relation to 
tissue donation, they would be required to understand the consequences of refusing to 
be a tissue donor.  Even if the minor is assumed to have capacity under the 2005 Act, it 
does not automatically result in them being able to provide consent to be a tissue donor.  
They must also meet the requirements under section 8 of the Family Law Reform Act 
1969.  Section 8 permits a minor to provide consent to ‘surgical, medical, or dental 
treatment’ as if they were of full age.   
 
6.3.2 Family Law Reform Act 1969 
The 1969 Act was introduced as a result of Parliament’s response to the Report of the 
Committee on the Age of Majority produced by the Latey Committee.591  In relation to 
consent to a medical treatment, the Latey Committee recommended that ‘without 
prejudice to any consent that may otherwise be lawful, the consent of young persons 
aged 16 and over to medical or dental treatment shall be as valid as the consent of a 
person of full age.’592  This recommendation formed the basis for section 8 of the 1969 
Act which is the relevant legislation when determining whether 16- and 17- year olds 
can provide consent to be a tissue donor. 
 
6.3.2.1  Section 8 
Section 8(1) states that: 
 
the consent of a minor who has attained the age of sixteen years to any surgical, medical, 
or dental treatment which, in the absence of consent, would constitute a trespass to his 
person, shall be as effective as it would be if he were of full age; and where a minor has 
 
591 Latey Committee, Report on the Committee on the Age of Majority (Cmnd 3342 (1967)). 
592 Latey Committee (n 592) para 484, Recommendation. 
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by virtue of this section given an effective consent to any treatment it shall not be 
necessary to obtain any consent for it from his parent or guardian.   
 
In other words, this section allows those of 16 years and above to provide consent to 
surgical, medical or dental treatment without the need to obtain any consent from those 
with PR.  Section 8(2) provides further clarification as to the scope of section 8(1) by 
stating that ‘surgical, medical, or dental treatment’: 
 
includes any procedure undertaken for the purposes of diagnosis, and this section 
applies to any procedure (including, in particular, the administration of anaesthetic) 
which is ancillary to any treatment as it applies to that treatment. 
 
6.3.2.2  Proposed Clarification of section 8 
Section 8 of the 1969 Act uses the term ‘treatment’ with regard to the types of medical 
procedures that a 16- or 17- year old can provide consent for.  My contention is that 
while, prima facie, the term ‘treatment’ does not include tissue donation from living 
minors as it is a non-therapeutic procedure for the donor, section 8 should be interpreted 
broadly to cover such procedures.  My reasons for this are twofold.  First, that the 2004 
Act explicitly states that minors can provide consent to be a tissue donor.593  Secondly, 
that the HTA’s Code of Practice G states that consent by a minor donor who has 
capacity is effective as if they were of full age.594  Before analysing the reasons for the 
use of the term ‘treatment’ it is necessary to consider in-depth the definition of 
‘treatment’.   
 
 
593 Human Tissue Act 2004, s.2(2). 
594 Human Tissue Authority, Code of Practice G: Donation of Allogeneic Bone Marrow and Peripheral 
Blood Stem Cells for Transplantation (April 2017) para 45.   
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6.3.2.2.1 What is ‘treatment’? 
The term ‘treatment’ in the dictionary means ‘the use of drugs, exercises etc to cure a 
person of an illness or injury’.595  A treatment is a therapeutic procedure as it has an 
identifiable and measurable intention to benefit the individual, either physically or 
psychologically.  It indicates that it is an accepted method, within society, of curing or 
improving a particular illness or injury by a medical professional.  The courts have held 
that treatment suggests that it benefits the patient.596  On the other hand, the term 
‘procedure’ is defined as ‘a medical operation’.597  Although there is a clear distinction 
between these two definitions, the terms treatment and procedure may be used 
synonymously in everyday vernacular.  A procedure can be considered to be both 
therapeutic and non-therapeutic.  For instance, the removal of tonsils is both a treatment 
as well as a therapeutic procedure because it is remedying the illness of infected tonsils 
and it is a medical act performed on the individual by a medical professional.  
 
Tissue donation is a non-therapeutic procedure for the donor, it does not alleviate any 
injury, illness or ailment, but instead actively harms the donor for the benefit of the 
recipient.  Thus, it cannot be considered to be a medical treatment, but instead, can be 
classed as a medical procedure.  As Ian Kennedy stated in the 1980s: 
 
 
595 Cambridge Dictionary, ‘Treatment’ <https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/treatment> 
accessed 07/10/2018. 
596 see R(Burke) v General Medical Council [2005] EWCA Civ 1003; Portsmouth Hospitals NHS Trust 
v Wyatt dand another [2005] EWCA Civ 1181 (Fam); Re J (A Minor)(Child in Care: Medical Treatment) 
[1992] 3 WLR 507.   




the assumption was made that, if something was described as treatment, it was ipso 
facto justified.  The word ‘treatment’ was enough.  And treatment was what the doctor 
said was treatment.  The law did not enquire further.598 
 
Therefore, if the medical professionals concluded that tissue donation was considered a 
treatment, then it was classed as such.  However, the paternalistic approach of the 
medical profession which was present in the 1980s has now shifted to a more patient-
centred approach.599  Consequently, more than just ‘the stamp of the medical 
professional’ is required to determine whether something is treatment.600  A patient is 
now more likely to question a medical professional’s advice rather than accept it as 
correct, and allowing a medical professional to determine whether it is a medical 
treatment is now unlikely to be accepted.  Lord Donaldson stated in obiter, in Re W (A 
Minor)(Medical Treatment)601, in the 1990s, in relation to tissue donation that ‘so far as 
the donor is concerned [the donation of organs or tissues] do not constitute either 
treatment or diagnosis.’602  Furthermore, Nolan LJ in the same case stated: ‘a case in 
which a child of any age consented to donate an organ: such a case is not, of course, 
covered by section 8 of the Family Law Reform Act 1969.’603  Subsequently, tissue 
donation from a living minor is not considered to be ‘treatment’.   
 
When the 1991 Act was being discussed as a Bill, the SLC considered section 8 of the 
1969 Act when deciding on the definition of ‘medical treatment’ to use in section 2(4) 
of the 1991 Act.  The SLC concluded that the definition in section 8 of the 1969 Act did 
 
598 Ian Kennedy, ‘Emerging Problems of Medicine, Technology and the Law’ in Ian Kennedy (ed), Treat 
Me Right: Essays in Medical Law and Ethics (Clarendon Press 1988) 8. 
599 Montgomery v Lanarkshire Health Board [2015] UKSC 11. 
600 Kennedy (n 599) 26; see Chapter 6 at 6.2.2 for further discussion on the Age of Legal Capacity 
(Scotland) Act 1991. 
601 Re W (A Minor)(Medical Treatment) [1992] 4 All ER 627. 
602 Re W (n 602) 635.   
603 Re W (n 602) 647.   
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not cover medical procedures that were not considered treatment, such as non-
therapeutic procedures, which included tissue donation.  Therefore, in the 1991 Act 
Parliament adopted the explicit phrasing of ‘procedure or treatment’ in order to 
encompass all types of medical procedures within this definition.  This wider definition 
allows a minor to provide authorisation for experimental and non-therapeutic 
procedures, including tissue donation.  This demonstrates that there is ambiguity over 
the interpretation of the term treatment, and the SLC wanted to ensure that all types of 
medical procedures were considered under the 1991 Act.  Therefore, if a literal 
interpretation of the term treatment in section 8 of the 1969 Act is used this could result 
in tissue donation being excluded from the scope of the section. 
 
6.3.2.2.2 Reasoning for the use of the term ‘treatment’ in section 8 
The reasons why Parliament used the term ‘treatment’ in section 8 is unclear as there 
was no discussion by the Latey Committee in the Report of the Committee on the Age 
of Majority604, nor consideration by either House of Parliament that was reported in 
Hansard, when the Family Law Reform Bill was being passed.  Most of the academic 
commentary around the area of the definition of ‘treatment’ focuses on the medical 
exception in criminal law, and not the use of the term in section 8 of the 1969 Act.605   
 
In 1967, when the Latey Committee was providing recommendations for law reform 
and their report was produced, tissue donation from living minors was a procedure that 
was not performed in England and Wales.  In the 1960s tissue donation from deceased 
individuals, both adults and minors, was performed, but donation from living 
 
604 Latey Committee (n 592).  
605 see Sara Fovargue and Alex Mullock (eds), The Legitimacy of Medical Treatment: What Role for the 
Medical Exception? (Routledge 2015) for further discussion on the use of the term ‘treatment’ within the 
medical exception in criminal law. 
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individuals had not been medically developed.  Therefore, these procedures were not in 
the consciousness of the Latey Committee.  In addition, when discussing the Bill, MPs 
would not have been aware of these procedures either.  When the term treatment was 
decided upon, those involved in drafting the legislation would not have been aware that 
they were excluding tissue donation from living minors by using this particular term.  It 
is impossible for legislators to be expected to use wording in statutes that would cover 
all future medical procedures that might be developed.  The interpretation of the term 
treatment in the 1960s, when this Act was enacted, would be different to how it would 
be interpreted in the 2020s.  Although case law can be flexible and accommodate 
developing interpretations of terminology, there have been no decisions on the 
interpretation of treatment in section 8.  This would suggest that tissue donation from 
living minors was not a deliberate exclusion from the section.   
 
However, there is reasoning to suggest that the Latey Committee used the term 
treatment to exclude the types of tissue donation that were available in the 1960s.  This 
is implied from the express recommendation by the Latey Committee that those under 
the age of 18 should not be able to consent to give blood.606  The Ministry of Health 
provided the following explanation as to why 18 was chosen as the age when individuals 
can donate blood: 
 
18 was generally adopted as the minimum age by the blood transfusion services formed 
at the beginning of the last war.  Although the Ministry has no record of the reasons for 
selecting 18 the probably ones are that by this age, growth is very largely completed 
 
606 Latey Committee (n 592) paras 485-489. 
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and the psychological and physical changes of puberty are over; and that 18 was the 
minimum age for serving in the Armed Forces.607 
 
There appears to be no logic as to why the age an individual can donate blood should 
be dependent on the age they can join the army.  A more compelling argument is one 
based on the medical impact on the individual.  The medical objections to lowering the 
age to 16 are that the minor is still growing, that blood volume will not have reached 
the same level as that in an adult, and it seems unwise for the health of the minor to 
induce anaemia deliberately, even for a short duration, under such circumstances.608  
Therefore, the wording of section 8 may have been used in order to ensure that section 
8 did not cover blood donation.   
 
The reasoning for the use of the term treatment is unclear, and the discussion of this 
term implies that treatment does not include tissue donation.  However, such literal 
interpretation of the term does not have to be adopted by the court, the mischief rule 
could be used so that section 8 incorporates all types of medical procedures.  The 1969 
Act was enacted in the 1960s and as medicine advances the interpretation of section 8 
should be adapted to evolve with these changes.  
 
6.3.2.2.3 Broad interpretation of section 8 
It is my argument that the court should adopt a wide interpretation of the meaning of 
treatment in section 8 of the 1969 Act to incorporate tissue donation.  There are two 
reasons to suggest that legislation and professional guidance that is specific to tissue 
donation allows 16- and 17- year olds to be able to provide consent to be a tissue donor.  
 
607 Latey Committee (n 592) para 486. 
608 Latey Committee (n 592) para 488. 
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First, section 2(2) of the 2004 Act explicitly states that subject to subsection (3), where 
the minor concerned is alive and has capacity to consent themselves, ‘appropriate 
consent’ means their consent.  Therefore, if a minor has capacity, they can provide 
consent to be a tissue donor.  The 2004 Act defines minor for the purposes of this Act 
as being under the age of 18.609  Subsequently, if a 16- or 17- year old has capacity 
under the 2005 Act then they can provide consent to be a tissue donor.  If section 8 of 
the 1969 Act was interpreted to exclude tissue donation, then this interpretation would 
conflict with the 2004 Act which could result in confusion for the medical professionals 
as they would be unsure which legislation should be followed. 
 
Secondly, the HTA in Code of Practice G makes explicit reference to the 1969 Act.610  
In Code of Practice G paragraphs 45-47 deal specifically with ‘Children aged 16 and 
17’.  Paragraph 45 states: 
 
Children aged 16 or 17 are presumed to have capacity unless there is evidence to 
suggest otherwise.  Where a child is over 16 section 8(1) of the Family Law Reform 
Act 1969 states that the decision of a child shall be as effective as that of an adult.611  
 
This guidance was produced in 2017 and is currently the most up-to-date, I suggest that 
it would not make reference to the 1969 Act if it was not considered applicable in 
relation to tissue donation.  Moreover, paragraph 47 states that: 
 




609 Human Tissue Act 2004, s.54(1). 
610 HTA, Code of Practice G (n 595) para 45. 
611 HTA, Code of Practice G (n 595) para 45. 
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a)  request that the clinician referring the case provides the HTA with details of 
the competence assessment that was undertaken for the child; 
b)  following that, if the matter remains unclear, the HTA may make an application 
to the Court of Protection under the Children Act 1989 for the court to decide 
if the donor child is competent to make their own decisions about medical 
treatment.  The court would then decide whether the child had competence to 
consent to the procedure for him or herself.612 
 
This further suggests that a 16- or 17- year old should be able to consent to be a tissue 
donor themselves, and a decision that a minor donor is not competent will not be taken 
lightly by the HTA, but reassessed accordingly.  Using the reason that section 8 of the 
1969 Act does not encompass tissue donation because the term ‘treatment’ should have 
a narrow interpretation, as the reason for not allowing a 16- or 17- year old to consent 
to being a tissue donor, is unlikely to be accepted by the HTA as a valid reason for 
finding that a minor is deemed incompetent.  One of the reasons guidance is produced 
by the HTA is to assist medical professionals in their understanding of relevant law.  If 
section 8 of the 1969 Act was interpreted to exclude tissue donation, then the HTA 
guidance would be inconsistent with section 8.  
 
In addition, it is implied by the introduction of competency tests for those under 16, that 
16- and 17- year olds should also be able to be competent to provide consent to be a 
tissue donor.  When the 1969 Act was enacted those under 16 could not provide consent 
for any medical procedures, and had to rely on their parents or guardians to provide it.  
However, the law has evolved through common law in England and Wales, and statute 
in Scotland, to allow a minor under the age of 16 to be competent to consent to medical 
 
612 HTA, Code of Practice G (n 595) para 45. 
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procedures.  The Gillick613 competence test and section 2(4) competence test permit a 
minor under 16 to be competent if they have sufficient understanding and intelligence 
to enable them to fully understand what is proposed.  If the law now allows a minor 
under 16 to consent to be a tissue donor, then it would be consistent if section 8 was 
interpreted to allow a 16- or 17- year old, who ostensibly has the same or a higher level 
of understanding and intelligence, to also be allowed to provide consent.   
 
In conclusion, while the literal interpretation of treatment does not incorporate tissue 
donation, the language of the 1969 Act can remain intact so long as the courts provide 
a clear and wider interpretation of term treatment in section 8.  This interpretation would 
result in it being consistent with both the 2004 Act and the HTA CoP, as well as 
encompass the current medical technology that is available.  This may result in the term 
treatment being given a similar interpretation to the term procedure so it covers all 
therapeutic and non-therapeutic procedures.   
 
I have now established that a competent minor should be able to provide 
consent/authorisation to be a tissue donor if they meet the appropriate test.  I have also 
suggested clarification to the current law in respect of the Gillick competence test, 
section 2(4) competence test, and section 8 of the 1969 Act.  I am now going to consider 
whether those with PR currently can, and whether they should be able to override a 





613 Gillick (n 498). 
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6.4 Parental Responsibility  
In this section, I shall outline the current law for England and Wales, and Scotland 
separately as well as highlight its uncertainties.  I will argue that those with PR currently 
can, but should not be permitted to override a competent minor’s consent/authorisation 
for three reasons.  First, those with PR hold their power as agents or trustees on behalf 
of the minor until they are mature enough to begin to make decisions for themselves.614  
In other words, when a minor is competent and able to make decisions for themselves, 
the need for a proxy decision-maker becomes obsolete.  Secondly, the HTA, in England 
and Wales, have stated that consent from those with PR on behalf of a competent minor 
will not be treated by the HTA as lawful consent.615  Thirdly, the wording of section 8 
implies that consent from those with PR is not required. 
 
6.4.1 The current law in England and Wales 
The legal issue pertaining to whether those with PR can override the consent of a 
competent minor, in England and Wales, was not clarified in Gillick, with Lord Scarman 
asserting that the parental right is terminated, while Lord Fraser was more circumspect 
by allowing the parental right to continue even after the minor is competent.616  Lord 
Scarman stated that: 
 
I would hold that as a matter of law the parental right to determine whether or not their 
minor child below the age of 16 will have medical treatment terminates if and when the 
child achieves a sufficient understanding and intelligence to enable him or her to 
 
614 Jonathan Montgomery, ‘Children as Property’ [1988] 51 Modern Law Review 323, 323-324. 
615 HTA, Code of Practice G (n 595) para 44. 
616 Gillian Douglas, ‘The Retreat from Gillick’ (1992) 55(4) Medical Law Review 569, 574. 
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understand fully what is proposed.  It will be a question of fact whether a child seeking 
advice has sufficient understanding of what is involved to give a consent valid in law.617 
 
However, in R(on the application of Axon) v Secretary of State for Health,618 Silber J 
referred to this quote and held that the parental right to make decisions terminated once 
the minor is competent.619   
 
Furthermore, Lord Scarman, in Gillick, stated that ‘parental rights are derived from 
parental duty and exist only so long as they are needed for the protection of the person 
and property of the child’,620 and that ‘until the child achieves the capacity to consent, 
the parental right to make the decision continues save only in exceptional 
circumstances.’621  It would thus follow that, apart from the court, the only person able 
to consent would be a competent minor.  In contrast, Lord Fraser in Gillick referred 
favourably to Hewer v Bryant,622 where Lord Denning MR described the parental right 
as: 
 
a dwindling right which the courts will hesitate to enforce against the wishes of the 
child, and the more so the older he is.  It starts with a right of control and ends with 
little more than advice.623 
 
In agreement with Lord Denning, Lord Fraser argued that those with PR retain a right 
to consent on behalf of the minor which may only be disregarded if it is in the minor’s 
 
617 Gillick (n 498) 423. 
618 [2006] EWHC 37 (Admin). 
619 Axon (n 619) 56. 
620 Gillick (n 498) 420. 
621 Gillick (n 498) 418. 
622 [1970] 1 QB 357. 
623 Hewer (n 623) 369. 
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best interests to do so.624  Lord Donaldson also followed this line of argument, and said 
that while competent minors can provide consent it did not remove the power of those 
with PR to do so.625  He devised an analogy in Re R (A Minor)(Wardship: Medical 
Treatment),626 which stated that consent is merely: 
 
a key which unlocks a door.  Furthermore, whilst in the case of an adult of full capacity 
there will usually only be one keyholder, namely the patient, in the ordinary family unit 
where a young child is the patient there will be two keyholders, namely the parents, 
with a several as well as joint right to turn the key and unlock the door.627 
 
In Re W (A Minor)(Medical Treatment),628 Lord Donaldson adopted a different analogy 
for consent, relying on a military description: 
 
On reflection I regret my use in Re R of the keyholder analogy, because keys can lock 
as well as unlock.  I now prefer the analogy of the legal ‘flak-jacket’ which protects the 
doctor from claims by the litigious whether he acquires it from his patient, who may be 
a minor over the age of 16 or a Gillick competent child under that age, or from another 
person having parental responsibilities which include a right to consent to treatment of 
the minor.  Anyone who gives him a flak jacket (ie consent) may take it back, but the 
doctor only needs one and so long as he continues to have one, he has the legal right to 
proceed.629 
 
This shows that both competent minors and those with PR can consent on behalf of a 
minor to undergo a medical procedure.  The right of those with PR to consent on behalf 
 
624 Gillick (n 498) 411. 
625 Re R (n 567) 184. 
626 Re R (n 567) 184. 
627 Re R (n 567) 184. 
628 Re W (n 602). 
629 Re W (n 602) 635. 
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of the minor would not yield; rather a minor becomes an individual who can provide 
consent, alongside those with PR.630  A competent minor does not gain any greater legal 
standing than those with PR and it does not give a minor a right to veto.631  Subsequently, 
it is unclear whose consent would take the overriding stance.  While both the cases of 
Re R and Re W were in relation to the refusal of a medical procedure, I feel that it is 
appropriate and necessary to consider them since they are the leading authorities with 
regard to parental rights of competent minors.   
 
6.4.2 The current law in Scotland 
The legal landscape in Scotland is also unclear, with a similar discussion undertaken in 
Scotland as to whether those with PR can provide authorisation once the minor is 
competent under section 2(4) of the 1991 Act.  The House of Lords, in a debate when 
discussing the Age of Legal Capacity (Scotland) Bill, noted that the issue of parental 
rights within the Bill were not well defined.632  They agreed with the SLC report that 
the Bill did not affect parental rights, and that those with PR would still be entitled to 
exercise parental rights on behalf of their minor.633  However, the 1991 Act must be read 
in conjunction with section 15(5) of the 1995 Act, which states that ‘a person may act 
as a child’s legal representative only if the child is not capable of acting on his or her 
own behalf.’  This suggests a similar standpoint to that taken by Lord Scarman in the 
case of Gillick, that those with PR can only make a decision on behalf of a minor if they 
are deemed incompetent, and that those with PR lose their right once the minor is 
 
630 Jo Bridgeman, ‘Old Enough to Know Best?’ (1993) 13 Legal Studies 69, 73. 
631 Stephen Parker and John Dewar, ‘Re R (A Minor) [1991] 3 WLR 592’ (1992) 14(2) Journal of Social 
Welfare and Family Law 143, 147. 
632 HL Deb 01 July 1991, vol 520, cols 866-82. 
633 Hansard (n 633); Latey Committee (n 592) para 3.81. 
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competent.  In Houston Applicant,634 a Scottish case concerning those with PR 
overriding a competent minor’s refusal, Sheriff McGowan stated that: 
 
It seems to me illogical that, on the one hand a person under the age of 16 should be 
granted the power to decide upon medical treatment for himself while, on the other 
hand, his parents have the right to override his decision.  I am inclined to the view that 
the minor’s decision is paramount and cannot be overridden.  The 1991 Act itself does 
not provide any mechanism for resolving a dispute between minor and guardian but it 
seems to me that logic demands that the minor’s decision is paramount.635   
 
This is the opposing view to that taken by the House of Lords and the SLC in the 
discussion of the 1991 Bill.  However, Sheriff McGowan acknowledges that the 1991 
Act is unclear about disputes between minors and those with PR, therefore it would be 
for a court to make the necessary judgement.   
 
6.4.3 Proposed Reform to the current law 
I have established that both in England and Wales, and in Scotland those with PR can 
override the consent/authorisation of a competent minor.  I am now going to answer the 
following question: should those with PR be able to override the consent/authorisation 
of a competent minor?  The simple answer to this question is no, and the following is 
my reasoning for the stance I have taken on this issue.  I accept that when a minor is 
incapable of understanding the nature of a medical procedure and therefore in need of 
their interests to be protected, those with PR may give legally effective consent or 
authorisation, thus they have a right of complete control over the minor.636  However, 
 
634 1996 SCLR 943.  
635 Houston (n 635) 945. 
636 Montgomery (n 615) 324. 
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as a minor matures they start to make decisions for themselves, and this also facilitates 
their continuing growth.’637  As the minor makes more decisions for themselves their 
understanding and ability to make decisions will develop over time.  Amy Gutmann has 
written: 
 
The justification for defining adolescents as legal minors is that their own capacities for 
free exercise are limited and can be more fully developed by paternalistic supervision.  
We assume that as those capacities gradually develop, the freedom to exercise them 
stimulates their further development.638 
 
As a minor becomes more independent, they are able to make more decisions that will 
have a greater impact on them in their day-to-day life, often known as becoming mature.  
This is also applicable in relation to medical procedures.  A minor will be able to provide 
consent or authorisation for a sticking plaster at a younger age compared to providing 
consent or authorisation to have their tonsils removed.  Those with PR have a role as a 
safety mechanism so minors do not make decisions that are against their interests.  This 
role should dwindle as the minor matures, and once the minor is competent then this 
role should become obsolete.  The minor no longer requires those with PR to make 
decisions on their behalf because the minor can make these decisions for themselves 
and is best placed to decide a course of action. 
 
As a competent minor is able to provide consent/authorisation for the procedure on their 
own behalf, it seems absurd that those with PR would have a concurrent right to provide 
consent/authorisation for the procedure or alternatively be able to override the 
 
637 Montgomery (n 615) 324. 
638 Amy Gutmann, ‘Children, Paternalism, and Education: A Liberal Argument’ (1980) 9(4) Philosophy 
and Public Affairs 338, 355. 
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consent/authorisation of a competent minor.  If both the competent minor and those 
with PR could provide consent/authorisation then which consent/authorisation should 
the medical professionals rely on?  Or does it not matter?  When considering tissue 
donation, if the competent minor refused to donate then the consent/authorisation of 
those with PR would not be accepted as the minor could not be forced to donate tissue.  
But if the competent minor provides consent/authorisation for the procedure, can those 
with PR override this consent/authorisation?  Allowing those with PR to have any right 
over a competent minor creates a risk that the autonomous decisions of the competent 
minor would not be respected.  If a minor meets the competency test then they should 
be the sole determinant as to whether they provide consent/authorisation, regardless of 
whether those with PR agree with this course of action or not.   
 
The involvement of those with PR in a tissue donation procedure is only encouraged by 
the HTA, it is not a requirement.  Furthermore, consent/authorisation from those with 
PR on behalf of a competent minor will not be considered legally valid by the HTA.  In 
Code of Practice G, it states that: 
 
consent from a person with parental responsibility on behalf of a legally competent 
child will not be treated by the HTA as lawful consent.  Parental involvement in the 
child’s decision making should be encouraged, but the HTA considers that parents 
cannot make medical treatment decisions on behalf of a child who can make his or her 
own medical treatment decisions.639 
 
This demonstrates that those with PR can be involved in the decision-making process, 
but their consent will not be accepted as lawful.  This indicates that the HTA promote 
 
639 HTA, Code of Practice G (n 595) para 44. 
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the practice to respect the autonomous decision of a competent minor as well as taking 
into account relational autonomy.640  A minor who is relationally autonomous would 
look to their relationships with others, including those who have PR, and then make a 
decision taking into account their relationships.  It is natural that the minor would not 
make their decision in isolation but would discuss the process with others to ensure that 
they make the decision that is best suited to them, and the HTA promote communication 
and discussion.  This HTA guidance is only applicable in England and Wales, and while 
the HTA have not provided explicit guidance in Scotland in relation to this there is no 
evidence that suggests a contrary stance would be taken in Scotland.    
 
The arguments presented above are applicable to those aged 16- and 17- years old, but 
there is an additional argument that lies in concentrating upon the words in section 8(1): 
‘where a minor has by virtue of this section given an effective consent to any treatment 
it shall not be necessary to obtain any consent for it from his parent or guardian.’  In 
other words, if a minor provides consent then the consent from those with PR is not 
required.  The medical professional only needs the consent from the minor in order to 
proceed with the tissue donation.  Furthermore, in section 8(1) it is stated that the 
consent is ‘as effective as it would be if he were of full age.’  If the minor was 18, an 
adult, their ability to consent would have two separate effects.641  First, their consent 
would be fully effective, so it could not be overridden by those with PR.  In other words, 
if the minor provided consent for the procedure to occur then those with PR could not 
override the decision and prevent the medical procedure from proceeding.  Secondly, a 
failure to give consent would be fully effective as a veto, and no one else would be in a 
position to consent.  This means that the minor would be solely responsible for any 
 
640 see Chapter 2 at 2.2.1 for further discussion on relational autonomy.   
641 Re W (n 602) 634. 
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medical procedure they undergo, only their consent is required, and if they failed to 
provide consent then the medical procedure could not go ahead.  
 
There is, however, an argument that has been presented by John Murphy that suggests 
that, in fact, those with PR do maintain a right to provide consent on behalf of the minor 
until they reach the age of majority, 18.642  This argument rests on the wording in section 
8(3) of the 1969 Act which states that ‘nothing in this section shall be construed as 
making ineffective any consent which would have been effective if this section had not 
been enacted.’643  The impact of section 8(3) is twofold.644  First, the rights of consent 
vested in a minor at common law (if any existed) prior to the enactment of the 1969 are 
preserved.645  However, it is the second point that is most pertinent to this discussion.  
This section preserved the common law as it existed immediately before the 1969 Act, 
which gave an effective power of parental consent for all minors up to the age of 21, 
the then age of majority.646    Which means that it preserves the right of those with PR 
to provide consent in respect of a minor aged 16 and 17.647  But the preservation of the 
latter is subject to the caveat that such a right is ‘liable to be, if it has not already been, 
extinguished upon the attainment of capacity by the minor in question.’648  If the rights 
have not been extinguished once the minor is competent, it can lead to concurrent 
powers of consent between the 16- and 17- year old and those with PR.    
 
 
642 John Murphy, ‘W(h)ither Adolescent Autonomy?’ (1992) 14(6) Journal of Social Welfare and Family 
Law 529, 534. 
643 Murphy (n 643) 534. 
644 Murphy (n 643) 534. 
645 Murphy (n 643) 534. 
646 Re W (n 602) 634. 
647 Murphy (n 643) 534. 
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If those aged 16 and 17 have a right to consent to a medical procedure, then even if 
concurrent powers existed, the minor would have the overriding decision as to whether 
they undergo the medical procedure or not.  Lord Justice Balcombe in Re W (A 
Minor)(Medical Treatment)649 argued that section 8 could not confer an absolute right 
on the minor.650  He stated that the purpose of this section was ‘to enable a 16 year old 
to consent to medical treatment which, in the absence of consent by the minor or its 
parents, would constitute a trespass to the person.’651  This would suggest that in theory 
section 8 does not operate to prevent parental consent remaining effective.652  However, 
in practice, this section allows those with PR to provide consent on behalf of the minor 
if the minor was not competent to do so, rather than allowing those with PR to override 
the minor’s consent.   
 
My argument that those with PR should not be able to consent on behalf of a competent 
minor is further supported by the discussions of the Latey Committee.  One of the 
reasons for the recommendations to change the age of majority was because medical 
professionals were unable to treat the minor until parental consent for the minor had 
been provided.  Cases were occurring where minors between the ages of 16 and the age 
of majority, 21, were living away from home and required medical treatment.653  This 
treatment had not reached the emergency stage yet which meant that the medical 
professionals could not proceed without valid consent.  Medical professionals were 
unable to treat the minor until parental consent had been provided, and if the minor lived 
away from home it could be difficult to contact their parents.654  This caused practical 
 
649 Re W (n 602). 
650 Re W (n 602) 641. 
651 Re W (n 602) 641. 
652 Re W (n 602) 641. 
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issues for the medical professionals, and the parents may not be aware that the minor 
required a medical procedure if they were not in regular contact with them.   
 
To prevent this issue, the Latey Committee recommended that minors should be allowed 
to provide consent themselves without the need for consent from their parents.  
However, the Latey Committee stated that a medical professional should ‘for reasons 
of ethics and prudence, make contact with the parents of a minor in every case … unless 
the minor refuses permission.’655  This appears to be more of a courtesy rather than a 
legal requirement.  As already stated, if the minor provides the consent then the medical 
professional can legally proceed with the medical procedure.  Informing those with PR 
every time the minor undergoes a medical procedure is unnecessary and excessive, but 
where the minor is undergoing a procedure that requires the support from their family 
to aid recovery, it may be suggested that those with PR are informed.  For example, in 
tissue donation it was discussed in Chapter 4 that a minor is vulnerable and requires a 
support system to help them recover from the tissue donation.  Their family can provide 
an emotional support mechanism for the donor; however, this will differ depending on 
the circumstances of the family.656   
 
In conclusion, in this section I argued that those with PR currently can, but should not 
be permitted to override a competent minor’s consent/authorisation for three reasons.  
This includes because when a minor is competent and able to make decisions for 
themselves, the need for a proxy decision-maker becomes obsolete.  I will now consider 
whether a court can and should be able to override a competent minor’s decision in 
respect of tissue donation.   
 
655 Latey Committee (n 592) para 482.  




6.5 The Court 
While the court can make decisions on behalf of an incompetent minor by invoking 
their inherent jurisdiction, the parens patriae jurisdiction, it is unclear whether such a 
jurisdiction can be invoked over a competent minor.657  It is my view that once a minor 
is competent a court should not be able to override their decision about whether to be a 
tissue donor.  The role of the court is to protect the interests of the minor, and once the 
minor is competent to make their own decisions then the role of the court is obsolete.  
Although the legal authorities that govern this area of law in England and Wales, and 
Scotland are different, the legal principles that stem from them are the same, therefore, 
I am going to deal with the issues together to avoid repetition.   
 
As argued in the previous section, those with PR should lose their right to provide 
consent/authorisation on behalf of a minor once they are competent, the question is 
whether this also applies to the court.  The simple answer is yes it should do.  In 
Scotland, the 1991 Act must be read in conjunction with the 1995 Act.  Section 11 of 
that Act allows the court to make an order in relation to PR, parental rights, and 
guardianship.  When a court has before it a question as to the care and upbringing of a 
minor, it must treat the welfare of the minor as the paramount consideration in 
determining the order to be made.658  But it does not go further than that, this suggests 
that when a court is required to make an order it must treat the welfare of the minor as 
the paramount consideration, but it is unclear whether a court can make an order to 
override a competent minor’s decision.   
 
 
657 see Chapter 5 at 5.3 for further information about parens patriae.   
658 Children (Scotland) Act 1995, s.11(7).   
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In England and Wales, if the view of Lord Scarman in Gillick is adopted, when a 
competent minor provides consent to a medical procedure the right of those with PR to 
exercise control in respect of that matter ‘yields’659 and if a court can only act in the 
same way as a responsible parent their right will also yield.  Thus, the court would have 
no authority to act outside parental powers.660  As John Seymour has stated: 
 
It must not be overlooked that the parens patriae jurisdiction confers powers not only 
to protect the young, but also to control them.  At a time when the law is giving 
increasing recognition to the children’s autonomy … it is necessary fully to consider 
the implications of judicial claims to possess powers which are not defined by reference 
to current conceptions of the parent-child relationship.661 
 
However, a court may override a decision made by those with PR on behalf of a minor 
which suggests that the court has wider powers than those with PR.  Lord Donaldson 
stated in Re R that: 
 
The court has the right and, in appropriate cases, duty to override the decision of the 
parents or other guardians.  If it can override such consents, as it undoubtedly can, I see 
no reason why it would not be able, and in appropriate cases, willing, to override 
decisions by Gillick competent children.662 
 
He goes on to explain that: 
 
 
659 Gillick (n 498) 422 per Lord Scarman.   
660 Graeme Laurie, ‘Parents patriae jurisdiction in the medico-legal context: the vagaries of judicial 
activism’ (1999) Edinburgh Law Review 95, 105. 
661 John Seymour, ‘Parens Patriae and Wardship Powers: Their Nature and Origins’ (1994) 14(2) Oxford 
Journal of Legal Studies 159, 160.   
662 Re R (n 567) 187. 
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[T]he practical jurisdiction [of a court exercising parens patriae] is wider than that of 
parents … [T]his jurisdiction is not derivative from the parent’s rights and 
responsibilities, but derives from, or is, the delegated performance of the duties of the 
Crown to protect its subjects and particular children…663 
 
Furthermore, Lord Donaldson held that because the power of the court is wider than 
that of those with PR, it could override the consent of a competent minor.664  In Re W665, 
Lord Donaldson restated his view, expressed in Re R666, that: 
 
There is ample authority for the proposition that the inherent powers of the court under 
its parents patriae are theoretically limitless and that they certainly extend beyond the 
powers of a natural parent.667 
 
In his view, there could be no doubt that since the court’s powers extended beyond those 
with PR, the parens patriae jurisdiction could be exercised to override the refusal of a 
Gillick competent minor.668  In Re L (Medical Treatment: Gillick Competency)669, Sir 
Stephen Brown P stated that even if the court had found L to be Gillick competent, it 
would still have made the order for the blood transfusion to go ahead by overruling her 
decision because it was in her interests to have the transfusion.670  This indicates that 
even if a minor is competent, the court can overrule their decision, especially if it is in 
the minor’s interests to do so.  But in my contention that a court should not be able to 
overrule a competent minor’s decision.  The role of the court is to protect the interests 
 
663 Re R (n 567)186.   
664 Re R (n 567). 
665 Re W (n 602). 
666 Re R (n 567). 
667 Re W (n 602) 637. 
668 Re W (n 602) 637.  A similar decision was reached by Balcombe LJ (643) and by Nolan LJ (646).   
669 Re L (n 517).  
670 Re L (n 517) 813.   
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of the minor when they are unable to do so themselves.  Once a minor is competent this 
role is obsolete and should not be exercised over the minor.   
 
A court should not conclude that a minor is incompetent because they do not agree with 
the decision the minor has made or anticipate that their decision will change in the 
future.  However, it was demonstrated in Re E (A Minor)(Wardship: Medical 
Treatment)671 that a court can do this, when Ward J found that E was incompetent and 
held that it was in his best interests to have a blood transfusion despite, as a Jehovah’s 
Witness, his refusal of it.  Notably, once E reached 18, he refused all further blood 
transfusions, he succumbed to his illness and died as a result.672  However, as Emily 
Jackson has stated, ‘this was not because he had suddenly acquired an understanding of 
what it would be like to die, rather he had simply achieved the status of adulthood.’673  
At best, the additional two years enable E to become more solid in his convictions and 
better prepared to realise the full implications of his ultimate decision.674  If the court 
was to act on a presumption that a minor’s view will change as they get older then no 
minor would be able to make a decision.  It is my argument that if a minor meets the 
competency test then they should be the sole determinant as to whether they provide 
consent or authorisation, regardless of whether the court agrees with that decision or the 
procedure is in their best interests or not.   
 
In relation to 16- and 17- year olds, my argument that a court should not be able to 
override a competent minor’s decision is strengthened by the wording in section 8(1).  
 
671 Re E (n 511). 
672 Emily Jackson, Medical Law: Text, Cases, and Materials (OUP 2016) 303; and n.416 p120-121. 
673 Jackson (n 673) 303. 
674 Margaret Brazier and Caroline Bridge, ‘Coercion or Caring: analysing adolescent autonomy’ (1996) 
16(1) Legal Studies 84, 104. 
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Examining section 8(1) more closely, it states that the consent is ‘as effective as it would 
be if he were of full age’.  In other words, a minor can provide consent ‘as effective as 
it would be if he were of full age’.  If an adult has capacity, they can provide consent to 
a medical procedure that cannot be overruled by a court, nor can the court provide 
consent on behalf of the adult, regardless of whether the decision is in the adult’s best 
interests or not.  Therefore, if a 16- or 17- year old can consent under section 8 as if 
they were an adult, it would follow that the court cannot overrule the consent provided 
by the 16- or 17- year old, nor provide consent on their behalf.  Therefore, a 16- or 17- 
year old who is competent can provide consent to be a tissue donor, and this decision 
should not be able to be overruled by a court.   
 
6.6 Concluding thoughts 
In this chapter I considered the second research question of this thesis: who can and 
should be able to provide consent/authorisation for living minors to be regenerative 
tissue donors?  I concluded that if a competent minor meets the relevant competency 
test then they should be able to provide consent/authorisation for them to be a tissue 
donor.  As to whether they can currently do this, the law is unclear as there has been no 
application of tissue donation to the Gillick competency test, section 2(4) competency 
test or section 8 of the 1969 Act by the court.  In order to ensure that a medical 
professional is correctly applying these tests within the tissue donation process 
clarification is required.  This lack of clarity and precision results in uncertainty that is 
not conducive to effective decision-making.  Furthermore, I argued that those with PR 
and the court currently can but should not be permitted to override a competent minor’s 
consent/authorisation to tissue donation because when a minor is competent and able to 




I also examined the third research question of this thesis in relation to competent minors: 
what test(s) should be used to determine whether consent/authorisation can be provided 
for a living minor to be a tissue donor?  I have proposed clarification of the Gillick 
competence test and section 2(4) competence test.  This clarification means that in order 
for a minor to be competent under either of these tests they should require an 
understanding of the moral, family, emotional, and long-term implications of the 
donation, as well as an understanding of the potential consequences if they refuse the 
procedure.  In relation to those aged 16- and 17- years old, my contention is that while, 
prima facie, the term ‘treatment’ does not include tissue donation from living minors as 
it is a non-therapeutic procedure for the donor, section 8 should be interpreted broadly 
to cover such procedures.  But interpretation and application through common law is 
required so there is no ambiguity.  
 
I have now answered all three research questions in this thesis, therefore, in the 
following chapter I will evaluate my success in achieving my aims and outline the 
various conclusions that I have reached and propose any reforms to the current 















7.1 Proposed Reforms to the Regulatory Framework  
I have now considered all of the issues I consider relevant within the tissue donation 
debate in respect of living minors, and provided answers with in-depth reasoning to my 
three research questions I posed at the start of this thesis.  I will now demonstrate how 
the proposed reforms/clarifications to the current regulatory framework would apply in 
practice.  My main argument, in this thesis, is that the regulatory framework that 
currently governs living minors as tissue donors in England and Wales, and Scotland 
does not adequately protect the minor donor’s interests, and I would suggest it is in need 
of clarification and/or reform.  To reiterate my research questions: 
 
(1) Should non-regenerative tissue donation from living minors be permitted 
in England and Wales, and Scotland? 
 
(2) Who can and should provide consent/authorisation for living minors to 
be regenerative tissue donors? 
 
(3) What test(s) should be used to determine whether consent/authorisation 
can be provided for a living minor to be a tissue donor? 
 
The recommendations I have proposed will not just exist in the abstract, but will be 
applied in practice, so I feel that the best way to demonstrate how my recommendations 
apply to the donation process is to set out three realistic donation stories that cover 
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common likely scenarios.  These stories will follow the donation process flowcharts as 
set out in Figures 3 and 4.675   
 
I have previously discussed and offered robust argument that no living minor should be 
able to donate non-regenerative tissue which is the approach taken in the Scottish 
legislation, the Human Tissue (Scotland) Act 2006.  My overarching argument being 
that the psychological benefits do not outweigh the immediate and long-term medical 
risks and potential psychological harms of the donation, even if the donation is to a 
sibling, therefore, the donation cannot be justified.   
 
I concluded that the types of tissue donation that present the highest risks of morbidity 
and mortality are non-regenerative tissue donation.  A kidney donation presents the 
most significant long-term implications with the greatest lifestyle restrictions.  The 
justification for permitting the tissue donation is based on the psychological benefit the 
donor would develop from donating to a sibling.  But a psychological benefit cannot be 
guaranteed, and even less so if the transplant is not a success in the recipient.  I 
demonstrated that in relation to the donation of non-regenerative tissue, a minor donor 
has a higher susceptibility to particular vulnerabilities.  Therefore, there is a greater 
chance that the donor will develop a psychological harm from the donation of non-
regenerative tissue compared to regenerative tissue.  I, therefore, propose that the 
Human Tissue Act 2004, in England and Wales, should subsequently be reformed to 
include a restriction to prevent living minors from being permitted to donate non-
regenerative tissue.  Consequently, all of the following stories involve the donation of 
regenerative tissue, specifically bone marrow. 
 
675 See Chapter 3 at 3.5. 
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7.2 Daisy’s Story  
Daisy is 6-years old and lives with her half-brother Joshua who is 1-year old.  Daisy’s 
mother and biological father are divorced and live separately but have shared parental 
responsibility (PR) for Daisy.  Daisy’s mother has re-married and Daisy now has a step-
father who is Joshua’s father.  Daisy also has a close emotional bond with her paternal 
grandparents who she has regular contact with. 
 
Joshua is in need of a bone marrow transplant in order to save his life.  I have not 
specified a jurisdiction because the steps of the donation process are the same in 
England and Wales, and Scotland for this type of donation, the documented procedural 
steps are in a different order.  
 
Step 1: Identify a potential living donor (check histocompatibility) 
This step is performed by the medical professionals, and as part of the process, a number 
of individuals would be tested to check their suitability as a tissue match for Joshua.  
This would include Daisy, Joshua’s parents, and other family members.  Those with PR 
for Daisy, ie her parents, would have provided the consent for her to undergo the 
histocompatibility tests.  Following the histocompatibility tests, it was determined that 
Daisy was the best match to donate bone marrow to Joshua.  Even though Daisy is 
histocompatible, it does not automatically mean that Daisy will donate the tissue, all the 
steps of the donation process need to be met for the donation to proceed. 
  
Step 2: Is the potential donor a minor? 
Yes, Daisy is a minor because she is 6-years old, which is under the age of 18 in England 




Step 3: Is the minor competent to consent to the donation? 
No, Daisy is not competent to consent to the bone marrow donation.  I have previously 
stated that this story applies equally to England and Wales, and Scotland, however, the 
current law in Scotland uses the term authorisation rather than consent.  But I argued 
that the difference between the terms consent and authorisation is superficial as the test 
for informed consent and informed authorisation are identical.  Therefore, it is my 
contention that it would be clearer and more precise if the term consent replaces the 
term authorisation in the Human Tissue (Scotland) Act 2006 in relation to tissue 
donation.  Subsequently, if my recommendation is implemented the term consent would 
be used throughout all donation processes.   
 
Step 4: Gain informed consent from those with PR 
As Daisy is incompetent, those with PR will be able to provide consent on her behalf to 
be a tissue donor if it is deemed to be in her best interests.  I have suggested a reform in 
the body of my thesis to the best interests test, which is set out in italics, and I have 
applied this new test to the circumstances of Daisy: 
 
(a)  the minor’s age and maturity and so far, as practicable: 
(i)  give him [her] an opportunity to indicate whether he[she] wishes 
to express his [her] views; 
Daisy is 6-years old and has limited maturity.  But she should be given the opportunity 
to indicate whether she wants to express her views about the decision.  As I will discuss 
at step 6, Daisy will be interviewed by an Accredited Assessor (AA) which will involve 
them explaining to her about the donation procedure and Joshua’s illness.  She 
understands that she can help Joshua, but this understanding is limited to knowing that 
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she would need time off school, have to stay in hospital, and the procedure would cause 
her pain.     
(ii)  if he [she] does so wish, give him [her] an opportunity to express 
them;  
If Daisy wishes to express her views about the potential donation procedure then she 
should be given an opportunity to do this away from her parents and Joshua.  This may 
be in the presence of medical professionals, her teachers, or her grandparents.  If Daisy 
has a trusting relationship with someone, she may be more open about how she feels.  
This will allow her to ask any questions and express her own views in an independent, 
more-relaxed, informal environment.  Daisy does not have to necessarily express her 
views through verbal communication, but can do this through her actions.  While 
spending time with her grandparents, Daisy drew a picture that showed herself, her 
mum, her step-father, her biological father, and Joshua.  In the picture Joshua is no 
longer ill, and she wrote on the picture that ‘she helped Joshua feel better’.     
(iii)  have regard to such views as he [she] may express; 
When Daisy’s parents are making a decision on her behalf, they should have regard to 
Daisy’s views.  Daisy’s views are that she wants to help Joshua, which involves her 
donating bone marrow, therefore this should be a factor in the decision-making process.   
 
 (b)  the child’s physical, emotional and/or education needs; 
Daisy’s emotional needs involve her seeing her brother recover from his illness and live 
a fairly normal life.  Her physical needs are those related to the potential medical risks 
of the bone marrow donation.  The risks of morbidity of a bone marrow donation are 
low, and there have been no reported deaths.  This criterion also involves the medical 
and emotional support that can be provided to Daisy in order for her to fully recover 
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from the operation.  The medical support would be provided by the NHS, and the 
emotional support by her close family, including her parents and grandparents.     
 
 (c)  the likely effect on the child of any change in his/her circumstances; 
In relation to changes in circumstances, if it was deemed that Daisy was no longer able 
to donate bone marrow to Joshua she would not be considered as a potential tissue 
donor, similarly if Joshua no longer needed a transplant Daisy would not be required to 
donate bone marrow.   
 
(d)  the child’s age, sex, background and any other characteristics, which the 
court considers relevant; 
Daisy is 6-years old and female, there are no other characteristics that are considered 
relevant to take into account in the decision-making process that pertain to bone marrow 
donation.   
 
(e)  any harm which the child has suffered or is at risk of suffering; 
Daisy’s parents will be fully informed about the potential medical risks by medical 
professionals.  The test of information disclosure under Montgomery is that the doctor 
is ‘under a duty to take reasonable care to ensure that the patient is aware of any material 
risks involved in any recommended treatment, and of any reasonable alternative or 
variant treatments.’  The immediate potential medical risks that Daisy would be exposed 
to are minimal with the majority of risks as a result of the anaesthesia.  Daisy would 
need a period of recovery, but there are no reported long-term medical risks.  In these 
circumstances the medical risks posed to Daisy are considered minimal, therefore the 
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risk of harm does not outweigh the other factors considered in the test.  So, the donation 
could take place.     
 
(f)  how capable each of the child’s parents, and any other person in relation 
to whom the court considers the question to be relevant, is of meeting 
his/her needs; 
Daisy’s parents can meet her needs.   
 
(g)  the range of powers available to the court under the Children Act 1989 
in the proceedings in question; 
There are no indications that court intervention is required in this case.  Daisy’s parents 
are in agreement about the decision they are going to make, and no one has raised 
concerns that the bone marrow donation is not in Daisy’s best interests.   
 
Furthermore, I have recommended an additional section that should be incorporated 
into the 1989 Act under Section 1A, set out in italics, and I will apply it to Daisy: 
 
(1) In relation to tissue donation from a living minor, the following 
additional factor must be considered in addition to the best interests test 
as stated in section 1(3): 
 (a) the inclusion of relational parental decision-making. 
In this thesis, I have devised the new and novel principle of relational parental decision-
making.  This means that when those with PR make a decision on behalf of an 
incompetent minor, instead of treating the minor as if they were an isolated being, I 
proposed that the relationships that the minor has with others should be a contributing 
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part of the decision-making.  I provided a list of factors that the decision-maker could 
take into account when considering each relationship.  These are: 
(1) type of relationship 
(2) length of relationship 
(3) potential future interaction (temporary or long-term relationship) 
(4) frequency of interaction 
(5) type of interaction   
 
The relationships that Daisy has are as follows: 
(a) Joshua (the potential recipient)  
(b) Daisy’s biological mother and father 
(c) Daisy’s wider family to include paternal grandparents and step-father 
(d) Daisy’s friends 
 
Taking each relationship in turn and applying it to the five factors: 
(a) Joshua (the potential recipient)  
(1) type of relationship – familial relationship as Joshua is Daisy’s half-
brother.  
(2) length of the relationship – 1-year.   
(3) potential future interaction (temporary or long-term relationship) –  as 
siblings they will be expected to have a familial relationship for a life-
time.  The relationship between Daisy and Joshua is currently a close 
emotional bond, and there is no evidence to suggest that their 
relationship will breakdown in the immediate future.     
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(4) frequency of interaction – Daisy and Joshua interact on a daily basis 
because they live together as part of the family unit.  They also spend 
time apart as Daisy goes to school in the day time and stays with her 
biological father at the weekend.     
(5) type of interaction – they have necessary interactions when they spend 
time with their parents, but they also have voluntary interactions.  Daisy 
enjoys spending time with her brother.  Daisy understands that they have 
the same mother, but have a different father.   
 
This relationship has a positive impact on Daisy, and can be given significant weight in 
the decision-making process.  There is potential for a future emotional relationship 
between them if Joshua survives.  Daisy gets upset about Joshua’s illness and has told 
her parents, grandparents, medical professionals and teachers that she wants Joshua to 
get better.   
 
(b) Daisy’s biological mother and father 
(1) type of relationship – familial relationship. 
(2) length of the relationship with Daisy – 6-years; her parents got divorced 
when she was 3 years old.   
(3) potential future interaction (temporary or long-term relationship) – 
Daisy enjoys spending time with both of her parents.  Daisy’s mother 
and father have an amicable relationship and there is no evidence to 
suggest that Daisy would be prevented from spending time with her 
mother or father in the immediate future.   
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(4) frequency of interaction – Daisy interacts with her mother on a daily 
basis as she lives with her.  Daisy interacts with her father at the weekend 
when she stays at his house.   
(5) type of interaction – Daisy’s relationship is necessary with her mother 
since she lives with her.  Daisy’s relationship with her father is voluntary 
as she has a choice if she wants to spend time with him.  She always 
chooses to see her father, and if she was able to, she would like to spend 
more time with him.   
 
These relationships have a positive impact on Daisy.  Daisy’s father has less of a conflict 
of interest compared to Daisy’s mother since he is not biologically related to Joshua.  
However, Daisy’s father consents for Daisy to undergo the donation procedure.  
Furthermore, Daisy’s father’s house can be used by Daisy as a caring, loving and 
supportive environment away from Joshua, her mother and step-father to help her 
recover from the donation if required or preferred.  Therefore, should Daisy’s mother 
and step-father focus their efforts and attention on Joshua at any point and neglect 
Daisy’s emotional needs, Daisy has an alternative environment to visit which is 
beneficial to Daisy.   
 
(c) Daisy’s wider family  
(1) type of relationship – familial relationship.  Daisy’s wider family include 
her paternal grandparents and step-father.     
(2) length of the relationship –  
Daisy has had a relationship with her grandparents for 6 years.   
Daisy’s relationship with her step-father has been for 2 years.     
256 
 
(3) potential future interaction (temporary or long-term relationship) – 
Daisy’s grandparents are seniors; however, it is likely that they will be 
able to continue to interact with Daisy for many years to come.   
Daisy’s mother and step-father have been together 2 years and are 
married.  Their relationship is good and they intend to stay together, so 
it is likely that her step-father will be involved in Daisy’s life in the 
immediate future.    
(4) frequency of interaction –  
Daisy interacts with her grandparents weekly, and during school 
holidays.   
Daisy interacts with her step-father on a daily basis as they live in the 
same house.   
(5) type of interaction –  
Daisy’s interaction with her grandparents is voluntary as she chooses to 
spend time with them.   
With regard to Daisy’s relationship with her step-father this is necessary 
as she lives with him.  Daisy does not choose to spend time with her 
step-father, it is not voluntary their relationship could be described as 
amicable.   
 
The relationship that Daisy has with her grandparents is positive, she talks to them about 
Joshua and his illness.  They provide an independent, supportive, loving and caring 
environment for Daisy.  They are not biologically related to Joshua and have no contact 
with him; therefore, their primary focus is on Daisy’s interests.  This is beneficial to 
Daisy as it will allow her to communicate freely with her grandparents with no risk of 
257 
 
them pressuring her to undergo the procedure.  But they do not have suitable 
accommodation for her to recover from the donation, if necessary.     
 
In respect of her relationship with her step-father, it is a necessary relationship.  He has 
no impact on the decision being made on behalf of Daisy because he does not have PR 
for her.  The relationship that Daisy has with her grandparents will have greater 
weighting in the decision-making process than her relationship with her step-father.      
 
(d) Daisy’s friends 
(1) type of relationship – societal relationship.  Daisy has a number of 
friends at school.   
(2) length of the relationship – Daisy has been at school for around 1 year.   
(3) potential future interaction (temporary or long-term relationship) – 
friendships can be temporary especially at Daisy’s age.  If Daisy did 
undergo the donation procedure, she will have time off school, but her 
friends would be able to visit her as she is recovering.     
(4) frequency of interaction – Daisy interacts with her friends daily at 
school, and during school holidays.   
(5) type of interaction – this relationship is voluntary.  Daisy chooses to 
spend time with her friends.   
 
While this is a positive relationship for Daisy, it will hold minimal weight in the 
decision-making process.  There is no evidence to suggest that Daisy has told her friends 
about Joshua’s illness or that she will be friends with them for any significant period of 




(2) In relation to tissue donation from a living minor when considering the 
best interests test in section 1(3), the factor under section 1(3)(e) should 
be given the greatest weight. 
In these circumstances, the medical risks posed to Daisy are considered minimal, 
therefore, the risk of harm does not outweigh the other factors considered in the best 
interests test.  So, the donation could take place.   
 
If this scenario was set in Scotland, then those with PR would consider the best interests 
of the minor, but there is no test set out in 1995 Act.  But I have recommended an 
additional section to be included in the 1995 Act under Section 6A, set out in italics: 
 
(1) In relation to tissue donation from a living minor, the following factor 
must be considered when determining whether it is in the minor’s best 
interests to undergo the procedure: 
 (a) the inclusion of relational parental decision-making. 
 
(2) In relation to tissue donation from a living minor when considering their 
best interests the consideration of the harm of the procedure should be 
given the greatest weight.   
 
The application to Daisy is the same as discussed in England and Wales under the 1989 
Act.   
 
In conclusion, taking into account all of the factors in the best interests test which 
includes giving weight to Daisy’s views, and considering the principle of relational 
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parental decision-making requiring her relationships to be examined with Joshua, her 
parents, and her grandparents, it is in Daisy’s best interests to donate bone marrow to 
her brother Joshua.  Therefore, her parents can provide consent on her behalf.  Only the 
consent of either her mother or father is legally required, but both of her parents agree 
with the proposed procedure.   
 
Step 5: Is the tissue non-regenerative or regenerative? 
The tissue that is requested for donation is regenerative tissue as it is bone marrow. 
 
Step 6: AA must interview the donor, the recipient and those with PR for the donor 
As Daisy is donating regenerative tissue the interviews will be undertaken by an AA.  
The AA will interview both Daisy and Joshua separately.  Furthermore, as Daisy is 
incompetent the AA will also interview her biological parents.  As Daisy is 6-years old 
there may be some issues with Daisy’s ability to communicate effectively with the AA.  
However, the AA must attempt to undertake an interview as Daisy is not a baby nor a 
pre-verbal minor.  It is imperative that the interview is undertaken at a level appropriate 
to Daisy’s age and understanding.  Joshua is 1-year old, therefore, is a pre-verbal minor.  
Subsequently, it may be a waste of time and resources for an AA to attempt to undertake 
an interview with him.  Once the interviews have been completed, the AA will write a 
report and submit it to the HTA.  The following matters must be covered in the interview 
report submitted by the AA: 
(a) whether there is any evidence of duress or coercion affecting the decision 
to give consent; 
(b) whether there is any evidence of an offer or a reward; 
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(c) whether there were any difficulties in communicating with the person(s) 
interviewed, and if so, an explanation of how these difficulties were 
overcome.   
 
Following the interview with Daisy’s biological parents, the AA concluded that there is 
no evidence of any duress or coercion affecting their decision-making.  There is no 
evidence of an offer or reward being given to Daisy or Daisy’s parents if she undergoes 
the bone marrow donation.  Any issues with Daisy’s ability to communicate is 
addressed fully in the report.  But it is concluded that she understands that Joshua is ill 
and she will get visibly upset when her mother and step-father discuss it.       
 
Furthermore, the report of the interview with Daisy, as she is the donor, must also 
contain: 
(a) the information given to the person interviewed as to the nature of the 
medical procedure and the risk involved in the removal of the 
transplantable material; 
(b) the full name of the person who gave that information to the person 
interviewed, and their qualification to give it; 
(c) the capacity of the person interviewed to understand the nature of the 
medical procedure, the risk involved and that consent may be withdrawn 
at any time before the removal of the transplantable material.   
 
At the time when Daisy’s parents provided consent on behalf of Daisy, they would have 
been given information about the nature of the tissue donation procedure and the 
medical risks involved in order for the consent to be compliant with the legal test in 
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Montgomery.  The name and qualifications of the medical professional who provided 
this information to Daisy’s parents would be recorded in the report.  Daisy is 
incompetent and, therefore, does not have the ability to fully understand the nature of 
the medical procedure and the risks involved.  However, the procedure and Joshua’s 
illness would have been explained to Daisy in a simple format.    
 
Step 7: Is there HTA approval? 
The HTA would assess the report that has been produced by the AA and ensure that all 
of the regulatory requirements have been met.  In this case, there were no issues 
identified in the interview with the AA and all regulatory steps have been fulfilled, 
therefore, the HTA would give approval for the donation to proceed.      
 
In this case all of the requirements have been fulfilled, therefore, Daisy would be 
allowed to donate bone marrow to Joshua.     
 
7.3 Ryan’s Story 
Ryan is 15-years old and lives with his brother Simon who is 5-years old.  They also 
have an older brother called Anthony who is 21-years old and no longer lives in the 
family home.  Ryan, Simon, and Anthony all share the same biological parents, and 
both parents share PR for Ryan.   
 
Simon is in need of a bone marrow transplant in order to save his life.  I have not 
specified a jurisdiction because the steps of the donation process are largely the same 
in England and Wales, and Scotland for this type of donation, there is just one major 




Step 1: Identify a potential living donor (check histocompatibility) 
This step is performed by the medical professionals, and as part of the process, a number 
of individuals would be tested to check their suitability as a tissue match.  This would 
include Ryan, Ryan’s parents, Anthony, and other family members.  Following the 
histocompatibility tests, it was determined that Ryan was the best match to donate bone 
marrow to Simon.  Even though Ryan is histocompatible, it does not automatically mean 
that he will donate the tissue, all the steps of the donation process need to be met for the 
donation to proceed. 
 
Step 2: Is the potential donor a minor? 
Yes, Ryan is a minor because he is 15-years old, which is under the age of 18 in England 
and Wales, and under 16 in Scotland.  
 
Step 3: Is the minor competent to provide consent? 
I have previously stated that this story applies equally to England and Wales, and 
Scotland, however, the current law in Scotland uses the term authorisation rather than 
consent.  But I argue that the difference between the terms consent and authorisation is 
superficial as the test for informed consent and informed authorisation are identical.  
Therefore, it is my contention that it would be clearer and more precise if the term 
consent replaces the term authorisation in the 2006 Act in relation to tissue donation.  
Subsequently, if my recommendation is implemented the term consent would be used 




Ryan is 15-years old, and in order to be competent he needs to meet the requirements 
under the Gillick competence test or section 2(4) competence test.  I have argued that 
both of the tests should have identical requirements, therefore if he meets these 
requirements, he would be competent in both England and Wales, and Scotland.  For 
Ryan to be competent, he must have an understanding of the moral, family, emotional, 
and long-term implications of the donation, as well as an understanding of the potential 
consequences if he refuses the procedure.  
 
(1) Moral implications of the decision 
Ryan should understand that there is no moral duty to donate to Simon.  But moral 
considerations may form part of Ryan’s reasoning, since his tissue could result in a life-
saving transplant for Simon.  Ryan understands the moral considerations of the decision 
as well as the fact that moral pressures that his parents, Simon, Anthony or the wider 
community may place on him to donate bone marrow.  He needs to disregard any 
intentional or inadvertent pressures placed on him by others when making his decision.   
 
(2) Family implications of the decision 
A factor when determining whether Ryan is competent is his understanding of the 
family implications of the decision.  This includes Ryan’s relationship with his parents, 
Simon, Anthony, and the wider family.  Ryan should be able to discuss his decision 
with his parents, in an environment free from pressure, and raise any concerns he may 
have as well as ask any questions.  His family needs to support him in his decision-
making by providing him with unbiased information.  Ryan’s familial relationships are 




(3) Emotional implications of the decision 
To be competent, Ryan would be required to understand the emotional implications of 
the donation, regardless of whether the donation was successful.  Indeed, if the donation 
was not a success then he may feel guilt or a sense of failure.  Ryan is aware of and 
understands that the donated tissue may fail, be rejected by Simon, or that the original 
cause of the tissue failure may recur and that the outcome is beyond his control.  It is 
not guaranteed that he is able to manage these feelings, but since he understands that 
these feelings may materialise, he may be able to better manage them by asking for 
support.  
 
(4) Long-term implications of the donation 
The long-term implications of a tissue donation are the future medical risks and any 
lifestyle restrictions following it.  In relation to a bone marrow donation there are no 
long-term medical risks or lifestyle restrictions that have been recorded.     
 
(5) Refusal of the procedure  
Ryan understands that if he refuses to donate bone marrow there would be no medical 
impact on him, but it would have an impact on Simon.  Ryan is only expected to 
understand an outline of the impact it would have on Simon and is not expected to 
understand the finer details of Simon’s illness. 
 
Ryan meets all of these requirements as he has a sufficient understanding and 
intelligence to enable him to fully understand what is proposed.  Therefore, the medical 




Step 4: Gain informed consent from the donor 
In order to legally provide consent the test for information disclosure under 
Montgomery needs to be satisfied.  The test under Montgomery is that the doctor is 
‘under a duty to take reasonable care to ensure that the patient is aware of any material 
risks involved in any recommended treatment, and of any reasonable alternative or 
variant treatments.’  Therefore, Ryan would be informed of the immediate and long-
term medical risks of undergoing the bone marrow donation.  The test of materiality is 
‘whether, in the circumstances of the particular case, a reasonable person in the patient’s 
position would be likely to attach significance to the risk, or the doctor is or should 
reasonably be aware that the particular patient would be likely to attach significance to 
it.’  Subsequently the medical professional would be required to inform Ryan of any 
type of medical risks that he is likely to attach particular significance to.   
 
I have argued in the main body of my thesis that the philosophical interpretation of the 
principle of relational autonomy should have a legal application in medical decision-
making, specifically tissue donation from a living minor.  My interpretation of relational 
autonomy is that if an individual makes an autonomous relational decision then that 
decision is made by considering the networks of relationships with others.  In other 
words, for an individual to make a decision they need to take into account their 
relationships with others that underpin their lives, such as familial and societal 
relationships.  I have provided a list of factors that the decision-maker could take into 
account when considering each relationship (see Daisy’s story for the full list).  Ryan’s 
relationships are as follows: 
(a) Simon (the potential recipient)  
(b) Ryan’s mother and father 
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(c) Ryan’s wider family which includes Anthony his brother  
(d) Ryan’s friends 
 
Taking each relationship in turn and applying it to the five factors: 
(a) Simon (potential recipient)   
(1) type of relationship – familial relationship as Simon is Ryan’s brother. 
(2) length of the relationship – 5 years.   
(3) potential future interaction (temporary or long-term relationship) – as 
siblings they will be expected to have a familial relationship for a life-
time.  The relationship between Ryan and Simon is currently a close 
emotional bond, but it should be noted that there is a 10 year age gap 
between the siblings, and Ryan may leave home in the next 3 years for 
university. 
(4) frequency of interaction – Ryan and Simon interact on a daily basis 
because they live together.   
(5) type of interaction – they have necessary interactions when they spend 
time with their parents, but they also have voluntary interaction.  Ryan 
enjoys spending time with his brother.  Ryan uses his pocket money to 
buy Simon gifts.   
 
This relationship has a positive impact on Ryan, and should be given significant weight 
in his decision-making.  Ryan requested that he was tested to see if he was 
histocompatible, and he has spent time researching Simon’s illness on the internet.  
Ryan is very concerned about Simon and wants to ensure he recovers from this illness.  
However, Ryan is also aware that recovery is not definite.   
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(b) Ryan’s mother and father 
(1) type of relationship – familial relationship.  
(2) length of the relationship with Ryan –15 years.    
(3) potential future interaction (temporary or long-term relationship) – Ryan 
enjoys spending time with both of his parents, together and separately.  
He has a close emotional relationship with them both, and there is no 
evidence to suggest that this relationship would change in the future, 
even if he were to leave the family home.   
(4) frequency of interaction – Ryan interacts with his parents on a daily 
basis.   
(5) type of interaction – Ryan’s interaction with his parents is both necessary 
and voluntary.  It is necessary because he lives with his parents, but he 
voluntarily chooses to spend time with them at the weekend and goes on 
holiday.   
 
This is a positive relationship for Ryan.  While his parents have strongly suggested to 
Ryan that he should consider donating to Simon because they do not want to see Simon 
die, they understand that it is Ryan’s decision.  They have provided a supportive 
environment for him to discuss the procedure with them and have stated that they will 
support Ryan, regardless of the decision he makes, and ensure that he successfully 
recovers physically if he undergoes the procedure.  This relationship will have 
significant weight in the decision-making procedure, but Ryan should not allow any 





(c) Ryan’s wider family  
(1) type of relationship – familial relationship.  The only other familial 
relationship that Ryan has is with his older brother Anthony who no 
longer lives at home.   
(2) length of the relationship –15 years.   
(3) potential future interaction (temporary or long-term relationship) – 
Anthony has not lived at home for 5 years, but Ryan continues to have a 
close emotional relationship with him.  It is likely that this relationship 
will continue as Ryan gets older, but this is not guaranteed.  There is 
always a risk that their relationship will breakdown, however, there is no 
evidence to suggest this will happen in the immediate future. 
(4) frequency of interaction – Ryan interacts with Anthony at family events 
and visits him on a weekly basis.   
(5) type of interaction – the interaction at family events is necessary, 
however, Ryan and Anthony voluntarily spend time together. 
 
This relationship has a positive impact on Ryan.  Ryan has spoken to Anthony about 
Simon’s illness and the decision he has to make.  Anthony also provides an environment 
where Ryan can stay if he needed space away from his parents and Simon either when 
making his decision, or to aid his recovery from the donation which is beneficial to 
Ryan.  However, Anthony lives in rented accommodation and works office hours.    
 
(d) Ryan’s friends  
(1) type of relationship – societal relationship.  Ryan has a number of friends 
at school as well as at sporting clubs.   
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(2) length of the relationship – these friendships differ in length of time from 
a few months to a number of years. 
(3) potential future interaction (temporary or long-term relationship) – some 
of these friendships will be temporary, but other friendships may last 
longer.  If Ryan underwent the bone marrow donation, then he would be 
required to have time off school, and not be able to participate in sport 
for a short period of time while he recovers, but he will still continue to 
be able to interact with his friends over social media.  Ryan plays rugby 
for his school and if donation takes place during the rugby season he may 
not be able to participate.    
(4) frequency of interaction – Ryan interacts with his friends on a daily 
basis.  He sees them at school, and interacts with them over social media 
in the evenings and at weekends.   
(5) type of interaction – Ryan’s interactions with his friends are voluntary 
because he chooses to spend time with them. 
 
These friendships are positive relationships for Ryan.  Ryan’s close friends can provide 
a supportive environment for him to discuss Simon’s illness and his decision as to 
whether to donate.  However, these relationships are unlikely to carry much weight in 
the decision-making process.  He will continue to be able to interact with his friends 
online during the donation process, and they would be able to visit him in hospital or at 
home while he recovers.   
 
Ryan would take a number of factors into account in the decision-making process, 
including all of these relationships, but he will give greater weight to his relationship 
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with Simon, Anthony, and his parents.  Ryan has decided that he wants to provide 
consent to donate bone marrow to Simon.    
 
If Ryan’s parents did not want Ryan to undergo the bone marrow donation, for instance 
they wanted Simon to receive tissue from another donor, it is my argument that those 
with PR should not be permitted to override a competent minor’s consent. This is 
because those with PR hold their power as agents or trustees on behalf of the minor until 
they are mature enough to begin to make decisions for themselves.  Therefore, I suggest 
that even if Ryan’s parents disagreed with his decision, because Ryan is competent his 
decision should be respected by his parents.     
 
Step 5: Is the tissue non-regenerative or regenerative? 
The tissue that is potentially being donated is regenerative tissue as it is bone marrow. 
 
Step 6: An AA must interview the potential donor and recipient 
As Ryan is potentially donating regenerative tissue the interviews will be undertaken 
by an AA.  The AA will interview both Ryan and Simon separately.  As Simon is 5-
years old there may be some issues with Simon’s ability to communicate effectively 
with the AA.  However, the AA must attempt to undertake an interview as Simon is not 
a baby nor a pre-verbal minor.  It is imperative that the interview is undertaken at a level 
appropriate to Simon’s age and understanding.  Once both interviews have been 
completed, the AA will write a report and submit that to the HTA.  The following 
matters must be covered in the report submitted by the AA: 
(a) whether there is any evidence of duress or coercion affecting the decision 
to give consent; 
271 
 
(b) whether there is any evidence of an offer or a reward; 
(c) whether there were any difficulties in communicating with the person 
interviewed, and if so, an explanation of how these difficulties were 
overcome.   
 
In relation to Ryan’s decision-making there is no evidence of any duress or coercion 
affecting his decision.  He has identified pressures that have been placed on him by 
Simon and his parents, but has attempted to ensure that they do not influence his 
decision.  His parents have acknowledged that it is solely for Ryan to make the decision. 
There is no offer or reward should he decide to donate his tissue.  There are no 
difficulties with his ability to communicate.   
 
Furthermore, the report of the interview with Ryan, as he is the donor, must also contain: 
(a) the information given to the person interviewed as to the nature of the 
medical procedure and the risk involved in the removal of the 
transplantable material; 
(b) the full name of the person who gave that information to the person 
interviewed, and their qualification to give it; 
(c) the capacity of the person interviewed to understand the nature of the 
medical procedure, the risk involved and that consent may be withdrawn 
at any time before the removal of the transplantable material.   
 
Ryan will have been provided with information about the nature of the tissue donation 
and the risks involved in order for his consent to be legally valid and in compliance with 
Montgomery.  The name and qualifications of the medical professional who provided 
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this information to Ryan would be recorded in the report.  Ryan is Gillick and section 
2(4) competent as he has the ability to understand the nature of the medical procedure 
and the risks involved.  He will also need to be aware that at any point before the bone 
marrow is removed from his body, he can withdraw his consent.   
 
Step 7: Is there HTA approval? 
As Ryan is a competent minor donating regenerative tissue this step would not be 
required in England and Wales, but it would be a requirement in Scotland.  However, it 
is my contention that where a competent minor is going to donate regenerative tissue 
there should be HTA approval to ensure that appropriate safeguards are in place.  They 
would also ensure that all regulatory requirements have been fulfilled, so the minor 
donor’s interests are sufficiently protected to prevent their exploitation.  If this 
recommendation was implemented in England and Wales, the HTA would assess the 
report that had been produced by the AA to ensure that all of the regulatory requirements 
had been met.  In this case, there were no issues identified in the interview with the AA 
and all regulatory steps have been fulfilled, therefore, the HTA would provide approval 
for the donation to proceed.      
 
In this case all of the requirements have been fulfilled, therefore, Ryan would be 
allowed to donate bone marrow to Simon.     
 
7.4 Victoria’s Story 
Victoria is 17-years old and lives with her younger brother Ben who is 2-years old.  
They live with their biological parents.  Victoria has a twin sister called Jessica who no 
longer lives in the family home.  Victoria has a boyfriend, James, who she has been in 
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a relationship with for 3 years.  Victoria is in further education and works part-time at 
the weekend and evenings in retail.   
 
Jessica is in need of a bone marrow transplant in order to save her life.  This story is set 
in England and Wales because Victoria would be considered an adult in Scotland, so 
the adult regulatory framework would apply.   
 
Step 1: Identify a potential living donor (check histocompatibility) 
This step is performed by the medical professionals, and as part of the process, a number 
of individuals would be tested to check their suitability as a tissue match.  This would 
include Jessica, Victoria’s parents, Ben, and other family members.  Following the 
histocompatibility tests, it was determined that Victoria was the best match to donate 
bone marrow to Jessica, her twin.  Even though Victoria is histocompatible, it does not 
automatically mean that she will donate the tissue, all the steps of the donation process 
need to be met for the donation to proceed. 
 
Step 2: Is the potential donor a minor? 
Yes, Victoria is a minor because she is 17-years old, which is under the age of 18 in 
England and Wales. 
 
Step 3: Is the minor competent to consent to the donation? 
Victoria is assumed to have capacity under section 1(2) of the Mental Capacity Act 
2005.  There are no concerns about Victoria’s capacity under section 3(1) as she is able 
to understand the information relevant to the tissue donation decision; to retain that 
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information; to use or weigh that information as part of the process of making the 
decision about tissue donation; and to communicate her decision. 
 
Even though Victoria is assumed to have capacity under the 2005 Act, it does not 
automatically result in her being able to provide consent to be a tissue donor for Jessica.  
The requirements under section 8 of the Family Law Reform Act 1969 need to be 
fulfilled which are that Victoria can consent to ‘any surgical, medical, or dental 
treatment’.  Section 8 uses the term ‘treatment’ and while the literal interpretation of 
treatment does not incorporate tissue donation, it is my contention that section 8 should 
be given a broad interpretation.  Therefore, a bone marrow donation would fall under 
‘surgical, medical, or dental treatment’, so the requirements under the 2005 Act and 
section 8 have been met.        
 
Step 4: Gain informed consent from the donor 
In order for Victoria to provide legally valid consent the test for information disclosure 
under Montgomery needs to be satisfied.  The test of information disclosure under 
Montgomery has been covered in step 4 of Ryan’s story.  Victoria would be informed 
of the immediate and long-term medical risks of undergoing the bone marrow donation.  
Also, the medical professional would be required to inform Victoria of any type of 
medical risks that she is likely to attach particular significance to.   
 
I have argued that the philosophical interpretation of the principle of relational 
autonomy should have a legal application in medical decision-making, specifically 
tissue donation from a living minor.  My interpretation of relational autonomy is that if 
an individual makes an autonomous relational decision then that decision is made by 
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considering the networks of relationships with others.  In other words, for an individual 
to make a decision they need to take into account their relationships with others that 
underpin their lives, such as familial and societal relationships.  I have provided a list 
of factors that the decision-maker could take into account when considering each 
relationship (see Daisy’s story for the full list).  Victoria’s relationships are as follows: 
(a) Jessica (the potential recipient) – twin sister 
(b) Victoria’s mother and father 
(c) Victoria’s wider family including Ben  
(d) Victoria’s employer and colleagues 
(e) Victoria’s friends 
 
Taking each relationship in turn and applying it to the five factors: 
(a) Jessica (potential recipient)   
(1) type of relationship – familial relationship as Victoria and Jessica are 
twin sisters.  
(2) length of the relationship – 17 years.   
(3) potential future interaction (temporary or long-term relationship) – as 
siblings they will be expected to have a familial relationship for a life-
time.  However, Victoria and Jessica do not have a close emotional bond 
and it is unlikely that they will have any future interaction when they are 
adults.   
(4) frequency of interaction – as Jessica no longer lives at home, they have 
minimal interaction.  They are forced to spend time together at family 
events.   
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(5) type of interaction – they have necessary interactions at family events.  
There are no voluntary interactions. 
     
This relationship has a negative impact on Victoria.  Even though they are twins, 
Victoria does not currently have a close emotional bond with Jessica, and there are no 
signs that this relationship will change.  Their parents are aware of this position.  
Therefore, this strained relationship should carry weight in the decision-making process 
since Victoria would be medically harming herself to benefit Jessica who she has no 
meaningful relationship with.   
 
(b) Victoria’s mother and father 
(1) type of relationship – familial relationship.   
(2) length of the relationship with Victoria – 17 years.   
(3) potential future interaction (temporary or long-term relationship) – 
Victoria has an amicable relationship with her parents.  She currently 
lives with her parents, but it is expected she will start university next 
year, and she will move into university accommodation.   
(4) frequency of interaction – Victoria interacts with them on a daily basis 
because she lives with them.   
(5) type of interaction – this is a necessary interaction.  Victoria does not 
voluntarily choose to spend time with her parents.   
 
This relationship has a negative impact on Victoria.  Her parents are putting a lot of 
pressure on her to donate, and are asking her to leave the family home if she refuses to 
donate.  However, Victoria is attempting to ignore this pressure and maintains that her 
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decision is that she does not want to donate bone marrow to her sister.  This relationship 
should have considerable weight in Victoria’s decision-making.  There is a real risk that 
Victoria will lose her relationship with her parents if she refuses to donate bone marrow, 
but since she currently has little or no close emotional relationship with her parents, this 
does not concern her.   
 
(c) Victoria’s wider family 
(1) type of relationship – familial relationship.  The only other notable 
familial relationship that Victoria has is with her younger brother Ben.  
(2) length of the relationship – 2 years.   
(3) potential future interaction (temporary or long-term relationship) – as 
siblings they will be expected to have a familial relationship for a life-
time.  However, there is a risk that this relationship will breakdown when 
Victoria goes to university next year.  Furthermore, there is a 15 year age 
gap between the siblings.     
(4) frequency of interaction – Victoria interacts with Ben on a daily basis 
because they live together.   
(5) type of interaction – the interactions are both necessary and voluntary.  
The interaction is necessary as it is part of the living arrangements; 
however, Victoria chooses to spend time with Ben.  She babysits him, 
picks him up from nursery, and takes him to the park. 
 
Victoria is aware that this relationship is not likely to be a significant relationship in the 
future.  If Victoria’s parents request her to leave then it is likely that her relationship 
with Ben will also disappear since she will no longer have necessary interaction, and it 
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is unlikely that her parents would permit her to have voluntary interaction.  In addition, 
Victoria is leaving for university next year.  
 
(d) Victoria’s employer and colleagues 
(1) type of relationship – societal relationship.   
(2) length of the relationship – Victoria has had a job for around 12 months, 
it is a part-time job.   
(3) potential future interaction (temporary or long-term relationship) – this 
employment will only last for around another 12 months, as she will 
resign when she goes to university.  Victoria uses her employment so 
she can be self-sufficient, she also makes a financial contribution to the 
household.   
(4) frequency of interaction – Victoria interacts with her employer and 
colleagues at weekends and evenings.   
(5) type of interaction – the interaction is necessary as Victoria does not 
choose to spend time with her employer or colleagues outside of work.   
 
This relationship will have minimal weight in Victoria’s decision-making.  Victoria will 
need time off work to undergo the procedure.  At the moment, Victoria has not informed 
her employer or colleagues that Jessica is ill because she does not intend to undergo the 
donation. 
 
(e) Victoria’s friends  
(1) type of relationship – societal relationship.  Victoria is insular but has a 
boyfriend.   
(2) length of the relationship – 3 years.   
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(3) potential future interaction (temporary or long-term relationship) – 
Victoria intends to remain in a relationship with James, but this is not 
guaranteed.  Victoria and James will likely study at the same university 
next year and intend to live together.  If Victoria underwent the donation 
procedure then James could visit her when she recovers and they could 
continue to interact over social media.   
(4) frequency of interaction – they interact daily, and they stay overnight at 
each other’s houses.   
(5) type of interaction – this relationship is voluntary; Victoria chooses to 
have a close relationship with James.   
 
This relationship has a positive impact on Victoria as she has been able to speak to 
James about the decision she intends to make, and he has provided a supportive 
environment for her away from the pressures of her family.  She also has the opportunity 
to stay at James’s house if her parents request that she leaves the family home for 
refusing to donate to Jessica.  This relationship is likely to have significant weight in 
Victoria’s decision-making due to their close loving relationship.     
 
Victoria will take into account a number of factors when making a decision, which 
includes her relationships with others, particularly Jessica.  Victoria has decided that 
she does not want to consent to donate bone marrow to Jessica.  As Victoria has capacity 
to make this decision, I suggest that it should not be overridden by her parents or the 
court.  If this matter subsequently went to court, it is likely that the court would take a 
pragmatic approach, and it is unlikely that the court would force Victoria to donate.  Nor 
should the court conclude that she lacks capacity to make a decision merely because 
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they disagree with her decision.  Her relational autonomous decision should be 
respected by others, even if this results in Jessica not being able to receive life-saving 
bone marrow.   
 
Step 5: Is the tissue non-regenerative or regenerative? 
The tissue that is potentially being donated is regenerative tissue as it is bone marrow. 
 
Step 6: An AA must interview the potential donor and recipient separately 
As Victoria has not provided consent to be a tissue donor the donation process would 
stop and no interview would be undertaken by an AA.  If, on the other hand, Victoria 
did provide consent, then the AA interviews would take the form of those discussed in 
Ryan’s story.     
 
Step 7: Is there HTA approval? 
Currently in England and Wales, this step is not part of the donation process.  However, 
it is my contention that where a competent minor is going to donate regenerative tissue 
there should be HTA approval to ensure that appropriate safeguards are in place.  The 
HTA would also ensure that all regulatory requirements have been fulfilled, so the 
minor donor’s interests are sufficiently protected to prevent their exploitation.  If this 
recommendation was implemented in England and Wales, the HTA would assess the 
report that has been produced by the AA to ensure that all of the regulatory requirements 




In this case, as Victoria has not provided consent to the bone marrow donation, and no 
AA interview has been undertaken, if the HTA were involved in this process they would 
not give approval for the donation to proceed.      
 
The donation process fails at step 4, therefore, Victoria would not donate bone marrow 
to Jessica.     
 
7.5 Concluding thoughts 
These three stories have demonstrated how my recommendations of reform and/or 
clarification of the current regulatory framework would apply in practice.  I suggest that 
these reforms would provide additional safeguards to protect the minor donor’s interests 
subsequently reducing the potential risk of their exploitation.  As donation medicine 
advances, the continual assessment of its regulatory framework is imperative to ensure 
that it robust and not subject to misinterpretation.  I hope that this thesis contributes to 
the ongoing discussion about how best to treat minors who donate tissue to a sibling, 
and that medical professionals, families and recipients, as well as policy-makers and 
professional bodies will find this contribution to the literature to be useful in considering 











Section 17 of the Human Tissue (Scotland) Act 2006 
 
17 Restrictions on transplants involving live donor 
 (1) Subject to subsections (3) to (5) and (8), a person commits an offence- 
  (a) if- 
(i) the person removes an organ, part of an organ, or any 
tissue from the body of a living child intending that it be 
used for transplantation; and  
(ii)  when the person removes the organ, part or tissue, the 
person knows, or might reasonably be expected to know, 
that the other person from whose body the person 
removes it is a living child; 
(b)  if— 
(i)  the person removes an organ or part of an organ from the 
body of a living adult intending that it be used for 
transplantation; and 
(ii)  when the person removes the organ or part, the person 
knows, or might reasonably be expected to know, that the 
adult from whose body the person removes it is alive; or 
(c)  if— 
(i)  the person removes any tissue from the body of a living 




(ii)  when the person removes the tissue the person knows, or 
might reasonably be expected to know, that the adult 
from whose body the person removes it is alive and an 
adult with incapacity. 
(2)  Subject to subsections (3) to (5) and (8), a person commits an offence— 
(a)  if— 
(i)  the person uses for transplantation an organ, part 
of an organ or any tissue which has come from the 
body of a living child; and 
(ii)  when the person does so, the person knows, or 
might reasonably be expected to know, that it has 
come from the body of a living child; 
(b)  if— 
(i)  the person uses for transplantation an organ or 
part of an organ which has come from the body of 
a living adult; and 
(ii)  when the person does so, the person knows, or 
might reasonably be expected to know, that it has 
come from the body of a living adult; or 
(c)  if— 
(i)  the person uses for transplantation any tissue 
which has come from the body of a living adult 
with incapacity; and 
(ii)  when the person does so, the person knows, or 
might reasonably be expected to know, that it has 
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come from the body of a living adult with 
incapacity. 
(3)  The Scottish Ministers may by regulations provide that subsection (1)(b) 
or (2)(b) does not apply in a case where— 
(a)  the Ministers are satisfied that— 
(i)  no reward has been or is to be given in 
contravention of section 20; and 
(ii)  such other conditions as may be specified in the 
regulations are satisfied; and 
(b)  such other requirements as may be specified in the 
regulations are complied with. 
(4)  The Scottish Ministers may by regulations provide that subsection (1)(a) 
or (c) or (2)(a) or (c) does not apply in a case where— 
(a)  a person— 
(i)  removes regenerative tissue; or 
(ii)  uses such tissue; 
(b)  the Ministers are satisfied that— 
(i)  no reward has been or is to be given in 
contravention of section 20; 
(ii)  such other conditions, as may be specified in the 
regulations are satisfied; and 
(c)  such other requirements as may be specified in the 
regulations are complied with. 
(5)  The Scottish Ministers may by regulations provide that subsection (1)(a) 
or (b) or (2)(a) or (b) does not apply in a case where— 
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(a)  a person— 
(i)  removes an organ or part of an organ as described 
in subsection (6); or 
(ii)  uses such an organ or part so removed; 
(b)  the Ministers are satisfied that— 
(i)  no reward has been or is to be given in 
contravention of section 20; 
(ii)  such other conditions, as may be specified in the 
regulations are satisfied; and 
(c)  such other requirements as may be specified in the 
regulations are complied with. 
(6) The organ or part of an organ is one that— 
(a)  during a domino organ transplant operation, is 
necessarily removed from— 
(i)  a child; or 
(ii)  an adult with incapacity; and 
(b)  is in turn intended to be used for transplantation in respect 
of another living person. 
(7)  Regulations under subsection (3), (4) or (5) must include provision as to 
appeals against decisions made in relation to matters which fall to be 
decided under the regulations. 
(8)  Where under— 
(a)  subsection (3) an exception from subsection (1)(b) or (2)(b) is in 
force, a person does not commit an offence under subsection 
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(1)(b) or, as the case may be, (2)(b) if the person reasonably 
believes that the exception applies; 
(b)  subsection (4) an exception from subsection (1)(a) or (c) or (2)(a) 
or (c) is in force, a person does not commit an offence under 
subsection (1)(a) or (c) or (2)(a) or (c), as the case may be, if the 
person reasonably believes that the exception applies; 
(c)  subsection (5) an exception from subsection (1)(a) or (b) or (2)(a) 
or (b) is in force, a person does not commit an offence under 
subsection (1)(a) or (b) or (2)(a) or (b), as the case may be, if the 
person reasonably believes that the exception applies. 
(9)  A person guilty of an offence under this section is liable on summary 
conviction to— 
(a)  imprisonment for a term not exceeding 12 months; 
(b)  a fine not exceeding level 5 on the standard scale; or 
(c)  both. 
(10)  In this section— 
“adult with incapacity” is— 
(a)  for the purposes of subsections (1)(c) and (2)(c), an adult to 
whom section 18 applies; 
(b)  for the purposes of subsection (6)(a)(ii), an adult in respect of 
whom section 47 of the Adults with Incapacity (Scotland) Act 
2000 (asp 4) applies in relation to the domino organ transplant 
operation in question; 
“domino organ transplant operation” means a transplant operation 
performed on a living person by a registered medical practitioner— 
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(a)  which is designed to safeguard or promote the physical health of 
the person by transplanting organs or parts of organs into the 
person; and 
(b)  by so doing, necessitates the removal of an organ or part of an 
organ from the person which in turn is intended to be used for 
transplantation in respect of another living person; 
“regenerative tissue” means tissue which is able to be replaced in the 
body of a living person by natural processes if the tissue is injured or 
removed; 
“reward” means any description of financial or other material advantage, 
but does not include any payment in money or money's worth for 
defraying or reimbursing— 
(a)  the cost of removing, transporting, preparing, preserving or 
storing the organ (or part) or tissue; 
(b)  any liability incurred in respect of expenses incurred by a third 
party in, or in connection with, any of the activities referred to in 
paragraph (a); 
(c)  any expenses or loss of earnings incurred by the person from 
whose body the organ (or part) or tissue comes so far as 
reasonably and directly attributable to the person's supplying it 










676 Jan Styczynski and others, ‘Risk of complications during hematopoietic stem cell collection in 
pediatric sibling donors: a prospective European Group for Blood and Marrow Transplantation Pediatric 
Diseases Working Party study, (2012) 119(12) Blood 2935, 2938. 
677 Styczynski (n 677) 2938. 
678 Styczynski (n 677) 2938. 
679 Styczynski (n 677) 2938; Tachycardia is a condition where your heart suddenly beats much faster than 
normal.  A normal resting heart rate is 60 to 100 beats per minute.  But with tachycardia your heart rate 
suddenly goes above 100 bpm; NHS Choices, ‘Supraventricular tachycardia’ 
<https://www.nhs.uk/conditions/supraventricular-tachycardia-svt/> accessed 08/07/2018. 
680 Styczynski (n 677) 2938; Bradycardia is a condition where your heart suddenly beats more slowly 
than normal.  A normal resting heart rate is 60 to 100 beats per minute.  But with bradycardia your heart 
rate is below 60 bpm; NHS Choices, ‘Heart Block’ <https://www.nhs.uk/conditions/heart-block/> 
accessed 09/07/2018. 
Type of Morbidity Risk of it Occurring (%) 
Vomiting676 11.8 
Sore throat677 7.1 






Risks of Morbidity for a Kidney Donation 
Type of Morbidity Risk of it Occurring (%) 
Hypertension681 30 
Large amounts of protein in the urine682 11-45 
Hernia683 0.6 
End Stage Renal Disease (ESRD)684 0.38-0.5 
Chronic disabling pain685 12 





681 Kidney Research UK, ‘Living with one kidney’ <http://www.kidneyresearchuk.org/health-
information/living-with-one-kidney> accessed 28/01/2018; British Transplantation Society, Guidelines 
for Living Donor Kidney Transplantation (2018) 90 and 92; Kidney Link, ‘Risks Involved in Living 
Donation’ <http://www.kidneylink.org/RisksInvolvedinLivingDonation.aspx> accessed 15/07/2018; 
Hassan N Ibrahim and others, ‘Long-term consequences of kidney donation’ (2009) 360 New England 
Journal of Medicine 459; Hypertension is high blood pressure which if untreated increases your risk of 
serious problems such as heart attacks or strokes; NHS Choices, ‘High Blood Pressure’ 
<https://www.nhs.uk/conditions/high-blood-pressure-hypertension/> accessed 11/07/2018. 
682 This large variation mainly depends on the criteria used to define proteinuria; Claudia Ponticelli and 
others, ‘Proteinuria after kidney transplantation’ (2012) 25(9) Transplantation International 909; People 
with proteinuria have urine containing an abnormal amount of protein.  The condition is often a sign of 
kidney disease.  Healthy kidneys do not allow a significant amount of protein to pass through their filters.  
But damaged filters may let proteins leak from the blood into the urine; Web MD, ‘Protein in Urine’ 
<https://www.webmd.com/a-to-z-guides/proteinuria-protein-in-urine> accessed 11/07/2018. 
683 Michael Siebels and others, ‘Risks and complications in 160 living kidney donors who underwent 
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Choices, ‘Hernia’ <https://www.nhs.uk/conditions/hernia/> accessed 11/07/2018. 
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311 Journal of the American Medical Association 579; ESRD is the failure of the remaining kidney. 
685 Margaret Owen and others, ‘Chronic pain following donor nephrectomy – a study of incidence, nature 
and impact of chronic post nephrectomy pain’ (2010) 14 European Journal of Pain 732. 
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Neuropathic Pain’ <https://www.healthline.com/health/neuropathic-pain> accessed 11/07/2018; 
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‘Neuropathic Pain Management <https://www.webmd.com/pain-management/guide/neuropathic-




Risks of Morbidity for a Lobe of Liver Donation 
 
687 British Transplantation Society (n 682); A small hole anywhere along the bile ducts can cause bile to 
leak into the abdominal cavity.  Bile is a digestive fluid produced by the liver and stored in the gallbladder 
and is used by the body to break down fats so they can be absorbed; Michigan Medicine, ‘Bile Duct 
Leaks’ <https://www.uofmhealth.org/conditions-treatments/digestive-and-liver-health/bile-duct-leaks> 
accessed 11/07/2018. 
688 British Transplantation Society (n 682); A bile duct stricture is an abnormal narrowing of the common 
bile duct, the tube that moves bile from the liver to the small intestine; Medline Plus, ‘Bile duct stricture’ 
<https://medlineplus.gov/ency/article/000220.htm> accessed 11/07/2018. 
689 British Transplantation Society (n 682); An incisional hernia is a hernia that occurs through a 
previously made incision in the abdominal wall, ie the scar left from a previous surgical operation; The 
British Hernia Centre, ‘Incisional Hernia’ <https://www.hernia.org/types/incisional-hernia/> accessed 
11/07/2018. 
690 British Transplantation Society (n 682); An intestinal obstruction occurs when food or stool cannot 
move through the intestines.  The obstruction can be complete or partial; Medline Plus, ‘Intestinal 
Obstruction’ <https://medlineplus.gov/intestinalobstruction.html> accessed 11/07/18. 
691 Thrombosis is a blood clot that develops within a deep vein in the body.  It can cause pain and swelling 
in the leg and may lead to complications such as pulmonary embolism; NHS Choices, ‘Deep Vein 
Thrombosis’ <https://www.nhs.uk/conditions/deep-vein-thrombosis-dvt/> accessed 09/07/2018; A 
pulmonary embolism is a blocked blood vessel in your lungs.  It can be life-threatening if not treated 
quickly; NHS Choices, ‘Pulmonary Embolism’ <https://www.nhs.uk/conditions/pulmonary-embolism/> 
accessed 09/07/2018.  
692 NHS Choices ‘Pulmonary Embolism’ (n 692).  
693 British Transplantation Society (n 682). 
694 Portal vein thrombosis (PVT) is a blood clot of the portal vein, also known as the hepatic portal vein.  
This vein allows blood to flow from the intestines to the liver.  A PVT blocks this blood flow; Healthline, 
‘Portal Vein Thrombosis’ <https://www.healthline.com/health/portal-vein-thrombosis> accessed 
11/07/18. 
Type of Morbidity Risk of it Occurring (%) 
Biliary leak687 8.1 
Biliary stricture688 0.6 
Incisional hernia689 6.6 
Bowel obstruction690 1.6 
Deep vein thrombosis691 0.8 
Pulmonary embolism692 0.9 
Infections693 13.2 
Hepatic artery thrombosis/Portal vein 
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